Imperfect Mobility of Labor Across Sectors A Reappraisal of the Balassa-Samuelson Effect by Cardi, Olivier & Restout, Romain
Imperfect Mobility of Labor Across Sectors A
Reappraisal of the Balassa-Samuelson Effect
Olivier Cardi, Romain Restout
To cite this version:
Olivier Cardi, Romain Restout. Imperfect Mobility of Labor Across Sectors A Reappraisal of
the Balassa-Samuelson Effect. 2015. <halshs-01252478>
HAL Id: halshs-01252478
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01252478
Submitted on 7 Jan 2016
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Document de Recherche du Laboratoire d’Économie d’Orléans 
 
DR LEO 2015-19 
Imperfect Mobility of Labor Across Sectors 
A Reappraisal of the 
Balassa-Samuelson Effect 
 
 
 
 
 
Olivier CARDI 
Romain RESTOUT 
 
Laboratoire d’Économie d’Orléans 
Collegium DEG 
Rue de Blois - BP 26739 
45067 Orléans Cedex 2 
Tél. : (33) (0)2 38 41 70 37 
e-mail : leo@univ-orleans.fr 
www.leo-univ-orleans.fr/ 
IMPERFECT MOBILITY OF LABOR ACROSS
SECTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF THE
BALASSA-SAMUELSON EFFECT∗
Olivier CARDI†
Universite´ de Tours LEO (CNRS UMR 7322)
Universite´ de Paris 2 CRED
Romain RESTOUT‡
Universite´ de Lorraine BETA (CNRS UMR 7522)
Universite´ catholique de Louvain IRES
Abstract
This paper investigates the relative price and relative wage effects of a higher produc-
tivity in the traded sector compared with the non traded sector in a two-sector open econ-
omy model with imperfect substitutability in hours worked across sectors. The Balassa-
Samuelson [1964] model predicts that a rise in the sectoral productivity ratio by 1% raises
the relative price of non tradables by 1% while leaving the non traded wage-traded wage
ratio unchanged. Applying cointegration methods to a panel of fourteen OECD countries
over the period 1970-2007, our estimates show that the relative price rises by only 0.78%
and the relative wage falls by 0.27%. While our first set of empirical findings cast doubt
on the quantitative predictions of the Balassa-Samuelson model, our second set of evi-
dence highlights the role of imperfect labor mobility: the relative price responds more to
a productivity differential between tradables and non tradables while the reaction of the
relative wage is more muted in countries with higher intersectoral reallocation of labor. We
show that the ability of the two-sector model to account for our evidence quantitatively
relies upon two ingredients: i) imperfect mobility of labor across sectors, and ii) physical
capital accumulation. Finally, our numerical results reveal that the model predicts the
relative price response fairly well, and to a lesser extent the relative wage response.
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1 Introduction
One of the strongest relationships established in the empirical macroeconomic literature is
the positive correlation between the price of non traded goods in terms of traded goods and
relative productivity in the traded and non traded sectors, see e.g., De Gregorio et al. [1994],
Canzoneri et al. [1999], Kakkar [2003], Lane and Milesi-Ferretti [2002]. Balassa [1964] and
Samuelson [1964] have provided the benchmark setup to explain the movements in the long
run of the relative price of non tradables in terms of the productivity differential between
tradables and non tradables. Quantitatively, the Balassa-Samuelson (BS hereafter) model
predicts that a rise by 1% in productivity in the traded sector relative to productivity in the
non traded sector raises the relative price of non tradables by the same amount while leaving
the ratio of the non traded wage to the traded wage (relative wage hereafter) unchanged,
due to the assumption of perfect mobility of labor across sectors. However, using a panel of
14 OECD countries over the period 1970-2007, our empirical estimates cast doubt on these
predictions as the relative price increases by less than 1% while the relative wage falls. We
find that theory can be reconciled with evidence once we consider imperfect mobility of labor
across sectors and allow for physical capital accumulation.
While the analysis of the consequences of a productivity differential between tradables
and non tradables has recently received growing attention in the literature, all studies assume
that wages equalize across sectors, see e.g., Bergin et al. [2006], Ghironi and Melitz [2005],
Mejean [2008]. More precisely, these studies focus on the real exchange rate by analyzing the
implications of entry and exit of firms and/or heterogeneous productivity, allowing for wages
to vary across countries instead of across sectors.1 Applying panel unit root tests, we find that
the ratio of sectoral wages is integrated of order one, thus revealing that the relative wage
is non stationary and invalidating the hypothesis of (long-run) wage equalization between
the traded and non traded sectors imposed in the literature.2 Our analysis complements the
papers mentioned above by focusing mainly on the movements in the relative price of non
tradables, departing from the wage equalization hypothesis. To our knowledge, our paper is
the first attempt to address quantitatively the long-run relative price of non-tradables and
relative wage responses to higher productivity growth in tradables relative to non tradables.3
1In the new literature analyzing the BS effect, the appreciation in domestic goods relative to foreign goods
operates mainly through an improvement in the terms of trade, see e.g., Corsetti et al. [2007].
2Using sectoral data for the U.S. over the period 1992-2002, Jensen and Kletzer [2006] find that when
education is controlled for, the earnings differential between traded and non traded industries amounts to
between 10% and 17%.
3Bergin et al. [2006] simulate their model and highlight numerically the role of both the endogenous ordering
of tradability and the endogenous concentration of traded goods in replicating a rising BS coefficient over time.
Unlike Bergin et al. [2006], we analyze the change in the ratio of sectoral wages and focus on the relative price
of non tradables instead of the real exchange rate by assuming perfectly competitive product markets.
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Because we aim to assess the ability of the two-sector model with tradables and non tradables
to account for the evidence, we first estimate the relative price and relative wage effects of
technological change biased toward the traded sector. Applying cointegration methods to a
panel of 14 OECD countries over the period 1970-2007, we find that a 1 percentage point
increase in the productivity differential between tradables and non tradables appreciates the
relative price of non tradables by 0.78% and lowers the relative wage by 0.27%. Furthermore,
using an intersectoral labor reallocation index, estimates reveal that countries with larger
movements of labor across sectors experience a more pronounced increase in the relative price
and a smaller decline in the relative wage following a productivity differential, thus confirming
the role of labor mobility in the determination of the relative price and relative wage responses.
In order to account for the long-run movements in the relative price and the relative wage,
we put forward a variant of the two-sector model with tradables and non tradables.4 We
assume that the economy is small in world goods (and capital) markets so that real exchange
rate movements are exclusively driven by the long-run adjustment in the relative price of
non tradables. One major feature of our setup is that we consider imperfect mobility of
labor across sectors by assuming limited substitutability in hours worked, along the lines of
Horvath [2000].5 When hours worked are perfect substitutes, as in the standard BS model,
the allocation of labor supply across sectors is perfectly elastic to the ratio of sectoral wages;
hence, the demand side of the labor market determines the sectoral allocation of the labor
force while the relative wage remains fixed. With limited substitutability of labor, the agent
is willing to devote more hours worked to one sector only if firms pay higher wages. The more
reluctant workers are to shift hours worked across sectors, the larger the required increase in
the sectoral wage. This difficulty in reallocating labor across sectors can be interpreted as
a preference for the status quo or psychological costs when switching sectors (Dix-Carneiro
[2014]), or it may capture other barriers to mobility that are not included in the model
such as sector-specific human capital (Lee and Wolpin [2006]), geographic mobility costs
(Kennan and Walker [2011]), and firing costs (Kambourov [2009]). The assumption of limited
substitutability of hours worked is a convenient shortcut to produce a difficulty in reallocating
hours worked across sectors which allows us i) to provide analytical results, ii) to estimate
precisely a deep parameter of the model capturing the degree of labor mobility across sectors
4A number of variants of the two-sector model with tradables and non tradables have been used to investigate
the real exchange rate and trade balance effects of financial liberalization (see Cordoba (de) and Kehoe [2000],
Bems and Hartelius [2006]), or to analyze disinflation policy transmission (see Mendoza and Uribe [2000]). See
also Turnovsky [1997] who presents variants of the two-sector model.
5See e.g., Bouakez et al. [2009], Kim and Kim [2006] who assume that sectoral hours worked are aggregated
by means of a CES function in order to account for the evidence related to the co-movement of sectoral
aggregates, or Altissimo et al. [2011] who address inflation dispersion across EMU members.
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for each country in our sample, and iii) to compare our results with those obtained in the
standard BS model since the situation of perfect mobility of labor emerges as a special case.
To shed light on the transmission mechanism of technical change biased toward the traded
sector in a model with imperfect mobility of labor, we analytically break down the relative
price and relative wage effects into three components: i) a productivity channel when keeping
sectoral capital-labor ratios and the capital stock unchanged, ii) a capital reallocation channel
stemming from the shift of capital across sectors, iii) a capital accumulation channel caused
by the investment boom along the transitional path. These three channels impinge on both
the relative price and the relative wage as long as there is a difficulty in reallocating labor
across sectors.
When it abstracts first from physical capital accumulation while assuming imperfect mo-
bility of labor, the model can account for the evidence through the productivity channel only
if traded and non traded goods are substitutes in consumption. Intuitively, higher produc-
tivity growth biased toward the traded sector has an expansionary effect on traded output so
that the relative price of non tradables must appreciate to clear the goods market. With an
elasticity of substitution in consumption greater than one, the relative price of non tradables
increases less than proportionately. In this case, the relative wage falls because the consec-
utive increased share of tradables in total expenditure has an expansionary effect on labor
demand in the traded sector. Conversely, with an elasticity of substitution smaller than one,
the relative price growth exceeds the productivity differential while the relative wage rises
instead of decreasing, in contradiction with our evidence, due to the expansionary effect on
labor demand in the non traded sector.
Introducing physical capital along with imperfect labor mobility improves the predictive
power of the model. More precisely, when the elasticity of substitution between traded and
non traded goods is smaller than one, we find analytically that both the reallocation of
capital across sectors and physical capital accumulation counteract the productivity channel.
First, keeping the aggregate stock of physical capital fixed while assuming perfect mobility
of capital, a productivity differential between tradables and non tradables produces a shift
of capital towards the non traded sector, thereby raising non traded output and exerting a
negative impact on the relative price and thus on the relative wage. Second, by giving rise to
an investment boom, a productivity shock leads to a current account deficit which requires
a long-run improvement in the trade balance for the intertemporal solvency condition to
hold. When labor is imperfectly mobile, a steady-state increase in net exports depreciates
the relative price of non tradables and lowers the relative wage by raising the demand for
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tradables.
The role of trade balance surplus in determining the adjustment in the relative price of
non tradables concurs closely with the empirical findings documented by Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti [2002], [2004]. More precisely, their estimates reveal that countries with net external
liabilities tend to run a trade balance surplus and to have a more depreciated relative price of
non tradables. Intuitively, a net external debt produces a negative wealth effect that lowers
consumption and raises labor supply. The fall in consumption of tradables raises net exports.
The combined effect of a decline in consumption of non tradables and a higher labor supply
to the non traded sector leads to a depreciation in the relative price of non tradables.6
In the assessment of the ability of our model to replicate our empirical findings, our
numerical results show that regardless of the value of the elasticity of substitution between
traded and non traded goods, the model can produce the less than proportional increase in
the relative price of non tradables and the decline in the relative wage, as long as we allow for
imperfect mobility of labor and physical capital. The final exercise we perform is to compare
the responses of the relative price and relative wage for each OECD economy in our sample
to our empirical estimates. To do so, we estimate the parameter capturing the degree of
labor mobility and the elasticity of substitution in consumption between tradables and non
tradables for each country. Allowing the two pivotal parameters to vary across countries,
the model is found to predict the relative price growth fairly well but tends to overstate the
decline in the relative wage.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide evidence on
the relative price and relative wage effects of relative productivities in the long run. In section
3, we develop an open economy version of the two-sector model with imperfect mobility of
labor across sectors. We abstract from physical capital, allowing us to explore analytically
the role of imperfect mobility of labor for the relative price and relative wage effects of higher
productivity of tradables relative to non tradables. In section 4, we introduce physical capital
and analytically break down the relative price and relative wage responses to a productivity
differential between tradables and non tradables. In section 5, we discuss numerical results
and investigate the ability of the model to replicate our empirical findings for each OECD
economy. Section 6 summarizes our main results and concludes.
6Although Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s [2004] paper is particularly closely related to our analysis, our approach
is different. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti [2004] investigate the impact of net foreign asset positions on the relative
price of non tradables while we analyze the role of imperfect mobility of labor across sectors in determining the
long-run responses of the relative price and relative wage to higher productivity growth of tradables relative
to non tradables. Moreover, the authors’ assumption that the output of the tradable sector is an endowment
can be interpreted as the fact that labor is not mobile between the two sectors which corresponds to a polar
case in our framework. Finally, they abstract from physical capital accumulation which plays a key role in our
model.
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2 Empirical evidence
In this section, we confront the predictions of the BS model with data and thereby revisit
the evidence regarding the relationships between relative price, relative wage and relative
productivity.7 Throughout the paper, we denote the level of the variable in upper case, the
logarithm in lower case, and the percentage deviation from its initial steady-state by a hat.
2.1 Revisiting the Balassa-Samuelson Effect
To set the stage for the empirical analysis, we find it useful to revisit the theory that Balassa
[1964] and Samuelson [1964] constructed to explain the appreciation of the relative price of
non tradables following technological change biased toward the traded sector. In contrast
with the original framework, we relax the assumption of perfect labor mobility across sectors
so that sectoral wages no longer equalize.
As is commonly assumed, the country is small in terms of both world goods and capital
markets, and thus faces an exogenous international price for the traded good P T,? and a given
world interest rate, r?. Each sector produces Y j by using physical capital, Kj , and labor, Lj ,
according to Cobb-Douglas production functions:
Y j = Zj
(
Lj
)θj (
Kj
)1−θj
, (1)
where Zj represents the total factor productivity (TFP) index and θj the labor income share
in the value added of sector j = T,N . In perfect competition, prices P j equalize with unit
costs for producing
Ψj(W j)θ
j
(Rj)1−θ
j
Zj
where Ψj =
(
θj
)θj (1− θj)1−θj , W j and Rj are the wage
rate and the rental rate of capital paid in sector j, respectively. Assuming that the law of
one price holds so that P T = P T,?, normalizing the price of the traded good on world good
markets to unity, and taking the traded good as the numeraire, the price of non tradables in
terms of tradables can be written as follows:
PN
P T
≡ P = Ψ
T
ΨN
ZT
ZN
(
WN
)θN (
RN
)1−θN
(W T )θ
T
(RT )1−θ
T . (2)
Using the fact that in the traded sector, the unit cost for producing is equal to one, we have
W T =
(
ZT
) 1
θT
(
ΨT
) 1
θT
(
RT
)−( 1−θT
θT
)
. Denoting by δK the fixed depreciation rate of physical
capital and assuming perfect capital mobility across sectors so that RT = RN = R where
7Additional empirical results, in particular alternative unit root tests or cointegration methods, and more de-
tails on the model as well as the derivations of the results which are stated below, are provided in a Technical Ap-
pendix which is available at http://www.beta-umr7522.fr/productions/publications/2014/2014-16.pdf.
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R = P (r? + δK) when investment is non-traded, eq. (2) reduces to:8
P =
ΨT
(ΨN )θ
T /θN
ZT
(ZN )θ
T /θN
(
WN
W T
)θT
(r? + δK)
θT−θN
θN . (3)
Taking logarithm, and denoting by ω = ln
(
WN/W T
)
the (logged) relative wage yields:
p = c+
(
zT − θ
T
θN
zN
)
+ θTω, (4)
where c = lnΨT − θT
θN
lnΨN +
(
θT−θN
θN
)
ln (r? + δK) is a constant. Imposing perfect labor
mobility across sectors, as in the standard BS model, both sectors pay the same wage so that
the wage differential across sectors vanishes, i.e., ω = 0. As a result, the relative price of non
tradables appreciates by the same amount as the productivity differential. The explanation
is intuitive. The wage in the non traded sector rises at the same speed as in the traded sector
while productivity gains are smaller. To compensate for the rise in the non-tradable unit labor
cost, prices must increase by
(
zT − θT
θN
zN
)
in that sector. Conversely, if labor is not perfectly
mobile, there is no longer wage equalization across sectors and therefore ω may change. When
labor demand expands in the traded sector due to higher productivity in tradables relative to
non tradables, the relative wage ω falls as the traded sector must pay higher wages to induce
workers to shift hours worked toward this sector. As a result, eq. (4) implies that the relative
price appreciates less than the productivity differential.
Eq. (4) establishes a relationship between the relative price, the productivity gap and the
relative wage. While this equation allows us to explain how imperfect labor mobility modifies
the long-run response of the relative price to a productivity differential between tradables and
non tradables, eq. (4) is determined by abstracting from the goods market equilibrium, which
matters as long as labor is not perfectly mobile across sectors. In section 4, we show that the
steady-state can be solved for the relative price and the relative wage, i.e., p = p
(
zT , zN
)
and
ω = ω
(
zT , zN
)
. Because all variables display trends, our empirical strategy consists in esti-
mating the cointegrating relationships with the productivity discrepancy between tradables
and non tradables.
2.2 Data Construction
Before empirically exploring the relative price and relative wage effects of a productivity differ-
ential, we briefly describe the dataset we use and provide details about data construction below
and in Appendix A. Our sample consists of a panel of fourteen OECD countries: Belgium,
8In the long-run, the return on domestic capital R must equalize with the capital rental cost PI (r
? + δ)
with PI is the investment price index. For clarity purposes, in the following, we assume that investment is non
traded so that PI reduces to P .
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Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands,
Sweden, the UK and the US.9 Our sample covers the period 1970-2007 (except for Japan:
1974-2007), for eleven 1-digit ISIC-rev.3 industries.
To split these eleven industries into traded and non traded sectors, we follow the classifica-
tion suggested by De Gregorio et al. [1994]. Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing; Mining
and quarrying; Total manufacturing; Transport, storage and communication are classified as
traded industries. Following Jensen and Kletzer [2006], we updated the classification of De
Gregorio et al. [1994] by treating Financial intermediation as a traded industry. Electricity,
gas and water supply; Construction; Wholesale and retail trade; Hotels and restaurants; Real
estate, renting and business services; Community, social and personal services are classified
as non traded industries.10 Once industries have been classified as tradable or non tradable,
series for sectoral value added in current (constant) prices are constructed by adding value
added in current (constant) prices of all sub-industries in sector j = T,N .
We use the EU KLEMS [2011] database which provides domestic currency series of value
added in current and constant prices, labor compensation and employment (number of hours
worked) for the eleven industries that we classify either as tradable or non tradable, permitting
the construction of price indices pj (in log) which correspond to sectoral value added deflators,
sectoral wage rates wj (in log), and sectoral measures of productivities zj (in log). The relative
price of non tradables p is the log of the ratio of the non traded value added deflator to the
traded value added deflator (i.e., p = pN − pT ). The relative wage ω is the log of the ratio
of the non traded wage to the traded wage (i.e., ω = wN − wT ). We use sectoral total factor
productivities Zj (TFPs) to approximate technical change. Sectoral TFPs (in log) zjt at time
t are constructed as Solow residuals from constant-price (domestic currency) series of value
added yjt and capital stock k
j
t , and employment l
j
t :
zjt = y
j
t − θjljt −
(
1− θj) kjt , (5)
where θj is labor’s share in value added in sector j = T,N defined as the ratio of the compen-
sation of employees to value added in the jth sector, averaged over the period 1970-2007. To
obtain series for sectoral capital stock, we first compute the overall capital stock by adopt-
9While the assumption of a small open economy is not suited to large countries such as the United States or
Japan, we decided to include these economies in our sample when conducting our empirical analysis in order
to make our estimates comparable with those documented by previous studies, in particular Canzoneri et al.
[1999] and Kakkar [2003] who adopt cointegration methods like us.
10De Gregorio et al. [1994], classify a sector as tradable if more than 10 percent of its total production is
exported. This classification has been updated by Jensen and Kletzer [2006] who use locational Gini coefficients
to measure the geographical concentration of different sectors and classify sectors with a Gini coefficient below
0.1 as non-tradable and all others as tradable (the authors classify activities that are traded domestically as
potentially tradable internationally). Unlike De Gregorio et al. [1994] who treat ”Financial intermediation” as
non tradable, we classify this industry as tradable, following Jensen and Kletzer [2006]; our sensitivity analysis
reveals that our conclusions hold whether ”Financial intermediation” is classified as tradable or non tradable.
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ing the perpetual inventory approach, using constant-price investment series taken from the
OECD’s Annual National Accounts. Following Garofalo and Yamarik [2002], we split the gross
capital stock into traded and non traded industries by using sectoral valued added shares.11
Assuming that investment expenditures are non traded, we compute the labor share-adjusted
TFP differential as follows zT − (θT /θN) zN .12
2.3 Tests of BS predictions
We begin by examining the behavior of the series for 14 OECD economies over the period
1970-2007. Figures 1(a) and 1(b) plot the average relative price growth and average relative
wage growth against the average productivity growth differential between tradables and non
tradables, respectively. Quantitatively, the BS model predicts that a 1 percentage point
increase in the productivity differential i) raises the relative price of non tradables by 1%,
ii) while leaving the relative wage unchanged. The first prediction implies that graphically,
all countries should be positioned on the 45◦ line in Figure 1(a). However, we find that
all countries are positioned below the 45◦ line which suggests that higher productivity in
tradables relative to non tradables is not fully reflected in the relative price. According to the
second prediction, all countries should be positioned on the X-axis in the bottom right panel.
However, as shown in Figure 1(b), all countries are below the X-axis which suggests that a
productivity differential between tradables and non tradables lowers the relative wage.
While the data seem to challenge the conclusions of the standard BS model, in the following
we use unit root tests and cointegration methods to confirm these findings and to estimate
precisely the effects of the higher productivity in tradables relative to non tradables on both
the relative price of non tradables and the relative wage.
< Please insert Figure 1 about here >
We test for the presence of unit roots in the logged relative wage, ω, and in the difference
between the (log) relative price p and the (log) relative TFPs, i.e., p− [zT − (θT /θN) zN]. If
the predictions of the BS model were right, the relative wage should be stationary due to the
assumption of perfect labor mobility, which implies wage equalization across sectors. Because
11Because the relative price of non tradables is computed by using value added deflators and thus might be
correlated with sectoral valued added shares, we alternatively construct time series for KT and KN by using
capital stocks at constant-prices by industry taken from the EU KLEMS database, applying the classification
for sectoral value added detailed above. Whether we adopt Garofalo and Yamarik’s [2002] procedure or use
disaggregated capital stocks to construct time series for KT and KN , running the regression for the same panel
of countries (i.e., eight instead of fourteen countries due to data availability) yields similar results.
12As a robustness check, we run the same regressions by using an alternative measure of the productivity
differential when investment expenditures are assumed to be traded, implying
(
θN/θT
)
zT −zN , or both traded
and non traded, leading to
zT− θT
θN
zN
αI+(1−αI ) θTθN
where αI is the investment expenditure share on non tradable goods.
Because results are very similar, to save space we do not present them and they are therefore relegated to the
Technical Appendix.
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sectoral wages increase at the same speed, the difference between the logged relative price
and the logged relative sectoral productivity should also be integrated of order zero.
< Please insert Table 1 about here >
We consider five panel unit root tests developed by Levin, Lin and Chu [2002], Breitung
[2000], Im, Pesaran and Shin [2003], Maddala and Wu [1999], and Hadri [2000]. Results are
summarized in Table 1. To begin with, as shown in the first and the third column of Table
1, all unit root tests applied to the relative price and the relative productivity of tradables
confirm that these two variables are non-stationary. On the basis of all tests shown in the
second column, except for Levin et al.’s [2002] unit root test, the relative wage variable is
found to be non-stationary. Hence, the data reject the wage equalization hypothesis. On
the contrary, the sectoral wage differential persists in the long run, casting doubt on the
assumption of perfect mobility of labor. The p-values shown in the last column of Table 1
reveal that the relative price of non tradables and the ratio of sectoral labor share-adjusted
TFPs are not cointegrated with a unit cointegrating vector. Put differently, the change in the
ratio of sectoral TFPs is not fully reflected in the relative price p.
To get some sense of the magnitude of the long-run effects that a productivity differential
might generate, we now estimate the cointegrating relationships. Using i to index countries
and t to index years, we regress the (log) relative wage ω and the (log) relative price p on the
(log) relative productivity, respectively:
ωi,t = δi + β
[
zTi,t −
(
θTi /θ
N
i
)
zNi,t
]
+ vi,t, (6a)
pi,t = αi + γ
[
zTi,t −
(
θTi /θ
N
i
)
zNi,t
]
+ ui,t, (6b)
where δi and αi are country fixed effects and vi,t and ui,t are i.i.d. error terms. While the
standard BS model predicts β = 0 and γ = 1, we expect β < 0 and 0 < γ < 1, in line with
our empirical findings above.
Having verified that the assumption of cointegration is empirically supported, we estimate
the cointegrating relationships by using fully modified OLS (FMOLS) and dynamic OLS
(DOLS) procedures for the cointegrated panel proposed by Pedroni [2000], [2001].13 Both
estimators give the same results and estimated coefficients of the cointegrating relationships
are significant at 1%. Estimates reported in column 1 of panel A (for β) and panel B (for γ)
of Table 2 reveal that a 1 percentage point increase in the productivity differential lowers the
relative wage by 0.27% and appreciates the relative price by 0.78%. As shown in the last row
of panel A (panel B) of Table 2, imposing the restriction that the slope of the cointegrating
13The DOLS estimator adds q leads and lags of 4(zT − (θT /θN) zN ) as additional regressors in (6). We set
q = 1; our results were identical for q = 2 and q = 3.
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vector β is equal to zero (γ is equal to one) is strongly rejected at a 1% significance level.
< Please insert Table 2 about here >
< Please insert Table 3 about here >
To get a sense of the interval of estimates across countries, we again run regressions of
(6a)-(6b) by letting β and γ vary across countries. Table 3 shows results for the fourteen
countries in our sample, using both DOLS and FMOLS cointegration procedures. Despite
large cross-country variations, higher productivity growth in tradables relative to non trad-
ables significantly lowers the relative wage in all countries (except Sweden and the United
States) while the estimated coefficient for the relative price is always significantly smaller
than one. When considering statistically significant estimates, the response of the relative
wage to a 1 percentage point increase in the productivity differential ranges from a low of
-0.59 for Germany to a high of -0.14 for the United Kingdom and Belgium while the reaction
of the relative price of non tradables varies between 0.47 for Denmark to 0.97 for Japan.
2.4 Interpreting the Puzzle: Imperfect Mobility of Labor across Sectors
How to explain the less than proportional increase in the relative price and the fall in the
relative wage? We conjecture that imperfect mobility of labor could rationalize the evidence
as unit root tests applied to the (logged) relative wage ω indicate that the sectoral wage
differential persists in the long run, a finding uncovered recently by the literature using a
structural empirical approach, see e.g., Artuc¸ et al. [2010], Lee and Wolpin [2006]. According
to the relative price equation (4) which has been derived without imposing wage equalization,
imperfect mobility moderates the relative price response to a productivity differential by
lowering the non traded wage relative to the traded wage.
< Please insert Figure 2 about here >
Intuitively, technological change biased toward the traded sector has an expansionary effect
on labor demand in the traded sector. To hire more workers, firms in the traded sector have
to pay higher wages to compensate for the mobility cost. The higher the mobility cost, the
more the ratio of non traded wage to traded wage should fall when traded firms experience
higher productivity gains than non traded producers. Because the non tradable unit labor
cost increases less than if labor were perfectly mobile, the relative price must be increased by
a smaller amount.
We thus empirically expect countries with lower interindustry gross flows of workers to
experience a smaller appreciation in the relative price and a larger decline in the relative
wage in response to productivity growth biased toward the traded sector. Using FMOLS
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estimates, Figure 2 illustrates this by depicting the relationship between the relative price
response and the relative wage reaction (in absolute value) to a 1 percentage point increase in
the productivity differential. The trend line in Figure 2 shows that the estimated responses
of these two variables are inversely related across countries.
In the next subsection, we thus test our conjecture whereby the relative price of non trad-
ables is more responsive to higher productivity growth in tradables relative to non tradables
while the reaction of the relative wage becomes more muted, as labor becomes more mobile
across sectors.
2.5 The Role of Imperfect Labor Mobility
To evaluate the role of imperfect mobility of labor across sectors in explaining the relationship
between p and ω and productivity, we proceed as follows. First, we construct an index
capturing the extent of labor shifts across sectors. Then we empirically explore our conjecture
by interacting the measure of intersectoral labor reallocation and the productivity differential.
2.5.1 Measures of Sectoral Labor Movements
For our empirical analysis, we construct an indicator capturing the extent of labor mobility
across sectors. The data are taken from EU KLEMS. Following Wacziarg and Wallack [2004],
we compute the labor reallocation index in year t for country i denoted by LRi,t by calculating
the ratio of the absolute change in sectoral employment resulting from labor reallocation to
average employment over τ years:
LRi,t (τ) =
∑N
j=T |Lji,t − Lji,t−τ | −
∣∣∣∑Nj=T Lji,t −∑Nj=T Lji,t−τ ∣∣∣
0.5
∑N
j=T (L
j
i,t−τ + L
j
i,t)
. (7)
where Lji,t denotes employment in sector j = T,N ; the changes are computed over τ = 2 and
τ = 3 years.14 The first term in the numerator of (7) captures the change in employment
over two (three) years in sector j while the second term “filters” the change in labor arising
from total employment growth. The term in the denominator of (7) is a measure of total
employment in the economy (i.e., the average employment computed over t and t−τ). Dividing
one by the other gives the rate of workers that have shifted from one sector to another over
two (three) years.
14Following Wacziarg and Wallack [2004], we eschew year-to-year changes because of the low frequency
changes in labor at that horizon and restrict our attention to differences over alternatively 2 or 3 years.
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2.5.2 Empirical results
To test our conjecture, we add interaction terms in (6) and explore the following relationships
empirically:
ωi,t = δi + β
[
zTi,t −
(
θTi /θ
N
i
)
zNi,t
]
+ βL
[
zTi,t −
(
θTi /θ
N
i
)
zNi,t
]× LRi,t + vi,t, (8a)
pi,t = αi + γ
[
zTi,t −
(
θTi /θ
N
i
)
zNi,t
]
+ γL
[
zTi,t −
(
θTi /θ
N
i
)
zNi,t
]× LRi,t + ui,t. (8b)
In light of our conjecture, we expect coefficients of interaction terms βL and γL to be positive
in both regressions (8a) and (8b). Such a result would imply that higher productivity in
tradables relative to non tradables lowers the relative wage less and raises the relative price
more in countries where workers are more mobile across sectors.
We estimate cointegrating vectors by using DOLS and FMOLS estimators. The estimates
are reported in columns 2 and 3 of Table 2. Both DOLS and FMOLS cointegration proce-
dures yield similar results. The first line of panel A and B of Table 2 confirms that higher
productivity growth in tradables relative to non tradables lowers the relative wage and raises
the relative price less than proportionately. Importantly, as shown in the second and third
lines of panels A and B of Table 2, the coefficients βL and γL of interaction terms are positive
(and statistically significant at conventional level), regardless of whether the labor realloca-
tion index is computed over 2 or 3 years. Hence, as labor mobility across sectors increases,
the relative price becomes more responsive to a productivity differential while the reaction of
the relative wage is more muted.
In the following, we construct a dynamic general equilibrium model with a traded and a
non traded sector by allowing for imperfect mobility of labor across sectors. In particular, our
aim is to assess its ability to account for the following set of empirical findings. A 1 percentage
point increase in the productivity differential between tradables and non tradables: i) raises
the relative price of non tradables p by 0.78%, ii) lowers the relative wage ω by 0.27%, iii)
appreciates p more while lowering ω less as labor becomes more mobile across sectors. In
order to shed light on the role of imperfect mobility of labor, we first solve analytically the
model in the next section by abstracting from physical capital.
3 A Simple Two-Sector Model with Limited Substitutability
of Labor
We consider a small open economy that is populated by a constant number of identical
households and firms that have perfect foresight and live forever. The country is small in
terms of both world goods and capital markets, and faces a given world interest rate, r?. One
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sector produces a traded good denoted by the superscript T that can be exported at no cost
and consumed domestically. A second sector produces a non traded good denoted by the
superscript N which is consumed domestically. The traded good is chosen as the numeraire.
We denote by P the relative price of nontradables (P ≡ PN/P T ). To derive a number of
analytical results which enables us to build intuition about the transmission mechanism, we
abstract first from physical capital and assume that both traded and non-traded goods are
produced by using labor only. Time is continuous and indexed by t.
3.1 Households
At each instant the representative household consumes traded and non traded goods denoted
by CT (t) and CN (t), respectively, which are aggregated by means of a CES function:
C(t) =
[
ϕ
1
φ
(
CT (t)
)φ−1
φ + (1− ϕ) 1φ (CN (t))φ−1φ ] φφ−1 , (9)
where 0 < ϕ < 1 is the weight attached to the traded good in the CES sub-utility function
C(.) and φ is the elasticity of substitution between traded goods and non traded goods.
The representative household supplies labor LT (t) and LN (t) in the traded and non traded
sectors, respectively. The standard BS model assumes that hours worked are perfect substi-
tutes. Because workers are willing to devote their whole time to the sector that pays the
highest wages, sectors pay the same wage. However, our unit root tests applied to the ratio
of sectoral wages reject the wage equalization between sectors in the long-run. A shortcut to
produce a persistent wage differential across sectors is to assume limited substitutability in
hours worked. Along the lines of Horvath [2000], we assume that hours worked in the traded
and the non traded sectors are aggregated by means of a CES function:
L(t) =
[
ϑ−1/²
(
LT (t)
) ²+1
² + (1− ϑ)−1/² (LN (t)) ²+1² ] ²²+1 , (10)
and 0 < ϑ < 1 is the weight of labor supply to the traded sector in the labor index L(.) and
² measures the ease with which worked hours can be substituted for each other and thereby
captures the degree of labor mobility. The case of perfect labor mobility is nested under the
assumption that ² tends towards infinity; in this case, (10) reduces to L(t) = LT (t) + LN (t)
which implies that hours worked are perfectly substitutable across sectors. When ² < ∞,
hours worked are no longer perfect substitutes. More specifically, as ² becomes smaller, labor
mobility across sectors becomes lower as workers perceive a higher cost (in utility terms) of
shifting and therefore become more reluctant to reallocate labor across sectors.
Producing imperfect labor mobility across sectors by means of (10) is a convenient shortcut
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which has several advantages over the alternatives.15 First, the CES form (10) for the aggre-
gate labor index allows us to consider the range of all degrees of labor mobility across sectors.
Specifically, if we let ² be zero or tend towards infinity, the situations of total immobility
(² = 0) and perfect mobility (²→∞) of labor emerge as special cases. Second, by combining
first-order conditions for labor supply and labor demand, the formulation (10) allows us to
estimate precisely the parameter ² for each country in our sample.16 Hence, the formulation
(10) serves our purpose which is to assess quantitatively the ability of the two-sector model
to account for our evidence. Third, as emphasized by Horvath [2000], this formulation intro-
duces partial labor mobility across sectors without deviating from the tractable representative
agent framework. Fourth, several papers introduce intersectoral adjustment costs to produce
imperfect mobility of labor across sectors (see e.g., Shi [2011]). Such formulation implies that
labor frictions are absent in the steady-state while our evidence reveals that sectoral wages do
not equalize in the long run. Since we focus on the long-run relative price and relative wage
effects of a productivity differential, we need to set up a model that can produce a persistent
sectoral wage differential. The aggregator function (10) is consistent with our objective.
The representative agent is endowed with one unit of time, supplies a fraction L(t) as labor,
and consumes the remainder 1 − L(t) as leisure. At any instant of time, households derive
utility from their consumption and experience disutility from working. Assuming that the
felicity function is additively separable in consumption and labor, the representative household
maximizes the following objective function:17
U =
∫ ∞
0
{
1
1− 1σC
C(t)1−
1
σC − 1
1 + 1σL
L(t)1+
1
σL
}
e−βtdt, (11)
where β is the discount rate, σC > 0 corresponds to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
15There are two alternative ways to depart from the strong assumption of wage equalization across sectors.
Shi [2011] introduces intersectoral adjustment costs to produce imperfect mobility of labor across sectors along
the transitional path. While the wage equalization does not hold in the short-run, wages equalize across sectors
in the long-run, in contradiction with our findings. The second approach is to introduce labor market frictions
in the tradition of Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides. While this strategy could serve our purpose, the advantage
of our approach is that the BS effect emerges as a special case. Moreover, we show in a Technical Appendix that
a two-sector dynamic general equilibrium with search unemployment leads to very similar formal relationships
between the relative price (the relative wage) change and the productivity differential. Finally, an additional
difficulty is to calibrate search parameters at a sectoral level. In contrast, our specification allows us to estimate
the deep parameters for each country in order to calibrate the model.
16While in the model, the difficulty in reallocating labor across sectors may reflect psychological costs when
switching sectors, it may also capture other barriers to mobility that are not included in the model such as labor
market regulation or specific human capital. When running the regression of ² on a number of labor market
regulation indicators, we find empirically that countries with more stringent employment protection legislation,
higher union density, and more generous unemployment benefit scheme display lower labor mobility (i.e., the
parameter ² takes smaller values). Moreover, countries with higher shares of young employees and low-skilled
workers experience larger labor mobility, as these two workers’ groups have relatively less sector-specific skills
than other types of workers and thus are more prone to switch jobs across sectors.
17In a Technical Appendix, we assess to what extent our results depend on the assumption of separability in
preferences. Numerical results reveal that considering a more general specification for preferences by allowing
for consumption and labor to be non-separable does not affect our conclusions.
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for consumption, and σL > 0 is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply or intertemporal elasticity
of substitution for (aggregate) labor supply.
Labor income is derived by supplying labor at a wage rate W (t). In addition, households
accumulate internationally traded bonds, B(t), that yield net interest rate earnings of r?B(t).
The flow budget constraint is equal to households’ income less consumption expenditure:
B˙(t) = r?B(t) +W
(
W T (t),WN (t)
)
L(t)− PC (P (t))C(t), (12)
where the consumption-based price index PC(.) is increasing with the relative price of non
tradables P . The aggregate wage index W (.) associated with the labor index (10) is:
W (t) =
[
ϑ
(
W T (t)
)²+1
+ (1− ϑ) (WN (t))²+1] 1²+1 , (13)
whereW T (t) andWN (t) are wages paid in the traded and the non traded sectors, respectively.
Denoting the co-state variable associated with eq. (12) by λ the first-order conditions
characterizing the representative household’s optimal plans are:
C(t) = [PC(t)λ(t)]
−σC , (14a)
L(t) = [λ(t)W (t)]σL , (14b)
λ˙(t) = λ(t) (β − r?) , (14c)
and the transversality condition limt→∞ λB(t)e−βt = 0. For the sake of clarity, we drop the
time argument below when this causes no confusion.
Applying Shephard’s lemma gives CN = P ′CC where P
′
C = ∂PC/∂P ; denoting by αC the
share of non-traded goods in the consumption expenditure, we have CN = αCPCC/P and
CT = (1− αC)PCC.18 Intra-temporal allocation of consumption follows from the following
optimal rule: (
1− ϕ
ϕ
)
CT
CN
= P φ. (15)
An appreciation in the relative price of non tradables P increases expenditure on tradables
relative to expenditure on non tradables (i.e., CT /PCN ), only when φ > 1.
As for consumption, intra-temporal allocation of hours worked across sectors follows from
Shephard’s Lemma. We therefore obtain labor income by supplying hours worked in the
non traded and the traded sectors, i.e., WNLN = αLWL and W TLT = (1− αL)WL, with
αL being the share of non-tradable labor revenue in the labor income.19 Denoting by Ω ≡
18Specifically, we have αC =
(1−ϕ)P1−φ
ϕ+(1−ϕ)P1−φ . Note that αC depends negatively on the relative price P as long
as φ > 1 and reduces to 1− ϕ when φ = 1.
19Specifically, we have αL =
(1−ϑ)(WN)²+1[
ϑ(WT )²+1+(1−ϑ)(WN)²+1
] .
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WN/W T the relative wage, workers allocate hours worked in the traded and the non traded
sectors according to the following optimal rule:(
1− ϑ
ϑ
)
LT
LN
= Ω−². (16)
If the traded sector pays higher wages (i.e., if Ω falls) workers are induced to shift hours worked
towards the traded sector, but less so as ² is lower. Put differently, the worker is reluctant
to shift hours worked from the non traded to the traded sector, unless the wage differential
across sectors is large enough to compensate for the cost (in utility terms) of moving hours
worked across sectors.
3.2 Firms
A large number of identical and perfectly competitive firms produces a traded and a non traded
good using labor Lj as the sole input in a linear (constant returns to scale) technology:
Y j = AjLj , (17)
where Y j denotes output and Aj is the labor productivity index in sector j. Since the labor
market is assumed to be competitive, the ratio of marginal revenues of labor must equalize
the ratio of sectoral wages:
P
AN
AT
= Ω. (18)
According to (18), the non traded wage falls relative to the traded wage if the relative price
of non tradables appreciates less than the productivity differential between tradables and non
tradables.
3.3 Model Closure and Equilibrium
To fully describe the equilibrium, we impose goods market clearing conditions. The non
traded good market clearing condition requires that output is equalized with consumption:
Y N = CN . (19)
Plugging this condition into the flow budget constraint (12) and using firms’ optimal condi-
tions yields the market clearing condition for tradables or the current account equation:
B˙ = r?B + Y T − CT = r?B +NX, (20)
where the second term on the RHS, i.e., Y T − CT ≡ NX, corresponds to net exports.
In an open economy model with a representative agent having perfect foresight, a constant
rate of time preference and perfect access to world capital markets, we impose β = r? in order
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to generate an interior solution. Setting β = r? into (14c) yields λ = λ¯. As the shadow value
of wealth must remain constant over time, invoking the transversality condition and denoting
the long-term value with a tilde implies that the intertemporal solvency condition reduces to:
B˜ = B0, (21)
where B0 is the initial stock of traded bonds. Because B(t) = B0 must hold at each point of
time, the dynamics degenerate so that the economy adjusts instantaneously to its steady-state.
The equilibrium which comprises (15)-(16), (18), and (19)-(21), can be reduced to two
equations. Combining the optimal rule for intra-temporal allocation of consumption (15) with
market clearing conditions for the non traded and the traded good, i.e., (19)-(20), together
with (21), yields the goods market equilibrium (henceforth GME):
Y˜ T
Y˜ N
=
(
ϕ
1− ϕ
)
P˜ φ
1 + ωB
, (22)
where we denote by ωB ≡ r?B0/Y T the ratio of interest receipts to traded output.
Using the production functions, i.e., Lj = Y j/Aj , and combining optimal rules for labor
supply (16) with labor demand (18) to eliminate Ω, yields the labor market equilibrium
(henceforth LME):
Y˜ T
Y˜ N
=
(
ϑ
1− ϑ
)(
AT
AN
)²+1
P˜−². (23)
3.4 Graphical Apparatus
Before turning to the derivation of steady-state effects of a productivity differential, we char-
acterize the long-run equilibrium graphically. Because the dynamics degenerate and thus the
open economy is always at steady-state, the tilde is suppressed for the purposes of clarity.
The long-run equilibrium can be described by considering alternatively the labor market or
the goods market. The initial steady-state is represented by E0 in Figure 3.
When focusing on the labor market, the model can be summarized graphically by two
schedules in the (lT − lN , ω)-space, as shown in Figure 3(a). Applying logarithm to eq. (16)
yields the (relative) labor supply-schedule (LS henceforth):
(
lT − lN) ∣∣LS = −²ω + d, (24)
where d = ln
(
ϑ
1−ϑ
)
. When the traded sector pays higher wages, the consecutive decline in
ω provides an incentive to shift labor supply from the non-traded sector towards the traded
sector. Hence the LS-schedule is downward-sloping in the (lT − lN , ω)-space where the slope
is equal to −1/². In the polar case of perfect labor mobility, ² tends towards infinity so
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that the LS-schedule becomes horizontal. Inserting the first-order conditions for the firm’s
maximization problem given by eq. (18) into (22), using production functions (17) to eliminate
sectoral outputs, yields the labor demand-schedule (LD henceforth). Formally, the (relative)
LD-schedule is given by:
(
lT − lN) ∣∣LD = φω + (φ− 1) (aT − aN)+ x, (25)
where x = ln
(
ϕ
1−ϕ
1
1+ωB
)
. The LD-schedule is upward-sloping in the (lT − lN , ω)-space where
the slope is equal to 1/φ. If the non-traded sector pays higher wages, that sector raises its
prices to compensate for the increased unit labor cost. As a result, consumers substitute
traded for non-traded goods which in turn produces an expansionary effect on labor demand
in the traded sector relative to the non-traded sector (i.e., LT /LN rises), and all the more so
the larger the elasticity of substitution φ between traded and non-traded goods.
We turn now to the goods market which can be summarized graphically by two schedules
in the (yT − yN , p)-space, as shown in Figure 3(b). The GME-equilibrium (see (22)) is
upward-sloping in the (yT − yN , p)-space with a slope equal to 1/φ. Intuitively, a rise in
traded output relative to non traded output produces an appreciation in the relative price of
non tradables which induces agents to substitute the traded good for the non traded. The
LME-schedule (see (23)) is downward-sloping in the (yT − yN , p)-space with a slope equal to
−1/². A rise in the relative price of non-tradables p raises the non traded wage which in turn
induces workers to shift hours worked to the non traded sector. As a consequence, the ratio of
sectoral outputs Y T /Y N declines. Assuming that hours worked are perfect substitutes (i.e.,
² → ∞), sectors pay the same wage. Graphically, the LME-schedule becomes an horizontal
line.
< Please insert Figure 3 about here >
3.5 Relative Price and Relative Wage Effects
This section analyzes graphically and analytically the consequences on the relative price and
the relative wage of an increase in relative sectoral productivity AT /AN . It compares the
steady-state of the model before and after the productivity shock biased towards the traded
sector.
To begin with, an inspection of eq. (25) shows that higher productivity in tradables relative
to non-tradables has an expansionary effect on labor demand in the traded sector relative to
the non traded sector, if and only if the elasticity of substitution φ between traded and non-
traded goods is larger than one. The reason is as follows. Higher productivity in tradables
and the labor inflow in that sector increases output of tradables relative to non-tradables.
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For the market clearing condition to hold (see eq. (22)), the relative price of non-tradables
must rise. With an elasticity of substitution φ greater than one, the demand for tradables
rises more than proportionally. The increased share of tradables in total expenditure has
an expansionary effect on labor demand in tradables relative to non tradables and therefore
lowers the relative wage ω (see eq. (18)). Graphically, as shown in Figure 3(a), the LD-
schedule shifts to the right along the LS-supply schedule which produces a fall in relative
wage from ω0 to ω1. Because the traded sector pays higher wages, workers shift hours worked
towards that sector (see eq. (16)).
To determine the change in the relative wage formally, we equate labor demand described
by (25) and labor supply described by (24). Differentiating and denoting by a hat the deviation
from initial steady-state in percentage terms gives the relative wage growth:
ωˆ = − (φ− 1)ΘL (aˆT − aˆN) , ΘL = ( 1
²+ φ
)
. (26)
According to (26), higher productivity growth in tradables relative to non tradables produces
a fall in the ratio of the non-traded wage to the traded wage if and only if φ > 1. In terms of
Figure 3(a), the new steady-state (E1) lies to the south east of the old equilibrium (E0) along
the initial LS-schedule. By contrast, when the elasticity of substitution φ is smaller than one,
demand for tradables increases less than proportionately, and therefore the share of tradables
in total expenditure falls. In this case, graphically, higher productivity growth in tradables
relative to non tradables shifts the LD-schedule to the left which results in an increase in
the relative wage ω. The second parameter which plays a major role in the determination
of changes in ω is ² which captures the degree of labor mobility across sectors. As workers
are less reluctant to shift hours worked from the non-traded to the traded sector, as reflected
by a higher ², the response of the relative wage to a productivity differential is moderated.
Graphically, the LD-schedule shifts along a flatter LS-schedule. When labor is perfectly
mobile, as in the standard BS model, ² tends toward infinity so that (26) implies that ωˆ = 0.
In terms of Figure 3(a), the LD-schedule shifts along a horizontal LS-schedule, thus leaving
unchanged the relative wage at ω0 while the intersect of the two schedules is at BS1.
Having explored the change in the relative wage, let us now examine the response of the
relative price of non-tradables. Equating (22) to (23), taking logarithm, and differentiating
leads to the long-run adjustment of the relative price in percentage terms:
pˆ = (²+ 1)ΘL
(
aˆT − aˆN) . (27)
According to (27), the relative price increases by less than 1% following a 1 percentage point
increase in the productivity differential only when φ > 1. Intuitively, because consumers are
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relatively more prone to substitute the traded for the non traded good, the relative price of
non tradables must appreciate less than proportionately to clear the goods market as traded
output relative to non traded output. Graphically, the LME-schedule shifts to the right as
shown in Figure 3(b). When φ > 1, the GME-schedule is flatter than the 45◦ line, so that the
new steady-state E1 is below the long-run equilibrium BS1 reached by assuming perfect labor
mobility. Moreover, as workers are more willing to switch from one sector to another (i.e., as ²
takes higher values), the relative price of non tradables appreciates by a larger amount because
traded output increases more. Graphically, the LME-schedule becomes flatter. When labor
is perfectly mobile across sectors, the LME-schedule become a horizontal line (see Figure
3(b)). Consequently, higher productivity growth of tradables relative to non tradables by 1%
shifts the LME-schedule higher, thus leading to an appreciation in the relative price by 1%.
In conclusion, the two-sector model can account for the fall in the relative wage and the
less than proportional increase in the relative price of non-tradables after a 1 percentage
point increase in the productivity differential between tradables and non tradables as long
as labor is imperfectly mobile across sectors (i.e., ² < ∞) and the elasticity of substitution
φ is larger than one. Because previous empirical studies and our estimates reveal that the
elasticity substitution may take values smaller than one, in the following section we add a
new ingredient to improve the predictive power of our model.20
4 Introducing Physical Capital
We introduce physical capital in the framework which is assumed to be perfectly mobile
across sectors. As will become clear later, this ingredient makes the two-sector model able
to account for the evidence related to the effects of sectoral productivity shocks, as long as
imperfect mobility of labor across sectors is assumed. For the purpose of clarity, we assume
that investment expenditures are non traded.21 For reasons of space and since the Balassa-
Samuelson effect is a long-run phenomenon, we restrict ourselves to the discussion of the
steady-state. We drop the time argument to refer to long-run values.
Before discussing the steady-state, we emphasize very briefly how introducing capital
modifies the framework. First, households’ factor income is derived by supplying labor L(t)
20The cross-section studies report an estimate of φ ranging from 0.44 to 0.74, see e.g., Stockman and Tesar
[1995] and Mendoza [1995], respectively. Empirical analysis using annual time series data pooled for a group
of countries by Ostry and Reinhart [1992] reports estimates ranging from 0.66 to 1.28. Adopting cointregation
methods over the period 1970-2007, we find an elasticity φ of 0.66 for the whole sample while estimates vary
between roughly 0.2 and 1.8 across countries. We provide more details in Appendix B.
21In a Technical Appendix, we relax this assumption and instead assume that investment expenditures are
both traded and non traded. Numerical results reveal that the relative price and relative wage effects of a
productivity differential are almost identical to those obtained when abstracting from traded investment.
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at a wage rateW (t), and capitalK(t) at a rental rate R(t). To rent capital, agents must invest
an amount I(t), thus giving rise to capital accumulation K˙(t) = I(t) − δKK(t), where 0 ≤
δK < 1 is a fixed depreciation rate. First-order conditions characterizing the representative
household’s optimal plans include (14) and the equality R(t)/P (t) − δK + P˙ (t)/P (t) = r?
which states that the return on domestic capital must equalize the return on traded bonds.
Second, firms produce according to constant returns to scale technology (1) while aggregate
capital (K(t)) is allocated to the traded (KT (t)) and the non traded sector (KN (t)), i.e.,
K(t) = KT (t) +KN (t).
4.1 The Steady-State
Considering the technology of production described by (1), since capital can move freely
between the two sectors, marginal revenues of capital in the traded and the non-traded sector
equalize while costly labor mobility implies a persistent wage differential across sectors:
ZT
(
1− θT ) (kT )−θT = PZN (1− θN) (kN)−θN ≡ R, (28a)
ZT θT
(
kT
)1−θT ≡W T , PZNθN (kN)1−θN ≡WN , (28b)
where we denote by kj ≡ Kj/Lj the capital-labor ratio for sector j = T,N , and θj represents
the labor income share in output of sector j. Using the fact that Kj = kjLj , the resource
constraint for capital can be written as follows:
kTLT + kNLN = K. (29)
When the relative price of non-tradables adjusts to its steady-state value (i.e., P˙ = 0), we
obtain the equality between the return on domestic capital and the world interest rate:
R/P − δK = r?, (30)
where R is given by (28a). Additionally, both non traded and traded goods markets must
clear, i.e., Y N = CN+I with I = δKK and Y T +r?B = CT . Denoting by υI ≡ δKK/Y N and
υB ≡ r?B/Y T the ratio of investment to non traded output and the ratio of interest receipts
to traded output, respectively, the market-clearing condition can be written as follows:
Y T (1 + υB)
Y N (1− υI) =
CT
CN
, (31)
where the allocation of aggregate consumption expenditure between traded and non traded
goods follows from (15).
Finally, the open economy must satisfy the intertemporal solvency condition:
B −B0 = Φ(K −K0) , (32)
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where Φ ≡ [∂Y T /∂K + (∂Y T /∂P − ∂CT /∂P )ω12] / (ν1 − r?) < 0, with all partial derivatives
evaluated at the steady-state and ω12 the element of the eigenvector associated with the stable
eigenvalue ν1 < 0, and B0, K0 are the initial stocks of traded bonds and physical capital,
respectively. 22
Using production functions (1), the system consisting of (15)-(16), (30)-(31), and (28a)-
(28b) can be solved for CT /CN , LT /LN , kT , kN ,W T ,WN and P as functions of ZT , ZN ,
(
1−υI
1+υB
)
which is taken as exogenous for pedagogical purposes.23 Hence, when solving the steady-state
in this way, we thus assume that the capital stock and traded bonds holding are exogenous.
This procedure to solve for the steady-state enables us to break down analytically the rela-
tive price and relative wage effects of a productivity differential between tradables and non
tradables in three components: i) a productivity channel when keeping sectoral capital-labor
ratios kj and the capital stock K (and thus B) unchanged, ii) a capital reallocation channel
stemming from the shift of capital across sectors, iii) a capital accumulation channel caused
by the investment boom along the transitional path. We build intuition about these three
channels below.24
Besides the productivity channel discussed in section 3, introducing physical capital
produces two additional channels through which higher productivity of tradables relative to
non tradables impinges on the relative price and the relative wage.
First, changes in sectoral TFPs shift capital across sectors (i.e., modify kj) and thus
influence the relative price by modifying sectoral outputs.25 Further, as shown by (28b), a
change in the relative price influences labor demand in the non traded sector and thereby the
relative wage. Therefore, keeping unchanged the overall capital stock K (and the stock of
foreign bonds B), the capital reallocation channel impinges on the relative price and the
relative wage by shifting capital across sectors.
Second, households hold financial wealth which consists of physical capital and foreign
bonds. A productivity shock increases the marginal product of capital above the rate of return
on traded bonds which triggers capital accumulation. Because the economy has perfect access
22Linearizing the capital accumulation equation which clears the non traded goods market K˙(t) =
Y N (K(t), P (t)) − CN (P (t)) − δKK(t) and the dynamic equation for the relative price of non traded goods
which equalizes the rates of return on domestic capital and foreign bonds P˙ (t) = P (t)
[
(δK + r
?)− R(t)
P (t)
]
, the
(linearized) system possesses one negative eigenvalue denoted by ν1 and one positive eigenvalue ν2 = r
? − ν1.
The stable path for the relative price is: P (t)− P = ω12 (K(t)−K).
23While we solve the steady-state keeping unchanged the capital stock and the stock of foreign bonds, these
two aggregates can be determined as follows. The system consisting of (15)-(16), (30)-(31), and (28a)-(28b)
together with Y N = CN+δKK, K = k
TLT+kNLN (first inserting the solutions for LT = LT
(
λ¯,K, P, ZT , ZN
)
and LN = LN
(
λ¯,K, P, ZT , ZN
)
) and (32), can be solved for K, B and λ¯ as functions of ZT and ZN .
24When solving the steady-state, changes in capital stock and foreign assets as reflected by changes in υI
and υB are assumed to be exogenous. Such a procedure allows us to isolate the relative price and relative wage
effects stemming from capital accumulation and changes in traded bonds holding.
25This point can be seen formally by combining (30) and (28a).
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to external borrowing, capital accumulation can be financed by running a current account
deficit along the transitional path. For the intertemporal solvency condition to hold, the
country must run a trade balance surplus in the long run. Increased net exports raise the
demand for tradables which in turn impinges on the relative price and the relative wage.
Hence, compared with a model abstracting from physical capital, a productivity differential
affects P and Ω ≡ WN/W T through a capital accumulation channel stemming from
changes in K and B.
4.2 Relative Price and Relative Wage Effects
Before turning to the numerical analysis, we analytically break down the relative price and
relative wage effects of a productivity differential between tradables and non tradables in
three components.
We first explore the relative wage effect of a productivity differential by equating relative
labor supply (24) and relative labor demand to eliminate lT − lN .26 Differentiating, and
noting that υB = −υNX where we denote by υNX ≡
(
Y T − CT ) /Y T the ratio of net exports
to traded output, yields the deviation in percentage of the relative wage from its initial steady-
state:27
ωˆ = − (φ− 1) [ΘL + (ΘK −ΘL)] [zˆT − (θT /θN) zˆN]−ΘK (dυNX − dυI) , (33)
where ΘK ≡ 1
[(²+1)+θT (φ−1)] > 0, Θ
L =
(
1
²+φ
)
> 0 (see (26)), and zˆT − (θT /θN) zˆN is the
labor share-adjusted TFP differential.
Eq. (33) breaks down ωˆ into three components. Setting the labor income share θT to
1 in (33) implies ΘK = ΘL and dυNX = dυI = 0. Hence, when abstracting from physical
capital accumulation, (33) reduces to ωˆ = − (φ− 1)ΘL (zˆT − zˆN) (see eq. (26)). In this
case, the relative wage is only affected through the productivity channel, as captured by
− (φ− 1)ΘL ≶ 0. In a model abstracting from physical capital, the relative wage falls only
when the elasticity of substitution in consumption, φ, between traded and non traded goods
is larger than one since only in this case does the share of tradables rise.
26To determine labor demand, we use the market clearing condition (31), eliminate Y j by using production
functions (1) and eliminate P by dividing the second equality of (28b) by the first equality. Then using (30)
and (28a) to eliminate the sectoral capital-labor ratios, combining the market-clearing condition (31) along
with the optimal rule allocating consumption into tradables and non tradables (15) and production functions
(1), and taking logarithm allow us to derive the (relative) LD-schedule:(
lT − lN
) ∣∣LD = [1 + θT (φ− 1)]ω + (φ− 1)(zT − θT
θN
zN
)
− ln
(
1 + υB
1− υI
)
− lnΘ,
where Θ > 0 is a term composed of exogenous preference (ϕ, φ) and production parameters (θj , δK , r
?).
27Note that to derive the RHS of (33), we use a first-order Taylor approximation to rewrite d ln
(
1+υB
1−υI
)
as
dυB +dυI which eases the discussion. Remembering that at the steady-state the traded good market clearing
condition is −NX = r?B. Dividing the LHS and the RHS by Y T , we get υB = −υNX .
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Eq. (33) reveals that introducing physical capital (i.e., θj < 1) produces two additional
effects on the relative wage. First, the effect of a productivity differential on ω stemming
from the shift of capital across sectors is captured by the term − (φ− 1) (ΘK −ΘL) < 0,
as shown in the RHS of (33). Hence the capital reallocation channel exerts a negative
impact on ω irrespective of whether φ > 1 or φ < 1. If φ < 1, the shift of capital towards the
non traded sector lowers p by raising non traded output; the fall in the relative price exerts a
negative impact on the marginal product of labor in the non traded sector and therefore on
the relative wage. When φ > 1, the productivity differential shifts capital towards the traded
sector which raises the marginal product of labor in this sector and thus reduces the relative
wage further. In terms of Figure 3(a), when considering capital, the LD-schedule becomes
steeper (if φ > 1) so that it intercepts the LS-schedule for a relative wage below ω1.
Second, when introducing physical capital, the productivity differential impinges on ωˆ
through a capital accumulation channel, as captured by −ΘK (dυNX − dυI) < 0. Because
higher productivity raises the rate of return on domestic capital, it is optimal for the economy
to accumulate physical capital by running a current account deficit which must be matched in
the long run by a trade balance surplus. Further, the improvement in the trade balance must
exceed the investment boom because along the transitional path, the current account deficit
is induced by the combined effect of capital accumulation and reduced savings.28 Formally,
we have dυNX−dυI > 0. Higher steady-state net exports raise demand for tradables, with an
expansionary effect on labor demand in the traded sector, thereby lowering ω. Graphically,
in terms of Figure 3(a), the capital accumulation channel shifts the LD-schedule to the right,
regardless of the value of the elasticity of substitution between traded and non traded goods.
We now explore the long-run response of the relative price of non tradables to a produc-
tivity differential by equating demand (15) and supply of tradables in terms of non tradables
to eliminate yT − yN .29 Differentiating yields the deviation in percentage of the relative price
from its initial steady-state:
pˆ = (1 + ²)
[
ΘL +
(
ΘK −ΘL)] [zˆT − (θT /θN) zˆN]− θTΘK (dυNX − dυI) . (34)
When assuming perfect mobility of labor across sectors as in the standard BS model, (34)
reduces to pˆ = zˆT − (θT /θN) zˆN .
28The worker/consumer reduces private savings to avoid a reduction in consumption while she/he lowers
labor supply.
29Using (28b) to determine the relative wage Ω, inserting the optimal allocation of aggregate labor supply
across sectors (16) and production functions (1), using (30) and (28a) to eliminate the sectoral capital-labor
ratios, and taking logarithm yields the relative LME-schedule:(
yT − yN
) ∣∣LME = − [²+ (1− θT
θT
)
(1 + ²)
]
p+
(
1 + ²
θT
)(
zT − θ
T
θN
zN
)
+ lnΠ.
where Π > 0 is a term composed of exogenous preference (ϑ, ²) and production parameters (θj , δK , r
?).
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Conversely, assuming imperfect mobility of labor across sectors while abstracting from
physical capital accumulation (by setting θj = 1), (34) reduces to pˆ = (1 + ²)ΘL
[
zˆT − zˆN].
In this case, only the productivity channel, reflected by (1 + ²)ΘL > 0, is in effect (see eq.
(27)). According to the productivity channel, a 1 percentage point increase in the productivity
differential raises the relative price of non tradables less (more) than proportionately if the
elasticity of substitution φ is larger (smaller) than one.
Introducing physical capital produces two additional channels through which a produc-
tivity differential may impinge on the relative price of non tradables. First, the effect of a
productivity differential on p stemming from the shift of capital across sectors is captured by
the term (1 + ²)
(
ΘK −ΘL) ≷ 0, as shown in the RHS of (34), depending on whether φ ≷ 1.
Hence, the capital reallocation channel may reinforce the increase in p triggered by the
productivity channel if φ > 1 or may moderate it if φ < 1. In the latter case, capital shifts
towards the non traded sector, thereby raising output in that sector, which lowers p. When
φ > 1, the shift of capital towards the traded sector amplifies the increase in p by raising
the marginal product of labor (and hence wages in that sector) so that the consecutive labor
inflow raises traded output.
When introducing physical capital, a productivity differential also impinges on p through
a capital accumulation channel captured by −θTΘK (dυNX − dυI) < 0 (see the second
term on the RHS of (34)). The capital accumulation channel always exerts a negative impact
on p. As mentioned above, the long-run improvement in the trade balance raises the demand
for tradables which produces a fall in p. Graphically, in terms of Figure 3(b), the capital
accumulation channel shifts the GME-schedule to the right, regardless of the value of φ.
To conclude, we have to consider two cases depending on whether the elasticity of substi-
tution between traded and non traded goods is larger or smaller than one:
• If φ > 1, when abstracting from physical capital, higher productivity growth in tradables
relative to non tradables lowers the relative wage and increases the relative price of non
tradables less than proportionately, in line with our evidence. Introducing physical
capital exerts two opposite effects on the relative price while both channels reduce the
relative wage. First, a productivity differential induces a shift of capital towards the
traded sector, which pushes up the relative price and lowers the relative wage. Second,
increased demand for tradables due to the long-run trade balance surplus drives down
both the relative price of non tradables and the relative wage.
• When φ < 1, a model without physical capital predicts that higher productivity growth
in tradables relative to non tradables raises the relative wage and more than proportion-
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ately increases the relative price, in contradiction to our evidence. Introducing physical
capital produces two novel channels which lower the relative price and the relative wage.
First, by shifting capital towards the non traded sector, a productivity differential exerts
a negative impact on p and ω. Second, the trade balance surplus further reduces p and
ω.
While in the latter case (i.e., φ < 1), the capital reallocation and accumulation channels
counteract the productivity channel, we have to determine numerically if they are large enough
to produce a decline in the relative wage and a less than proportional increase in the relative
price following a productivity differential between tradables and non tradables.
5 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we analyze the effects of a 1 percentage point increase in the labor share-
adjusted TFP differential quantitatively. For this purpose we solve the model numerically.30
Therefore, first we discuss parameter values before turning to the long-term consequences of
higher productivity growth in tradables relative to non tradables.
5.1 Calibration
To calibrate our model, we estimated a set of parameters so that the initial steady-state is
consistent with the key empirical properties of a representative OECD economy. While at the
end of the section we move a step further and calibrate the model for each economy, we first
have to evaluate the ability of the two-sector open economy model with physical capital and
imperfect mobility of labor to accommodate the less than proportional increase in the relative
price and the decline in the relative wage. Our sample covers the fourteen OECD economies
in our dataset. Our reference period for the calibration corresponds to the period 1990-2007.
Since we calibrate a two-sector model with tradables and non tradables, we pay particular
attention to the adequacy of the non-tradable content of the model to the data. Table 7
in Appendix B summarizes our estimates of the non-tradable content of GDP, employment,
consumption, and gives the share of government spending on the traded and non traded goods
in the sectoral output, the shares of labor income in output in both sectors, for all countries
in our sample.31 Targeted ratios when calibrating to the representative OECD economy are
the fourteen OECD countries’ unweighted average shown in the last line of Table 7.
30Technically, the assumption β = r? requires the joint determination of the transition and the steady-state.
We have recourse to the standard linear approximation.
31Government spending on traded GT and non traded goods PGN are considered for calibration purposes.
Hence, the market clearing condition for the traded good and the non traded good at the steady-state are
r?B + Y T = CT +GT and Y N = CN + I +GN .
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We start by describing the calibration of consumption-side parameters that we use as a
baseline. The world interest rate which is equal to the subjective time discount rate β is set
to 4%. One period of time corresponds to a year. In light of our discussion above, both ² and
φ play a key role in the determination of the relative price and the relative wage responses to
a productivity differential.32 Building on our panel data estimations, we set the elasticity of
substitution to 1 in the baseline calibration but conduct a sensitivity analysis by considering
alternatively a value of φ smaller or larger than one (i.e., φ is set to 0.5 and 1.5, respectively).33
The degree of labor mobility captured by ² is set to 0.8 which corresponds roughly to
the average of our estimates shown in column 1 of Table 6 in Appendix B. Our estimates
display a wide dispersion across countries and we therefore conduct a sensitivity analysis with
respect to this parameter. Excluding the estimate of ² for Denmark which is not statistically
significant at 10%, estimates of ² range from a low of 0.22 for the Netherlands to a high of
1.80 for the United States. Hence, we allow for ² to vary between 0.2 and 1.8 in the sensitivity
analysis.
The weight of consumption in non tradables 1− ϕ is set to 0.43 to target a non-tradable
content in total consumption expenditure (i.e., αC) of 43%, in line with the average of our
estimates shown in the last line of Table 7. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution for
consumption σC is set to 1. In our baseline parametrization, we set the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution for labor supply σL to 0.5, in line with evidence reported by Domeij and Flode´n
[2006], but conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to this parameter. The weight of labor
supply to the non traded sector, 1− ϑ, is set to 0.6 to target a non-tradable content of labor
compensation of 65%, in line with the average of our estimates shown in the last line of Table
7.
We now describe the calibration of production-side parameters. We assume that physical
capital depreciates at a rate δK = 6% to target an investment-GDP ratio of 20%. The shares
of sectoral labor income in output take two different values depending on whether the traded
sector is more or less capital intensive than the non traded sector. If kT > kN , labor shares
in the traded (θT ) and the non traded sector (θN ) are set to 0.6 and 0.7, respectively, which
correspond roughly to the averages for countries with kT > kN . When kN > kT , we use
32Appendix B presents the empirical strategy while details of derivation of the relationship we explore
empirically can be found in a Technical Appendix.
33As shown in Table 6, estimates of φ for Ireland and Italy are either negative or not statistically significant.
Hence, column 2 of Table 5 reports only consistent estimates for the elasticity of substitution φ between traded
and non traded goods which average to 0.9. The advantage of setting φ to 1 in the baseline scenario is twofold.
First, the share of non traded goods in consumption expenditure αC coincides with the weight of the non
traded good 1 − ϕ in the CES sub-utility function (9) if φ = 1. Second, setting φ = 1 implies that only the
capital accumulation channel is in effect as the baseline and capital reallocation channels vanish, allowing us
to highlight the intertemporal effect trigged by the investment boom.
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reverse but symmetric values, i.e., θT = 0.7 and θN = 0.6. As in Ghironi and Melitz [2005],
we assume that traded firms are 50 percent more productive than non traded firms; hence we
set ZT and ZN to 1.5 and 1, respectively.
For calibration purposes, we introduce government spending on traded and non traded
goods in the setup. We set GN and GT so as to yield a non-tradable share of government
spending of 90%, and government spending as a share of GDP of 20%.34 In line with the
averages of the values reported in the last line of Table 7, the ratios GT /Y T and GN/Y N are
5% and 28% in the baseline calibration.
We consider a permanent increase in the TFP index Zj of both sectors biased towards
the traded sector so that the labor share-adjusted productivity differential between tradables
and non tradables, i.e., zˆT − (θT /θN) zˆN , is 1%. While in our baseline calibration we set
φ = 1, ² = 0.8, σL = 0.5, θT = 0.6, we conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to these
four parameters by setting alternatively: φ to 0.5 and 1.5, ² to 0.2 and 1.8, σL to 0.2 and 1,
and the sectoral labor income share θT to 0.7.
5.2 Discussion
The relative price and relative wage responses are summarized in Table 4. For comparison
purposes, column 1 summarizes our empirical evidence for the whole sample. Since a two-
sector model (with imperfect mobility of labor) abstracting from physical capital accumulation
fails to account for the evidence when the elasticity of substitution between traded and non
traded goods is smaller than one, we first discuss the numerical results in this configuration.
Panels C and D of Table 4 report the long-run changes (in percentage) for the (log) relative
price of non traded goods p and the (log) relative wage ω ≡ wN −wT . The numbers reported
in the first line of each panel give the (overall) responses of these variables to a 1 percentage
point increase in the productivity differential between tradables and non tradables.
Column 2 of Table 4 shows that the standard two-sector model assuming perfect mobility
of labor across sectors predicts an unchanged relative wage and an increase in the relative price
of 1%. While the standard BS model fails to account for the evidence, the predictive power
of the two-sector model improves when we introduce two ingredients: imperfect mobility of
labor across sectors and physical capital. More precisely, the results summarized in column 3
for the benchmark scenario reveal that ω falls by 0.24% while p increases by 0.85%.
To emphasize the key role of physical capital in improving the predictive power of the
model, it is useful to break down the responses of the relative wage and relative price into three
34Sectoral government spending allows us to target a non-tradable content of GDP of 63% in accordance
with the mean value shown in the last line of Table 7.
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components: a productivity effect, a capital reallocation effect, and a capital accumulation
effect stemming from changes in the overall capital stock and therefore in net exports. When
breaking down the effects, the second line of panel D shows that a model abstracting from
physical capital predicts an increase in p by 1.38%. The reason is that when the elasticity of
substitution φ is smaller than one, the relative price must increase more than proportionately
to clear the goods market. Moreover, as shown in the second line of panel C, the relative wage
increases instead of decreasing as expenditure on non tradables rises relative to expenditure
on tradables, therefore producing an expansionary effect on labor demand in the non traded
sector.
The third line and the fourth line of panels C and D show that both the capital reallocation
and capital accumulation channels counteract the productivity channel. More precisely, the
third line of panel D reveals that the capital reallocation channel produces a fall in the relative
price of non tradables (by 0.18%) by raising non traded output as capital shifts towards the
non traded sector. The decline in p lowers the marginal product of labor in the non traded
sector, which reduces ω (by 0.05%), as shown in the third line of panel C. Productivity growth
in tradables relative to non tradables also lowers p and ω through the capital accumulation
channel. More precisely, the long-run improvement in the trade balance raises the demand for
tradables, which substantially reduces the relative price by 0.34%, as shown in the fourth line
of panel D. Additionally, to hire more workers, the traded sector must pay higher wages which
significantly drives down the relative wage by 0.57%. Importantly, numerical results show that
both the capital reallocation and accumulation channels are large enough to produce a less
than proportional increase in p and a decline in ω, in line with the evidence established in
section 2.
Columns 6 and 7 of Table 4 reveal that the degree of labor mobility substantially modifies
the results. As labor mobility increases (i.e., ² is raised from 0.2 to 1.8), the first line of panel
C and panel D indicates that p increases more while ω falls less, in line with the evidence
documented in section 2. Introducing physical capital plays a key role in accommodating the
data. As shown in the fourth line of panel C and D, raising labor mobility across sectors
significantly moderates the capital accumulation channel. As workers are more willing to
shift hours worked across sectors, traded wages increase by a smaller amount, dampening the
decline in ω from -0.87% to -0.35%. Because traded output increases by a larger amount as
² is raised from 0.2 to 1.8, the relative price must fall less to clear the goods market.
As shown in columns 4 and 5, the elasticity of labor supply merely affects the results
by modifying the capital accumulation channel.35 Finally, columns 8 and 9 of Table 4 show
35The reason is as follows. Following the productivity differential, the worker/consumer lowers labor supply
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results when it is assumed that the non traded sector is more capital intensive than the traded
sector. If the assumption of perfect mobility across sectors is imposed, the responses of ω and
p shown in column 8 are unchanged compared with those displayed in column 2 where we
impose kT > kN . When assuming imperfect labor mobility, a comparison of the responses of
ω and p in column 9 with those shown in column 3 indicates that our results are robust to
sectoral capital intensities.36
Let us briefly discuss the scenario of an elasticity of substitution between CT and CN
larger than one. As shown in column 3 of Table 4, the second line of panels E and F reveals
that a model abstracting from physical capital predicts the responses of ω and p estimated
empirically fairly well. However, as shown in the first line of panel E, the model tends
to overstate the decline in the relative wage because both the capital reallocation and the
capital accumulation channels reinforce the productivity channel.
Finally, we explore the relative wage and relative price effects when the elasticity of sub-
stitution between tradables and non tradables is set to one. This case is shown in panel A
and panel B of Table 4. The second line reveals that a model with imperfect labor mobility
across sectors abstracting from physical capital, yields identical results to those obtained in
the standard BS framework assuming ²→∞, because the share of tradables in total expendi-
ture remains unchanged. However, by producing a trade balance surplus in the long run, the
model with physical capital and imperfect mobility of labor lowers ω and exerts a negative
impact on p (thus producing a less than proportional increase in p), as shown in the fourth
line of panel A and panel B of Table 4. Alternative scenarios yield similar results to those
discussed above and therefore do not merit further comment.
< Please insert Table 4 about here >
5.3 Taking the Model to the Data
We now compare the predicted values for pˆ and ωˆ with empirical estimates of β and γ for
each country and the whole sample. To do so, we keep the baseline calibration unchanged,
except for the parameter capturing the degree of labor mobility across sectors (i.e., ²) and the
elasticity of substitution between traded and non traded goods (i.e., φ) which play a major
on impact and thus reduces private savings to avoid a decline in consumption, all else being equal. The more
responsive the labor supply, the more private savings decline, and therefore the larger the current account
deficit. As a result, net exports and therefore demand for tradables rise further, exerting a larger negative
impact on ω and p, as shown in the fourth line of panel C and D, respectively.
36Numerical results indicate that raising θT from 0.6 to 0.7 while reducing θN from 0.7 to 0.6 moderates the
capital reallocation channel. When the non traded sector becomes more capital intensive, the capital inflow
in the non traded sector is less pronounced as the traded sector is more labor intensive. Hence, decreases in p
and ω due to the shift of capital are moderated.
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role in the determination of responses of p and ω.37 When numerically computing ωˆi and pˆi
for each country i, we set ²i and φi in accordance with their empirical estimates shown in
columns 1 and 2 of Table 5. When contrasting predicted with empirically estimated values
for pˆ and ωˆ for the whole sample, we set ² to 0.61 and φ to 0.66 which correspond to their
estimates for the whole sample, i.e., when assuming ²i = ² and φi = φ.
Results are shown in Table 5. Columns 3 and 6 of Table 5 give the predicted responses
of pˆ and ωˆ to a 1 percentage point increase in the productivity differential between tradables
and non tradables. Columns 4 and 7 report fully modified OLS estimates of pˆ and ωˆ for
each country and the whole sample.38 Column 5 gives the ratio between the actual and the
predicted value for the relative price response; when the ratio is smaller (larger) than one, the
model tends to overstate (understate) the actual values. As shown in the last line of Table
5, for the whole sample, our two-sector model with imperfect mobility of labor across sectors
predicts the actual response (i.e., 0.78%) of the relative price remarkably well. Column 5
also reveals that our model’s predictions for pˆ are close to the evidence, i.e., the error does
not exceed 10%, for nine of the countries in our sample, and to a lesser extent for Belgium,
Finland and Korea.
< Please insert Table 5 about here >
When we turn to the relative wage response, we find that the model tends to substantially
overstate the response of the relative wage. For the whole sample, the model predicts a decline
in ω by 0.35% while the relative wage is found to fall by 0.27% in the data. The difference
between actual and predicted values reported in the last column reveals that the two-sector
model is able to predict the relative wage response for six countries pretty well, including
Germany, Italy, Korea, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom and to a lesser extent for
France, Japan and the United States. By and large, the figures shown in the last column
of Table 5 indicate that the model tends to overstate the decline in the relative wage as the
difference between actual and predicted values shown in the last column is positive for ten
countries.
37While we could calibrate the model so as to target the ratios summarized in Table 7 for each country,
we only allow for ² and φ to vary across countries. The reason is twofold. First, we have shown analytically
and numerically that both the degree of labor mobility ² and the elasticity of substitution play a major role
in determining the responses of the relative price and the relative wage to a productivity differential. In a
Technical Appendix, we contrast the prediction error allowing for ² and φ to vary across countries with that
when the calibration of the model is consistent with the key ratios of each economy as well. While the latter
strategy reduces the model’s prediction error, the discrepancy between the two approaches is small. Second, our
aim is to isolate the role of the degree of labor mobility ² and of the elasticity of substitution φ in determining
the responses of p and ω to a productivity differential, all else being equal. Keeping the baseline calibration
unchanged except for ² and φ is consistent with our objective.
38Because we use the FMOLS procedure to estimate φ, and since FMOLS and DOLS cointegration procedures
give very similar estimates for the relative price and relative wage responses to a productivity differential, we
compare predicted values with FMOLS estimates of β and γ. We reach similar conclusions when using DOLS
estimates.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed the relative price and the relative wage effects of higher
productivity growth in tradables relative to non tradables in a two-sector small open economy
model with imperfect mobility of labor across sectors. To guide our theoretical analysis,
we have estimated the responses of the relative price of non tradables and the ratio of the
non traded wage to the traded wage to a productivity differential. For a sample covering
fourteen OECD countries over the period 1970-2007, three major results emerge. Following a
1 percentage point increase in the productivity differential, i) the relative price increases by
0.78%, ii) the relative wage declines by 0.27%, and iii) the relative price rises more while the
relative wage falls less as the degree of labor mobility across sectors increases.
We find analytically that two parameters play a major role in the determination of the
relative price and relative wage responses to technological change biased toward the traded
sector: the elasticity of substitution in consumption between traded and non traded goods
and the extent of the difficulty in reallocating labor across sectors. After estimating these
two parameters and calibrating the two-sector model, the numerical results reveal that two
ingredients are necessary to account for the set of evidence: imperfect mobility of labor across
sectors and physical capital accumulation. Quantitatively, we find that our calibrated and
simulated two-sector model predicts the response of the relative price fairly well but tends to
overstate the decline in the relative wage.
Our quantitative exercise suggests that further work has to be done to improve the predic-
tive power of the two-sector model regarding the response of the relative wage. We believe that
our assumption of perfectly competitive labor markets is too strong; in this regard, extending
the setup to labor market frictions in the tradition of Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides should
improve the model’s performance. Such a framework also has the advantage of clarifying
the nature of switching costs across sectors, in particular induced by labor market regula-
tion, such as firing costs, generous unemployment benefit schemes, or high worker bargaining
power. Moreover, while we assume that labor is homogenous, the change in the skill premium
could potentially impinge on the relative price and the relative wage of non tradables as long
as the low-skilled (or high-skilled) labor income shares are heterogenous across sectors. We
leave a further analysis of these issues for future research.
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Figure 1: Relative Price and Relative Wage Growth against Productivity Growth Differen-
tial. Notes: Figure 1(a) plots the average relative price growth (Y -axis) against the average
productivity growth differential between tradables and non tradables (X-axis) while Figure
1(b) plots the average relative wage growth (Y -axis) against the average productivity growth
differential (X-axis) over the period 1970-2007 (1974-2007 for Japan).
Table 1: Panel Unit Root Tests (p-values)
Test Stat Variables
p ω zT − (θT /θN )zN p− (zT − (θT /θN )zN )
Levin et al. [2002] t-stat 0.840 0.001 0.991 0.295
Breitung [2000] t-stat 0.730 0.520 0.592 0.138
Im et al. [2003] Wtbar 1.000 0.398 1.000 0.930
Maddala and Wu [1999] P(ADF-stat) 1.000 0.174 0.997 0.811
P(PP-stat) 0.982 0.250 1.000 0.911
Hadri [2000] Zµ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: For all tests, except for Hadri [2000], the null of a unit root is not rejected if p-value ≥ 0.05 at a 5% significance
level. For Hadri [2000], the null of stationarity is rejected if p-value ≤ 0.05 at a 5% significance level.
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Figure 2: Relative Price against Relative Wage Responses. Notes: Figure plots fully modified
OLS estimates of relative price responses to a labor-share adjusted TFPs differential against
relative wage responses. FMOLS estimates for each country are taken from Table 3.
Table 2: Panel Cointegration Estimates of β and γ for the Whole Sample
Panel A Dependent variable: Relative wage (ω)
eq. (6a) eq. (8a)
(1) (2) (3)
DOLS FMOLS DOLS FMOLS DOLS FMOLS
(zT − (θT /θN )zN ) −0.270a
(−22.27)
−0.270a
(−27.83)
−0.262a
(−28.18)
−0.269a
(−30.85)
−0.253a
(−25.55)
−0.258a
(−29.43)
(zT − (θT /θN )zN )× LR(2) 0.212c
(1.78)
0.164c
(1.80)
(zT − (θT /θN )zN )× LR(3) 0.162a
(2.80)
0.153b
(2.38)
t(β) = 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of countries 14 14 14 14 14 14
Number of observations 529 529 501 501 487 487
Panel B Dependent variable: Relative price (p)
eq. (6b) eq. (8b)
(1) (2) (3)
DOLS FMOLS DOLS FMOLS DOLS FMOLS
(zT − (θT /θN )zN ) 0.782a
(91.83)
0.779a
(108.91)
0.796a
(107.34)
0.780a
(118.24)
0.802a
(105.21)
0.788a
(118.74)
(zT − (θT /θN )zN )× LR(2) 0.125b
(2.39)
0.126b
(2.38)
(zT − (θT /θN )zN )× LR(3) 0.084b
(2.43)
0.089b
(2.46)
t(γ) = 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of countries 14 14 14 14 14 14
Number of observations 529 529 501 501 487 487
Notes: All regressions include country fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. a, b and c denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. The rows
t(β) = 0 and t(γ) = 1 report the p-value of the test of H0 : β = 0 and H0 : γ = 1 respectively, where in
this context, β and γ refer to the estimated coefficients. LR(2) and LR(3) are labor reallocation indices,
developed by Wacziarg and Wallack [2004], measuring the rate of workers who shift from one sector to
another over 2 and 3 years, respectively.
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Table 3: Panel Cointegration Estimates of βi and γi for Each Country (eq. (6))
Country Relative wage equation Relative price equation
βˆDOLSi βˆ
FMOLS
i γˆ
DOLS
i γˆ
FMOLS
i
BEL −0.160a
(−5.44)
−0.142a
(−5.10)
0.815a
(23.26)
0.825a
(24.75)
DEU −0.590a
(−14.03)
−0.582a
(−18.35)
0.624a
(10.14)
0.606a
(11.58)
DNK −0.452a
(−3.90)
−0.453a
(−5.53)
0.469a
(10.13)
0.470a
(14.68)
ESP −0.277a
(−6.97)
−0.280a
(−10.70)
0.821a
(21.99)
0.836a
(29.26)
FIN −0.224a
(−9.07)
−0.221a
(−11.66)
0.762a
(25.24)
0.733a
(28.38)
FRA −0.413a
(−5.15)
−0.412a
(−6.47)
0.840a
(33.66)
0.841a
(40.31)
GBR −0.122
(−1.52)
−0.141b
(−2.29)
0.941a
(8.82)
0.922a
(10.63)
IRL −0.171b
(−2.05)
−0.210a
(−3.34)
0.733a
(16.37)
0.737a
(22.50)
ITA −0.274a
(−9.64)
−0.290a
(−10.50)
0.786a
(34.72)
0.767a
(32.49)
JPN −0.192a
(−9.63)
−0.178a
(−10.25)
0.950a
(54.10)
0.970a
(56.74)
KOR −0.499a
(−9.28)
−0.482a
(−12.19)
0.648a
(40.34)
0.651a
(52.48)
NLD −0.375a
(−5.59)
−0.345a
(−6.12)
0.796a
(20.44)
0.800a
(24.85)
SWE −0.012
(−0.35)
−0.004
(−0.23)
0.925a
(11.33)
0.918a
(23.80)
USA −0.018
(−0.68)
−0.034
(−1.40)
0.837a
(33.06)
0.822a
(35.05)
Whole sample −0.270a
(−22.27)
−0.270a
(−27.83)
0.782a
(91.83)
0.779a
(108.91)
Notes: Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics are re-
ported in parentheses. a, b and c denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
levels.
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Figure 3: Relative Price and Relative Wage Effects of an Increase in aT − aN
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Table 4: Long-Term Relative Price and Relative Wage Responses (in %) to Higher Produc-
tivity Growth in Tradables relative to Non Tradables
Data BS Bench Labor supply Mobility kN > kT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(² =∞) (² = 0.8) (σL = 0.2) (σL = 1) (² = 0.2) (² = 1.8) (² =∞) (² = 0.8)
φ = 1
A.Relative Wage
Relative wage, ωˆ -0.27 0.00 -0.45 -0.47 -0.42 -0.68 -0.28 0.00 -0.41
Productivity effect 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Capital reallocation effect 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Capital accumulation effect 0.00 -0.45 -0.47 -0.42 -0.68 -0.28 0.00 -0.41
B.Relative Price
Relative price, pˆ 0.78 1.00 0.72 0.71 0.74 0.58 0.82 1.00 0.70
Productivity effect 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Capital reallocation effect 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Capital accumulation effect 0.00 -0.27 -0.28 -0.25 -0.41 -0.17 0.00 -0.29
φ < 1
C.Relative Wage
Relative wage, ωˆ -0.27 0.00 -0.24 -0.27 -0.21 -0.32 -0.16 0.00 -0.24
Productivity effect 0.00 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.71 0.22 0.00 0.38
Capital reallocation effect 0.00 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.16 -0.02 0.00 -0.04
Capital accumulation effect 0.00 -0.57 -0.59 -0.54 -0.87 -0.35 0.00 -0.58
D.Relative Price
Relative price, pˆ 0.78 1.00 0.85 0.83 0.87 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.82
Productivity effect 1.00 1.38 1.38 1.38 1.71 1.22 1.00 1.38
Capital reallocation effect 0.00 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.38 -0.10 0.00 -0.14
Capital accumulation effect 0.00 -0.34 -0.36 -0.32 -0.52 -0.21 0.00 -0.40
φ > 1
E.Relative Wage
Relative wage, ωˆ -0.27 0.00 -0.58 -0.60 -0.56 -0.87 -0.37 0.00 -0.54
Productivity effect 0.00 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.29 -0.15 0.00 -0.22
Capital reallocation effect 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.02
Capital accumulation effect 0.00 -0.34 -0.36 -0.32 -0.54 -0.21 0.00 -0.31
F.Relative Price
Relative price, pˆ 0.78 1.00 0.64 0.63 0.65 0.47 0.77 1.00 0.61
Productivity effect 1.00 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.71 0.85 1.00 0.78
Capital reallocation effect 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.05
Capital accumulation effect 0.00 -0.21 -0.22 -0.19 -0.32 -0.13 0.00 -0.22
Notes: Effects of a 1 percentage point increase in the labor share-adjusted TFPs differential between tradables and
non tradables. Column (1) gives estimates for the whole sample taken from the first column of Table 2 while columns
(2)-(9) show numerical results. Panels A and B show the deviation in percentage relative to the steady-state for
the (log) relative price of non tradables, p ≡ pN − pT , and the (log) ratio of the non traded to the traded wage,
ω ≡ wN − wT , respectively, and break down changes in a productivity effect (keeping unchanged sectoral capital-
labor ratios kj , the overall capital stock K and the stock of foreign bonds B), a capital reallocation effect (induced
by changes in kj keeping unchanged K and B), a capital accumulation effect (stemming from the investment boom
causing a current account deficit in the short-run and therefore requiring a steady-state improvement in the balance
of trade). While panels A and B show the results when setting φ to one, panels C and D show results for φ < 1
and panels E and F show results for φ > 1; φ is the elasticity of substitution between tradables and non tradables;
² captures the degree of labor mobility across sectors; σL is the elasticity of labor supply.
37
Table 5: Comparison of Predicted Values with Empirical Estimates
Country Parameters Relative price response Relative wage response
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mobility ² Substitutability φ pˆpredict pˆFMOLS (4)/(3) ωˆpredict ωˆFMOLS (7)-(6)
BEL 0.32 0.77 0.691 0.825 1.19 -0.498 -0.142 0.36
DEU 0.73 1.24 0.668 0.606 0.91 -0.535 -0.582 -0.05
DNK 0.12 1.42 0.445 0.470 1.06 -0.905 -0.453 0.45
ESP 1.65 0.78 0.844 0.836 0.99 -0.245 -0.280 -0.04
FIN 0.53 1.04 0.662 0.733 1.11 -0.545 -0.221 0.32
FRA 1.26 0.75 0.823 0.841 1.02 -0.279 -0.412 -0.13
GBR 0.99 0.48 0.867 0.922 1.06 -0.207 -0.141 0.07
IRL 0.25 - 0.720 0.737 1.02 -0.450 -0.210 0.24
ITA 0.77 - 0.798 0.767 0.96 -0.321 -0.290 0.03
JPN 0.99 0.81 0.786 0.970 1.23 -0.340 -0.178 0.16
KOR 1.80 1.79 0.744 0.651 0.88 -0.410 -0.482 -0.07
NLD 0.22 0.93 0.608 0.800 1.32 -0.635 -0.345 0.29
SWE 0.42 0.23 0.976 0.918 0.94 -0.026 -0.004 0.02
USA 1.80 0.58 0.884 0.822 0.93 -0.178 -0.034 0.14
Whole sample 0.61 0.66 0.779 0.779 1.00 -0.353 -0.270 0.08
Notes: ² captures the degree of labor mobility across sectors; φ is the intratemporal elasticity of substi-
tution between traded goods and non traded goods. We denote by superscripts “predict” and “FMOLS”
the numerically computed values and fully modified OLS estimates taken from Table 3, respectively;
column (5) gives the ratio of estimates to predicted values for the percentage change in the relative price
of non tradables while column (8) shows the difference between estimates and predicted values for the
percentage change in the relative wage of non tradables.
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A Data for Empirical Analysis
Coverage: Our sample consists of a panel of 14 countries: Belgium (BEL), Denmark (DNK), Finland
(FIN), France (FRA), Germany (DEU) Ireland (IRL), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), Korea (KOR), the
Netherlands (NLD), Spain (ESP), Sweden (SWE), the United Kingdom (GBR), and the United States
(USA). The period is running from 1970 to 2007, except for Japan (1974-2007).
Source: We use the EU KLEMS [2011] database (the March 2011 data release, available at
http://www.euklems.net) which provides annual data for eleven 1-digit ISIC-rev.3 industries.
Traded Sector comprises the following industries: Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing;
Mining and Quarrying; Total Manufacturing; Transport, Storage and Communication; and Financial
Intermediation.
Non Traded Sector comprises the following industries: Electricity, Gas and Water Supply;
Construction; Wholesale and Retail Trade; Hotels and Restaurants; Real Estate, Renting and Business
Services; and Community Social and Personal Services.
In the following, we provide details on data construction (mnemonics are in parentheses):
• The relative price of non tradables, Pt, corresponds to the ratio of the value added deflator
of non traded goods PNt to the value added deflator of traded goods PTt , i.e., Pt = PNt /PTt .
The sectoral value-added deflator P jt for sector j = T,N is calculated by dividing value added
at current prices (VA) by value added at constant prices (VA QI) in sector j.
• The relative wage of non tradables, Ωt, is calculated as the ratio of the nominal wage in the
non traded sector WNt to the nominal wage in the traded sector W
T
t , i.e., Ωt = W
N
t /W
T
t . The
sectoral nominal wage W jt for sector j = T,N is calculated by dividing labor compensation in
sector j (LAB) by total hours worked by persons engaged (H EMP) in that sector.
• The relative productivity of tradables, ZTt /
(
ZNt
)θT /θN , is calculated as the ratio of traded
TFP ZTt to the labor share-adjusted non traded TFP
(
ZNt
)θT /θN where sectoral TFPs are con-
structed as Solow residuals from constant-price domestic currency series of value added (VA QI),
capital, labor shares θj , and employment (H EMP) in sector j; θj is the ratio of the compen-
sation of employees (LAB) to value added (VA) in the jth sector, averaged over the period
1970-2007 (except Japan: 1974-2007). Aggregate capital stocks are estimated from the perpet-
ual inventory approach by using real gross capital formation from the OECD Economic Outlook
Database (data in millions of national currency, constant prices) and assuming a depreciation
rate of 5%. Following Garofalo and Yamarik [2002], the capital stock is then allocated to traded
and non traded industries by using sectoral output shares Kjt = $
j
tKt where $
j
t is the share of
sector j’s value added in overall output.
• The labor reallocation index (see eq. (7)), LRt(τ), is computed by using data for labor
(H EMP). Series for the rate of workers that have shifted from one sector to another over two
(LR(2)) or three (LR(3)) years cover the period 1972-2007 (1976-2007 for Japan) and 1973-2007
(1977-2007 for Japan), respectively.
B Data for Calibration
Table 7 shows the non-tradable content of GDP, consumption, government spending, labor, labor
compensation, and gives the share of government spending on traded and non traded goods in the
sectoral value added, the shares of labor income in value added in both sectors. Our sample covers
the 14 OECD countries mentioned in section A. Our reference period for the calibration corresponds
to the period 1990-2007. The choice of this period has been dictated by data availability.
To calculate the non-tradable share of output, employment and labor compensation, we split the
eleven industries into traded and non-traded sectors by adopting the classification proposed by De
Gregorio et al. [1994] and updated by Jensen and Kletzer [2006] (Source: EU KLEMS [2011]). The
non-tradable shares of output and labor, shown in columns 1 and 4 of Table 7, average to 63% and
65%, respectively. We calculate the non-tradable share of labor compensation as αL = WNLN/WL
where WL corresponds to overall labor compensation (Source: EU KLEMS [2011]). The non-tradable
share of compensation of employees, shown in column 5 of Table 7, averages to 65%.
To split consumption expenditure (at current prices) into consumption in traded and non traded
goods, we made use of the Classification of Individual Consumption by Purpose (COICOP) published
by the United Nations (Source: United Nations [2011]). Among the twelve items, the following ones
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are treated as consumption in traded goods: Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages; Alcoholic Beverages
Tobacco and Narcotics; Clothing and Footwear; Furnishings, Household Equipment; Transport; Mis-
cellaneous Goods and Services. The remaining items are treated as consumption in non traded goods:
Housing, Water, Electricity, Gas and Fuels; Health; Communication; Education; Restaurants and Ho-
tels. Because the item ’Recreation and Culture’ is somewhat problematic, we decided to consider it
as both tradable (50%) and non tradable (50%) with equal shares. Note that the non-tradable share
of consumption shown in column 2 of Table 7 averages to 43%, in line with the share reported by
Stockman and Tesar [1995].
Sectoral government expenditure data were obtained from the Government Finance Statistics Year-
book (Source: IMF [2011]) and the OECD General Government Accounts database (Source: OECD
[2011]). Adopting Morshed and Turnovsky’s [2004] methodology, the following four items were treated
as traded: Fuel and Energy; Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting; Mining, Manufacturing,
and Construction; Transport and Communications. Items treated as non traded are: Government
Public Services; Defense; Public Order and Safety; Education; Health; Social Security and Welfare;
Environment Protection; Housing and Community Amenities; Recreation Cultural and Community
Affairs. The non-tradable component of government spending shown in column 3 of Table 7 averages
to 90%. The proportion of government spending on the traded and non traded good (i.e., GT /Y T and
GN/Y N ) are shown in columns 6 and 7 of Table 7. They average 5% and 28%, respectively.
The labor income share for sector j denoted by θj is calculated as the ratio of labor compensation
to value added in current prices (Source: EU KLEMS [2011]). The labor income shares for the traded
and the non traded sector (i.e., θT and θN ) shown in columns 8 and 9 of Table 7 average 0.63 and 0.68,
respectively. When kT > kN , the shares of labor income average 0.61 and 0.69 for the traded and the
non traded sector, respectively, while if kN > kT , θT and θN average 0.72 and 0.64, respectively.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 show our estimates of ² which captures the degree of labor mobility
across sectors and of the elasticity of substitution φ between traded and non traded goods. We detail
our empirical strategy to estimate these two parameters for each country and the whole sample as well
below.
Along the lines of Horvath [2000], we derive a testable equation by combining optimal rules for
labor supply and labor demand and estimate ² by running the regression of the worker inflow in sector
j = T,N of country i at time t arising from labor reallocation across sectors computed as lˆji,t − lˆi,t on
the relative labor’s share percentage changes in sector j βˆji,t:
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lˆji,t − lˆi,t = fi + ft + γiβˆji,t + νji,t, (35)
where we denote logarithm in lower case and the deviation from initial steady-state by a hat; νji,t
is an i.i.d. error term; country fixed effects are captured by country dummies, fi, and common
macroeconomic shocks by year dummies, ft. The LHS term of (35) is calculated as the difference
between changes (in percentage) in hours worked in sector j, lˆji,t, and in total hours worked lˆi,t. The
RHS term βj corresponds to the fraction of labor’s share of output accumulating to labor in sector
j. Denoting by P jt Q
j
t the output at current prices in sector j = T,N at time t, β
j
t is computed
as ξ
jP jt Q
j
t∑T
j=N ξ
jP jt Q
j
t
where ξj is labor’s share in output in sector j = T,N defined as the ratio of the
compensation of employees to output in the jth sector, averaged over the period 1971-2007.40 Because
hours worked are aggregated by means of a CES function, total hours percentage change lˆi,t is calculated
as a weighted average of sectoral employment percentage changes, i.e., lˆt =
∑T
j=N β
j
t−1 lˆ
j
t . Data are
taken from EU KLEMS [2011] and the sample includes the 14 OECD countries mentioned above over
the period 1971-2007 (except for Japan: 1975-2007). When exploring empirically (35), the coefficient γ
is alternatively assumed to be identical, i.e., γi = γ, or to vary across countries. Building on our panel
data estimations, we calculate ²i by computing γi1−γi where in this context, γi refers to the estimated
coefficient. Table 6 reports empirical estimates over the period 1971-2007 with t-stats. All values are
statistically significant at 10%, except for Denmark. Estimates of ² are also reported in column 1 of
Table 5 when calibrating the model for each country.41
39Details of derivation of the equation we explore empirically can be found in a Technical Appendix.
40Like Horvath [2000], we use time series for output instead of value added so that our estimates can be
compared with those documented by the author.
41In a Technical Appendix, we address two potential econometric issues. While βji,t (i.e., the RHS term in
eq. (35)) is constructed independently from the dependent variable (i.e., the LHS term in eq. (35)), if the
labor’s share is (almost) constant over time and thus is close from the average ξj , an endogeneity problem
40
To estimate the elasticity of substitution in consumption φ between traded and non traded goods,
we first derive a testable equation by inserting the optimal rule for intra-temporal allocation of con-
sumption (15) into the goods market equilibrium which gives C
T
CN
= Y
T−NX−GT−IT
Y N−GN−IN =
(
ϕ
1−ϕ
)
Pφ
where NX ≡ B˙ − r?B is net exports, Ij and Gj are investment in physical capital and govern-
ment spending in sector j, respectively. Isolating
(
Y T −NX) /Y N and taking logarithm yields
ln
(
Y T−NX
Y N
)
= α + φ lnP . Adding an error term µ, we estimate φ by running the regression of
the (logged) output of tradables adjusted with net exports at constant prices in terms of output of
non tradables on the (logged) relative price of non tradables:
ln
(
Y T −NX
Y N
)
i,t
= fi + ft + αit+ φi lnPi,t + µi,t, (36)
where fi and ft are the country fixed effects and time dummies, respectively. Because the term
α ≡ ln (1−υGN−υIN )(1−υGT−υIT ) + ln
(
ϕ
1−ϕ
)
is composed of ratios, denoted by υGj and υIj , of GT (GN ) and IT
(IN ) to Y T − NX (Y N ) and hence may display a trend over time, we add country-specific linear
trends, as captured by αit.42
Instead of using time series for sectoral value added, we can alternatively make use of series for
sectoral labor compensation by inserting the first-order condition equating the marginal revenue of
labor and the sectoral wage, i.e., θ
jP jY j
Lj =W
j , into the goods market clearing condition. Eliminating
Y j , denoting by γT =
(
WTLT − θTPTNX) and γN =WNLN , and taking logarithm yields ln( γT
γN
)
=
η+φ lnP where η is a term composed of both preference (i.e., ϕ) and production (i.e., θj) parameters,
and (logged) ratios of GT (GN ) and IT (IN ) to WTLT − θTPTNX (WNLN ). We estimate φ by
exploring alternatively the following empirical relationship:
ln
(
γT /γN
)
i,t
= gi + gt + σit+ φi lnPi,t + ζi,t, (37)
where gi and gt are the country fixed effects and time dummies, respectively, and we add country-
specific trends, as captured by σit, because η is composed of ratios that may display a trend over
time.
Time series for sectoral value added at constant prices, labor compensation, and the relative price
of non tradables are taken from EU KLEMS [2011] (see section A). Net exports correspond to the
external balance of goods and services at current prices taken from the OECD Economic Outlook
Database. To construct time series for net exports at constant prices NX, data are deflated by the
value added deflator of traded goods PT .
Since LHS terms of (36) and (37) and relative price of non tradables display trends, we ran unit root
and then cointegration tests. Having verified that these two assumptions are empirically supported,
we estimate the cointegrating relationships by using the fully modified OLS (FMOLS) procedure for
cointegrated panels proposed by Pedroni [2000], [2001]. FMOLS estimates are reported in the second
and the third column of Table 6, considering alternatively eq. (36) or eq. (37). Estimates of φ are
reported in column 2 of Table 5 when calibrating the model for each country. As a reference model,
we consider eq. (36); exploring the empirical relationship (36) gives an estimate for the whole sample
of 0.66 which is roughly halfway between estimates documented by cross-section studies, notably
Stockman and Tesar [1995] who find a value for φ of 0.44 and Mendoza [1995] who reports an estimate
of 0.74. Yet, as shown in column 2 of Table 6, estimates for Belgium, Denmark, and Korea are not
statistically significant and thus we take consistent estimates obtained when exploring the empirical
relationship (37) for these three economies. Because estimates for Italy and Ireland are either negative
may potentially show up. Our empirical results reveal that for the majority of the countries in our sample, the
dependent variable does not Granger-cause the explanatory variable. A second econometric issue is related to
the correlation of dependent variables across sectors within each country. We thus relax the homoscedasticity
assumption and allow standard errors of the residuals to be clustered at the country level. By and large,
our results suggest that allowing errors to be correlated within each country merely influences the statistical
significance of our estimates of the degree of labor mobility across sectors for the whole sample and the majority
of the countries.
42Because an endogeneity problem of relative prices may potentially affect our econometric results, we ran
Granger causality tests. Our empirical results reveal that for the majority of the countries in our sample, the
dependent variable does not Granger-cause the explanatory variable. Our results show that one can consider
the regressor in eq. (36) as exogenous with respect to the dependent variable.
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Table 6: Panel Data Estimates of the Degree of Labor Mobility (²) and the Elasticity of
Substitution in Consumption between Tradables and Non Tradables (φ)
Country Labor Mobility ² Elasticity of substitution φ
eq. (35) (1971-2007) eq. (36) (1970-2007) eq. (37) (1970-2007)
²i φ
FMOLS
i φ
FMOLS
i
BEL 0.320b
(2.14)
0.205
(0.90)
0.770a
(4.78)
DEU 0.733b
(2.47)
1.236a
(3.98)
1.581a
(4.96)
DNK 0.119
(1.05)
0.493
(0.63)
1.416a
(2.69)
ESP 1.649a
(2.61)
0.779a
(5.29)
0.284c
(1.90)
FIN 0.525a
(3.09)
1.041a
(8.99)
1.354a
(7.71)
FRA 1.262b
(2.11)
0.749a
(4.95)
0.824a
(4.34)
GBR 0.994a
(3.29)
0.482a
(8.50)
1.202a
(16.87)
IRL 0.249a
(2.66)
0.133
(0.52)
−0.147
(−0.27)
ITA 0.768b
(2.48)
−0.006
(−0.05)
0.091
(0.88)
JPN 0.994b
(2.53)
0.811a
(4.16)
0.785a
(6.60)
KOR 1.795a
(3.06)
1.580
(1.58)
1.786a
(2.99)
NLD 0.216c
(1.66)
0.927b
(2.56)
0.786c
(1.87)
SWE 0.419a
(3.06)
0.231b
(2.15)
0.864a
(5.97)
USA 1.800c
(1.84)
0.577a
(3.02)
0.593c
(1.73)
Whole sample 0.607a
(10.22)
0.660a
(12.61)
0.871a
(16.84)
Notes: Fixed effects (country) regressions for ² and panel cointegration estimates for φ.
a, b and c denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels; t-statistics are reported in
parentheses.
or not statistically significant by using alternatively eq. (36) or eq. (37), estimates for φ for these two
countries are left blank and φ is set to our panel data estimation for the whole sample, i.e., 0.66, when
calibrating the model for each country.
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Table 7: Data to Calibrate the Two-Sector Model (1990-2007)
Country Non tradable Share Gj/Y j Labor Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Output Consumption Gov. Spending Labor Lab. comp. GT /Y T GN/Y N θT θN
BEL 0.65 0.42 0.91 0.68 0.66 0.06 0.30 0.61 0.63
DEU 0.65 0.40 0.91 0.65 0.60 0.05 0.27 0.75 0.63
DNK 0.66 0.42 0.94 0.68 0.68 0.05 0.36 0.63 0.70
ESP 0.64 0.46 0.88 0.66 0.67 0.06 0.24 0.60 0.66
FIN 0.58 0.43 0.89 0.63 0.63 0.06 0.34 0.59 0.73
FRA 0.70 0.40 0.94 0.69 0.68 0.05 0.31 0.70 0.64
GBR 0.64 0.40 0.93 0.70 0.65 0.04 0.29 0.70 0.73
IRL 0.52 0.43 0.89 0.62 0.62 0.04 0.26 0.46 0.69
ITA 0.64 0.38 0.91 0.63 0.62 0.05 0.28 0.71 0.64
JPN 0.63 0.43 0.86 0.64 0.65 0.06 0.22 0.55 0.60
KOR 0.52 0.44 0.76 0.58 0.56 0.06 0.18 0.73 0.83
NLD 0.65 0.40 0.90 0.70 0.69 0.07 0.32 0.60 0.70
SWE 0.64 0.45 0.92 0.68 0.67 0.06 0.39 0.63 0.71
USA 0.68 0.51 0.90 0.73 0.69 0.05 0.21 0.61 0.66
Mean 0.63 0.43 0.90 0.65 0.65 0.05 0.28 0.63 0.68
Notes: Gj/Y j is the share of government spending in good j in output of sector j. θj is the share of labor income in
output of sector j = T,N .
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IMPERFECT MOBILITY OF LABOR
ACROSS SECTORS:
A REAPPRAISAL OF THE
BALASSA-SAMUELSON EFFECT
TECHNICAL APPENDIX
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1
A Data Description
A.1 Data: Source and Construction
Coverage: Our sample consists of a panel of 14 countries: Belgium (BEL), Denmark (DNK), Finland
(FIN), France (FRA), Germany (DEU) Ireland (IRL), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), Korea (KOR), the
Netherlands (NLD), Spain (ESP), Sweden (SWE), the United Kingdom (GBR), and the United States
(USA). These countries have the most extensive coverage of variables of our interest.
Source: We use the EU KLEMS [2011] database (the March 2011 data release, available at
http://www.euklems.net) which provides annual data for eleven 1-digit ISIC-rev.3 industries. The
period is running from 1970 to 2007, except for Japan (1974-2007).
The eleven 1-digit ISIC-rev.3 industries are split into tradables and non tradables sectors. To do
so, we adopt the classification proposed by De Gregorio et al. [1994] who treat an industry as traded
when it exports at least 10% of its output. Following Jensen and Kletzer [2006], we have updated
the classification suggested by De Gregorio et al. [1994] by treating ”Financial Intermediation” as
a traded industry. Jensen and Kletzer [2006] use the geographic concentration of service activities
within the United States to identify which service activities are traded domestically. The authors
classify activities that are traded domestically as potentially traded internationally. The idea is that
when a good or a service is traded, the production of the activity is concentrated in a particular region
to take advantage of economies of scale in production.
Jensen and Kletzer [2006] use the two-digit NAICS (North American Industrial Classification
System) to identify tradable and non tradable sectors. We map their classification into the NACE-
ISIC-rev.3 used by the EU KLEMS database. The mapping was clear for all sectors except for ”Real
Estate, Renting and Business Services”. According to the EU KLEMS classification, the industry
labelled ”Real Estate, Renting and Business Services” is an aggregate of five sub-industries: ”Real
estate activities” (NACE code: 70), ”Renting of Machinery and Equipment” (71), ”Computer and
Related Activities” (72), ”Research and Development” (73) and ”Other Business Activities” (74).
While Jensen and Kletzer [2006] find that industries 70 and 71 can be classified as tradable, they do
not provide information for industries 72, 73 and 74. We decided to classify ”Real Estate, Renting
and Business Services” as non tradable but conduct a robustness check by contrasting our empirical
findings when ”Real Estate, Renting and Business Services” is non traded with those when ”Real
Estate, Renting and Business Services” is traded in section G.2. As shown in panel E of Table 15, our
conclusions hold and remain unsensitive to the classification.
Traded Sector comprises the following industries: Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing;
Mining and Quarrying; Total Manufacturing; Transport, Storage and Communication; and Financial
Intermediation.
Non Traded Sector comprises the following industries: Electricity, Gas and Water Supply;
Construction; Wholesale and Retail Trade; Hotels and Restaurants; Real Estate, Renting and Business
Services; and Community Social and Personal Services.
Relevant to our work, the EU KLEMS database provides data, for each industry and year, on value
added at current and constant prices, permitting the derivation of sectoral deflators of value added,
as well as details on labor compensation and employment data, allowing the construction of sectoral
wage rates. We describe below the construction for the data employed in Section 2 (mnemonics are
given in parentheses):
- Sectoral value-added deflator P jt for j = T,N : value added at current prices (VA) over value
added at constant prices (VA QI) in sector j. Source: EU KLEMS database. The relative price
of non tradables Pt corresponds to the ratio of the value added deflator of non traded goods to
the value added deflator of traded goods: Pt = PNt /P
T
t .
- Sectoral labor Ljt for j = T,N : total hours worked by persons engaged (H EMP) in sector j.
Source: EU KLEMS database.
- Sectoral nominal wage W jt for j = T,N : labor compensation in sector j (LAB) over total
hours worked by persons engaged (H EMP) in that sector. Source: EU KLEMS database. The
relative wage, Ωt is calculated as the ratio of the nominal wage in the non traded sector WN to
the nominal wage in the traded sector: Ωt =WNt /WTt .
Summary statistics of the data used in the empirical analysis are displayed in Table 9. As shown in
the first three columns, all countries of our sample experience technological change biased toward the
traded sector, an appreciation in the relative price of non tradables and a decline in the ratio of the
non traded wage relative to the traded wage.
2
Because data source and construction are heterogenous across variables as a result of different
nomenclatures, Table 8 provides a summary of the classification adopted to split value added and its
demand components as well intro traded and non traded goods.
A.2 Construction of Sectoral TFPs
To calculate the total factor productivity for sector j = T,N , we assume that traded and non traded
goods are produced with capital Kj and labor Lj according a constant returns to scale technology:
Y jt = Z
j
t (K
j
t )
1−θj (Ljt )
θj , (38)
where Y jt is value added, K
j
t is capital input, L
j
t is labor input, and θj corresponds to the labor
share in value added in sector j. Data for the series of constant-price value-added (VA QI) and labor
(H EMP) are taken from EU KLEMS database. The sectoral labor share in output corresponds to
the labor compensation in sector j (LAB) over value added at current prices (VA) averaged over the
period 1970-2007 (1974-2007 for Japan). Source: EU KLEMS database.
To construct the series for the sectoral capital stock, we proceed as follows. Capital stocks are
estimated from the perpetual inventory approach. In order to apply this method, we need (i) real
gross capital formation series, (ii) the initial capital stock in the base year, which is set to be 1970
and (iii) the rate of depreciation of the existing capital stock. Real gross capital formation is obtained
from OECD Economic Outlook Database (data in millions of national currency, constant prices).
Consistent with the neoclassical growth model, the initial capital stock, K1970, is computed using
the following formula:
K1970 =
I1970
gI + δK
,
where I1970 corresponds to the real gross capital formation in the base year 1970, gI is the average
growth rate from 1970 to 2007 of the real gross capital formation series and δ is the depreciation rate
which is assumed to be 5% (see Hall and Jones [1999]). The capital stock is obtained by using the
standard capital accumulation equation: Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + It for t = 1970, . . . , 2007 and where Kt
is the capital stock at the beginning of period t. Following Garofalo and Yamarik [2002], the gross
capital stock is then allocated to traded and non traded industries by using sectoral output shares:
Kjt = $
j
tKt,
where $jt is the share of sector j’s value added in overall output.
Sectoral TFPs (in log) zjt at time t are constructed as Solow residuals from constant-price (domestic
currency) series of value added yjt and capital stock k
j
t , and employment l
j
t :
zjt = y
j
t − θj ljt −
(
1− θj) kjt . (39)
Finally, the (log) relative productivity variable is computed as the labor share-adjusted ratio of traded
TFP to non traded TFP in the form zTt −
(
θT
θN
)
zNt . In cointegrating regressions, all variables of our
interest, namely Pt, Ωt and ZTt /(Z
N
t )
θT /θN are converted into index 1995=100 and are expressed in log
levels. Summary statistics of the relative productivity of tradables used in the empirical analysis are
displayed in Table 9. As shown in the third column, all countries of our sample experience a positive
productivity differential between tradables and non tradables.
A.3 Construction of the Labor Reallocation Index
The labor reallocation index denoted by LRt(τ) is the ratio of the absolute change in sectoral employ-
ment resulting from labor reallocation to average employment over τ years, with τ = 2, 3:
LRt(τ) =
∑N
j=T |Ljt − Ljt−τ | −
∣∣∣∑Nj=T Ljt −∑Nj=T Ljt−τ ∣∣∣
0.5
∑N
j=T (L
j
t−τ + L
j
t )
,
Data for labor (H EMP), used to compute LRt(τ), are taken from EU KLEMS database.
Summary statistics of the the labor reallocation index used in the empirical analysis are displayed
in Table 9. Columns 4 and 5 show the rate of workers who shift from one sector to another over
alternatively two or three years. On average, 1.33% of workers have shifted from one sector to another
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Table 9: Summary Statistics per Country (1970-2007)
Countries Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
pˆ ωˆ zˆT − (θT /θN )zˆN LR(2) LR(3)
BEL 2.18 -0.21 2.33 1.04 1.53
DEU 0.81 -0.61 1.28 0.99 1.50
DNK 0.73 -0.90 1.60 0.47 0.73
ESP 2.53 -0.97 3.00 0.81 1.05
FIN 2.43 -0.78 3.50 1.12 1.84
FRA 2.08 -0.97 2.45 1.13 1.76
GBR 1.46 -0.50 1.95 1.03 1.45
IRL 2.43 -0.98 3.11 0.49 0.88
ITA 1.94 -0.92 2.73 1.23 1.81
JPN 2.12 -0.55 2.25 0.71 0.97
KOR 3.21 -2.29 5.05 1.69 2.68
NLD 1.78 -0.39 2.16 0.34 0.48
SWE 2.22 -0.12 2.53 0.61 1.02
USA 1.66 -0.25 2.27 0.49 0.90
Average 1.97 -0.75 2.59 0.87 1.33
Notes: pˆ is the average growth rate for the relative price of non tradables,
ωˆ is the average growth rate for the relative wage of non tradables and
zˆT − (θT /θN )zˆN is the labor-share adjusted productivity differential be-
tween tradables and non tradables (average growth rate). For pˆ, ωˆ and
zˆT −(θT /θN )zˆN the data coverage is 1970-2007 (except Japan: 1974-2007).
Columns LR(2) and LR(3) display the mean of the labor reallocation index
LR resulting from sectoral changes in labor over 2 and 3 years respectively
(data coverage : 1972-2007 for LR(2) (1976-2007 for Japan) and 1973-2007
for LR(3) (1977-2007 for Japan)).
over any given 3-year period. This result is in line with the evidence documented by Davis and
Haltiwanger [1999] who find that most job reallocations are within sectors. There is considerable
heterogeneity in this indicator, which varies from a low of 0.48 for the Netherlands to a high of 2.68 for
Korea. It is worth noting that the labor reallocation indicator LR is not a measure of the intersectoral
labor mobility cost: some countries can exhibit a high LR index due to a large productivity differential.
We have to interact the LR index with the productivity differential to investigate whether countries
with larger labor shifts across sectors experience a more pronounced appreciation in the relative price
of non tradables and a smaller decline in the ratio of sectoral wages.
The low LR(2) index for the U.S. shown in Table 9 could be rationalized in the light of the
estimates documented by Kambourov and Manovskii [2009] who find that educated workers exhibit
lower occupational mobility than their less educated counterparts. Since the U.S. is endowed with
a high human capital per worker and because human capital is not perfectly transferable across all
occupations, it is expected to reduce workers’ mobility.
B Robustness Check for Panel Unit Tests and Cointegration
Tests
B.1 Robustness Check for Panel Unit Root Tests
In the paper, we consider five panel unit root tests among the most commonly used in the literature:
Levin, Lin and Chu ([2002], hereafter LLC), Breitung [2000], Im, Pesaran and Shin ([2003], hereafter
IPS), Maddala and Wu ([1999], hereafter MW) and Hadri [2000]. All tests, with the exception of Hadri
[2000], consider the null hypothesis of a unit root against the alternative that some members of the
panel are stationary. Additionally, they are designed for cross sectionally independent panels. LLC
and IPS are based on the use of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF hereafter) to each individual
series of the form ∆xi,t = αi + ρixi,t−1 +
∑qi
j=1 θi,j∆xi,t−j + εi,t, where εi,t are assumed to be iid (the
lag length qi is permitted to vary across individual members of the panel). Under the homogenous
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Table 10: Panel Unit Root Tests (second generation)
Test Stat Variables
p ω zT − (θT /θN )zN p− (zT − (θT /θN )zN )
Bai and Ng [2002] Zceˆ 0.260 0.062 0.122 0.778
P ceˆ 0.242 0.073 0.125 0.769
Choi [2001] Pm 0.996 0.000 0.993 0.240
Z 1.000 0.002 1.000 0.322
L? 1.000 0.001 1.000 0.343
Pesaran [2007] CIPS 0.160 0.100 0.520 0.155
CIPS? 0.160 0.100 0.520 0.155
Chang [2002] SN 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Notes: For all tests, the null of a unit root is not rejected if p-value ≥ 0.05 at a 5% significance level.
alternative the coefficient ρi in LLC is required to be identical across all units (ρi = ρ, ∀i). IPS
relax this assumption and allow for ρi to be individual specific under the alternative hypothesis. MW
propose a Fisher type test based on the p-values from individual unit root statistics (ADF or Phillips-
Perron [1988] for instance). Like IPS, MW allow for heterogeneity of the autoregressive root ρi under
the alternative. We also apply the pooled panel unit root test developed by Breitung [2000] which
does not require bias correction factors when individual specific trends are included in the ADF type
regression. This is achieved by an appropriate variable transformation. As a sensitivity analysis, we
also employ the test developed by Hadri [2000] which proposes a panel extension of the Kwiatkowski et
al. [1992] test of the null that the time series for each cross section is stationary against the alternative
of a unit root in the panel data. Breitung’ and Hadri’s tests, like LLC’s test, are pooled tests against
the homogenous alternative.
The common feature of these first generation tests is the restriction that all cross-sections are
independent. In order to check that the cross-unit independence assumption does not affect the main
conclusions we draw, we apply second generation unit root tests that allow for cross-unit dependencies
as well. We consider the tests developed by: i) Bai and Ng [2002] based on a dynamic factor model, ii)
Choi [2001] based on an error-component model, iii) Pesaran [2007] based on a dynamic factor model
and iv) Chang [2002] who proposes the instrumental variable nonlinear test. The results of second
generation unit root tests are shown in Table 10.
In all cases, except for the Choi’s [2001] test applied to the relative wage variable (ω), we fail to
reject the presence of a unit root in the relative price, the relative wage, the productivity differential,
and the difference zT − (θT /θN) zN , when cross-unit dependencies are taken into account.
B.2 Cointegration Tests and Robustness Check
To begin with, we report the results of parametric and non parametric cointegration tests developed by
Pedroni ([1999]), ([2004]). Cointegration tests are based on the estimated residuals of equations (6a)
and (6b). Table 11 reports the tests of the null hypothesis of no cointegration. All Panel tests reject
the null hypothesis of no cointegration between p and zT − (θT /θN) zN at the 1% significance level
while three Panel tests reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration between ω and zT − (θT /θN) zN
at the 5% significance level. Group-mean t-test confirms cointegration between p and labor share-
adjusted productivity differential and between ω and zT − θT
θN
zN at the 5% and 10% significance level,
respectively. This is strong evidence in favor of cointegration between the relative price and relative
productivity. Pedroni [2004] explores finite sample performances of the seven statistics. The results
reveal that group-mean parametric t-test is more powerful than other tests in finite samples. While
the results are somewhat less pervasive for the relative wage equation, group-mean parametric t-test
indicatess that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration for both the relative price and
the relative wage equations.
As robustness checks, we contrast our group-mean FMOLS estimates and group-mean DOLS
estimates with one lag (q = 1) shown in Table 2, with alternative estimators. Table 12 summarizes our
estimates for cointegrating vectors by adopting alternative procedure. First, we consider the group-
mean DOLS estimator with 2 lags (q = 2) and 3 lags (q = 3). Second, we estimate cointegration
relationships (6a) and (6b) by using the panel DOLS estimator (Mark and Sul [2003]). We also use
6
Table 11: Panel cointegration tests results (p-values)
wage equation price equation
eq. (6a) eq. (6b)
Panel tests
Non-parametric ν 0.020 0.000
Non-parametric ρ 0.088 0.003
Non-parametric t 0.030 0.003
Parametric t 0.070 0.021
Group-mean tests
Non-parametric ρ 0.399 0.149
Non-parametric t 0.063 0.017
Parametric t 0.014 0.039
Notes: The null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected if the p-value
is below 0.05 (0.10 resp.) at 5% (10% resp.) significance level.
Table 12: Alternative Cointegration Estimates of β and γ
Relative wage eq. (6a) Relative price eq. (6b)
βˆ t(βˆ = 0) γˆ t(γˆ = 1)
DOLS (q = 1) −0.270
(−22.27)
a 0.000 0.782
(91.83)
a 0.000
DOLS (q = 2) −0.268
(−21.56)
a 0.000 0.788
(97.24)
a 0.000
DOLS (q = 3) −0.261
(−20.83)
a 0.000 0.792
(97.94)
a 0.000
DFE −0.178
(−3.46)
a 0.001 0.797
(26.81)
a 0.000
MG −0.208
(−7.98)
a 0.000 0.760
(34.39)
a 0.000
PMG −0.190
(−8.97)
a 0.000 0.843
(50.71)
a 0.000
Panel DOLS (q = 1) −0.298
(−6.82)
a 0.000 0.762
(30.35)
a 0.000
Panel DOLS (q = 2) −0.298
(−7.28)
a 0.000 0.762
(32.35)
a 0.000
Panel DOLS (q = 3) −0.294
(−7.57)
a 0.000 0.763
(34.44)
a 0.000
Notes: All regressions include country fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity and au-
tocorrelation consistent t-statistics are reported in parentheses. a denotes signif-
icance at 1% level. The columns t(βˆ) = 0 and t(γˆ) = 1 report the p-value of the
test of H0 : βˆ = 0 and H0 : γˆ = 1 respectively.
alternative econometric techniques to estimate cointegrating relationships (6): the dynamic fixed effects
estimator (DFE), the mean group estimator (MG, Pesaran and Smith [1995]), the pooled mean group
estimator (PMG, Pesaran et al. [1999]). As shown in Table 12, our estimates of βˆ and γˆ are close to
those reported in Table 2 and discussed in the main text, except for the pooled mean group (PMG)
estimator.
C A Two-Sector Model with Imperfect Mobility of Labor across
Sectors
This Appendix presents the formal analysis underlying the results when abstracting from physical
capital. Time is continuous and indexed by t.
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C.1 Households
At each instant the representative agent consumes traded goods and non-traded goods denoted by
CT (t) and CN (t), respectively, which are aggregated by a constant elasticity of substitution function:
C
(
CT (t), CN (t)
)
=
[
ϕ
1
φ
(
CT (t)
)φ−1
φ + (1− ϕ) 1φ (CN (t))φ−1φ ] φφ−1 , (40)
The representative agent must also decide on worked hours in the traded and the non traded sector
denoted by LT (t) and LN (t) at each instant of time which are aggregated by a constant elasticity of
substitution function:
L
(
LT (t), LN (t)
)
=
[
ϑ−
1
²
(
LT (t)
) ²+1
² + (1− ϑ)− 1² (LN (t)) ²+1² ] ²²+1 , (41)
The agent is endowed with a unit of time and supplies a fraction L(t) of this unit as labor, while
the remainder, 1−L(t), is consumed as leisure. At any instant of time, households derive utility from
their consumption and experience disutility from working. Households decide on consumption and
worked hours by maximizing lifetime utility:
U =
∫ ∞
0
{
1
1− 1σC
C(t)1−
1
σC − γ 1
1 + 1σL
L(t)1+
1
σL
}
e−βtdt, (42)
where β is the consumer’s discount rate, σC > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for
consumption, and σL > 0 is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
Labor income is derived by supplying labor in the traded sector LT (t) and non traded sector LN (t)
at a wage rate WT (t) and WN (t), respectively. In addition, households accumulate internationally
traded bonds, B(t), that yield net interest rate earnings of r?B(t). The flow budget constraint is equal
to households’ income less consumption expenditure:
B˙(t) = r?B(t) +WT (t)LT (t) +WN (t)LN (t)− CT (t)− P (t)CN (t). (43)
For the sake of clarity, we drop the time argument below when this causes no confusion.
The current-value for the household’s optimization problem is (dropping the time index for the
purposes of clarity):
H = U [C (CT , CN)]+ V [L (LT , LN )] + λ (r?B +WTLT +WNLN − CT − PCN) ,
where B is the state variable, λ is the corresponding co-state variable, and CT , CN , LT and LN are
control variables. The first-order conditions are:
C
− 1σC ϕ
1
φ
(
CT
)− 1φ Cφ = λ, (44a)
C
− 1σC (1− ϕ) 1φ (CN)− 1φ Cφ = λP, (44b)
γL
1
σL ϑ−
1
²
(
LT
) 1
² L−
1
² = λWT , (44c)
γL
1
σL (1− ϑ))− 1² (LN) 1² L− 1² = λWN , (44d)
λ˙ = λ (β − r?) , (44e)
and the transversality condition limt→∞ λB(t)e−βt = 0.
Combining (44a) and (44b) yields: (
ϕ
1− ϕ
)
CN
CT
= P−φ. (45)
Combining (44c) and (44d) yields: (
ϑ
1− ϑ
)
LN
LT
= Ω², (46)
where Ω ≡WN/WT .
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Consumption Price Index
The traded and the non traded goods are aggregated by means of a CES function given by (40)
with φ > 0 the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between consumption of traded and non traded
goods. At the first stage, the household minimizes the cost or total expenditure measured in terms of
traded goods:
EC ≡ CT + PCN . (47)
for a given level of subutility, C, where P is the price of non traded goods in terms of traded goods.
For any chosen C, the optimal basket (CT , CN ) is a solution to:
PC (P )C = min{CT ,CN}
{
CT + PCN : C
(
CT , CN
) ≥ C} . (48)
The subutility function C (.) is linear homogeneous which implies that total expenditure in consump-
tion goods can be expressed as EC(t) = PC (P )C, with PC (P ) is the unit cost function dual (or
consumption-based price index) to C. The unit cost dual function, PC (.), is defined as the minimum
total expense in consumption goods, EC , such that C = C
(
CT , CN
)
= 1, for a given level of the
relative price of non tradables, P . Its expression is given by
PC =
[
ϕ+ (1− ϕ)P 1−φ] 11−φ . (49)
The minimized unit cost function depends on relative price of non tradables with the following prop-
erties:
P ′C = (1− ϕ)P−φ (PC)φ > 0, (50a)
−P
′′
CP
P ′C
= φ
[
1− (1− ϕ)P
1−φ
P 1−φC
]
= φ (1− αC) . (50b)
Intra-temporal allocations between non tradable goods and tradable goods follow from Shephard’s
Lemma (or the envelope theorem) applied to (48):
CN = P ′CC = (1− ϕ)
(
P
PC
)−φ
C, and
PCN
PCC
= αC , (51a)
CT = [PC − PP ′C ]C = ϕ
(
1
PC
)−φ
C, and
CT
PCC
= (1− αC) , (51b)
where the non tradable and tradable shares in total consumption expenditure are:
αC =
(1− ϕ)P 1−φ
ϕ+ (1− ϕ)P 1−φ , , (52a)
1− αC = ϕ
ϕ+ (1− ϕ)P 1−φ . (52b)
Note that the share of non traded goods in consumption expenditure αC coincides with the weight
of the non traded good in the overall consumption bundle 1− ϕ when the elasticity of substitution φ
between traded and non traded goods is equal to one. When calibrating the model, we consider an
elasticity of substitution equal to one in the baseline scenario so that αC = 1 − ϕ. When φ 6= 1, we
have to set ϕ so as to target a share of non traded goods in consumption expenditure αC in line with
our empirical estimates (i.e., 0.43, see Table 7).
Aggregate Wage Index
The representative household maximizes 1−L(.) where L(.) is a CES function given by (41) with
² > 0 the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between labor in the traded and non traded sector,
given total labor income denoted by R measured in terms of the traded good:
R ≡WTLT +WNLN , (53)
whereWT is the wage rate in the traded sector andWN is the wage rate in the non traded sector. The
linear homogeneity of the subutility function L (.) implies that total labor income can be expressed as
R = W
(
WT ,WN
)
L, with W
(
WT ,WN
)
is the unit cost function dual (or aggregate wage index) to
L. The unit cost dual function, W (.), is defined as the minimum total labor income, R, such that
L = L
(
LT , LN
)
= 1, for a given level of the wage rates WT and WN . We derive below its expression.
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Combining (46) together with total labor income denoted by R measured in terms of the traded
good, i.e. R ≡ WTLT +WNLN , we are able to express labor supply in the traded and non traded
sector, respectively, as functions of total labor income:
LT = (1− ϑ) (WT )−1 [(1− ϑ) + ϑ(WN
WT
)²+1]−1
R,
LN = ϑ
(
WT
)−1(WN
WT
)² [
(1− ϑ) + ϑ
(
WN
WT
)²+1]−1
R.
Plugging these equations into (41), setting L = 1 and R =W , yields the aggregate wage index:
W =
[
ϑ
(
WT
)²+1
+ (1− ϑ) (WN)²+1] 1²+1 . (54)
Intratemporal allocation of hours worked between the traded and the non traded sector follows
from Shephard’s Lemma (or the envelope theorem):
LT =
∂W
∂WT
L =WTL, and
WTLT
WL
= 1− αL, (55a)
LN =
∂W
∂WN
L =WNL, and
WNLN
WL
= αL, (55b)
where the non tradable and tradable content of total labor income are:
αL =
(1− ϑ) (WN)²+1[
ϑ (WT )²+1 + (1− ϑ) (WN )²+1
] , , (56a)
1− αL =
ϑ
(
WT
)²+1[
ϑ (WT )²+1 + (1− ϑ) (WN )²+1
] . (56b)
Alternative Way to Solve the Household’s Maximization Problem
The representative household maximizes lifetime utility (42) subject to the budget constraint:
B˙ = r?B +W
(
WT ,WN
)
L− PC (P )C. (57)
Denoting the co-state variable associated with (57) by λ, the first-order conditions characterizing
the representative household’s optimal plans are:
C = (PCλ)
−σC , (58a)
L =
(
Wλ
γ
)σL
, (58b)
λ˙ = λ (β − r?) , (58c)
and the transversality condition limt→∞ λ¯B(t)e−βt = 0. In an open economy model with a represen-
tative agent having perfect foresight, a constant rate of time preference and perfect access to world
capital markets, we impose β = r? in order to generate an interior solution. This standard assumption
made in the literature implies that the marginal utility of wealth, λ, will undergo a discrete jump when
individuals receive new information and must remain constant over time from thereon, i.e., λ = λ¯.
The homogeneity of C(.) allows a two-stage consumption decision: in the first stage, consumption
is determined, and the intratemporal allocation between traded and non-traded goods is decided at
the second stage. Applying Shephard’s lemma gives CN = P ′CC where P
′
C = ∂PC/∂P ; denoting by
αC the share of non-traded goods in the consumption expenditure, we have CN = αCPCC/P and
CT = PCC − PCN = (1− αC)PCC. Dividing expenditure on traded goods by expenditure on non
traded goods leads to:
CT
PCN
=
(1− αC)PCC
αCPCC
, or
(
1− ϕ
ϕ
)
CT
CN
= Pφ. (59)
Applying the same logic to the labor supply decision gives the tradable content of labor income
WTLT = (1− αL)WL and the non tradable content of total labor incomeWNLN = αLWL. Dividing
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labor income in the traded sector by labor income in the non traded sector and using the definition of
αL given by (56), we find:
WTLT
WNLN
=
(1− αL)WL
αLWL
, or
(
1− ϑ
ϑ
)
LT
LN
=
(
WT
WN
)²
. (60)
We write out some useful properties:
∂W
∂WT
WT
W
= (1− αL) , ∂W
∂WN
WN
W
= αL, (61a)
∂WT
∂WT
=
∂2W
∂ (WT )2
= ϑ²
(
WT
)²−1
W−²αL, (61b)
∂WT
∂WT
WT
WT
= ²αL > 0, (61c)
∂WT
∂WN
WN
WT
= −²αL < 0, (61d)
∂WN
∂WN
WN
W
= ² (1− αL) > 0, (61e)
∂WN
∂WT
WT
W
= −² (1− αL) < 0, (61f)
where Wj = ∂W∂W j (with j = T,N).
C.2 Firms
Both the traded and non-traded sectors use labor, LT and LN , according to linearly homogenous
production functions, Y T = ATLT and Y N = ANLN . Both sectors face a labor cost equal to the wage
rate, i.e., WT and WN , respectively. The traded and non traded sectors are assumed to be perfectly
competitive. The first order conditions derived from profit-maximization state that factors are paid
to their respective marginal products:
AT =WT , and PAN =WN (62)
Dividing the second equality by the first yields
P = Ω
AT
AN
. (63)
C.3 Solving the Model
Model Closure
Abstracting from capital accumulation and government spending, the market-clearing condition in
the non traded good market requires that non traded output Y N is equalized with consumption CN :
CN = Y N . (64)
Inserting (62) and plugging (64) into the accumulation equation of foreign bonds (57) yields the
market clearing condition for the traded good or the current account dynamic equation:
B˙ = r?B + Y T − CT . (65)
Short-Run Static Solutions for Consumption and Labor
In this subsection, we compute short-run static solutions for consumption and labor supply. Static
efficiency conditions (58a) and (58b) can be solved for consumption and labor which of course must
hold at any point of time:43
C = C
(
λ¯, P
)
, L = L
(
λ¯,WT ,WN
)
, (66)
43’Short-run static solutions’ refer to static optimality conditions (58a)-(58b) which can be solved for con-
sumption and labor.
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with
Cλ¯ =
∂C
∂λ¯
= −σC C
λ¯
< 0, (67a)
CP =
∂C
∂P
= −αCσC C
P
< 0, (67b)
Lλ¯ =
∂L
∂λ¯
= σL
L
λ¯
> 0, (67c)
LWT =
∂L
∂WT
= σLL
(1− αL)
WT
> 0, (67d)
LWN =
∂L
∂WN
= σLL
αL
WN
> 0, (67e)
where we used the fact that ∂W
∂WT
WT
W = (1− αL) and ∂W∂WN W
N
W = αL (see (61)); σC and σL correspond
to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption and labor, respectively.
Inserting first the short-run solution for consumption (66), (51) can be solved for CT and CN :
CT = CT
(
λ¯, P
)
, CN = CN
(
λ¯, P
)
, (68)
where partial derivatives are
CTλ¯ = −σC
CT
λ¯
< 0, (69a)
CTP = αC
CT
P
(φ− σC) ≶ 0, (69b)
CNλ¯ = −σC
CN
λ¯
< 0, (69c)
CNP = −
CN
P
[(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ] < 0, (69d)
where we used the fact that −P ′′CPP ′C = φ (1− αC) > 0 and P
′
CC = C
N .
Inserting first the short-run solution for labor (66), into LT =
∂W(WT ,WN)
∂WT
L and LN =
∂W(WT ,WN)
∂WN
L,
we are able to solve for LT and LN :
LT = LT
(
λ¯,WT ,WN
)
, LN = LN
(
λ¯,WT ,WN
)
, (70)
where partial derivatives are
LTλ¯ =
∂LT
∂λ¯
= σL
LT
λ¯
> 0, (71a)
LTWT =
∂LT
∂WT
=
LT
WT
[²αL + σL (1− αL)] > 0, (71b)
LTWN =
∂LT
∂WN
=
LT
WN
αL (σL − ²) ≷ 0, (71c)
LNλ¯ =
∂LN
∂λ¯
= σL
LN
λ¯
> 0, (71d)
LNWN =
∂LN
∂WN
=
LN
WN
[² (1− αL) + σLαL] > 0, (71e)
LNWT =
∂LN
∂WT
=
LN
WT
(1− αL) (σL − ²) ≷ 0, (71f)
(71g)
where we used the fact that WTTW
T
WT
= ²αL, WTNW
N
WT
= −²αL, WNNWNWN = ² (1− αL), WNTW
T
WN
=
−² (1− αL).
Short-run Static Solutions for Sectoral Wages
First order conditions (62) can be solved for the sectoral wages:
WT =WT
(
AT
)
, WN =WN
(
AN , P
)
, (72)
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where partial derivatives are:
WTAT =
∂WT
∂AT
= 1, (73a)
WNAN =
∂WN
∂AN
= P, (73b)
WNP =
∂WN
∂P
= AN . (73c)
Inserting (72) into (70) yields:
LT = LT
(
λ¯, AT , AN , P
)
, LN = LN
(
λ¯, AT , AN , P
)
, (74)
where partial derivatives are
LTAT =
∂LT
∂AT
= LTWT =
LT
WT
[²αL + σL (1− αL)] > 0, (75a)
LTAN =
∂LT
∂AN
= LTWNP = P
LT
WN
αL (σL − ²) ≷ 0, (75b)
LTP =
∂LT
∂P
= LTWNA
N = AN
LT
WN
αL (σL − ²) ≷ 0, (75c)
LNAT =
∂LN
∂AT
= LNWT =
LN
WT
(1− αL) (σL − ²) ≷ 0, (75d)
LNAN =
∂LN
∂AN
= LNWNP = P
LN
WN
[² (1− αL) + σLαL] ≷ 0, (75e)
LNP =
∂LN
∂P
= LNWNA
N = AN
LN
WN
[² (1− αL) + σLαL] > 0, (75f)
and LT
λ¯
and LN
λ¯
are given by (71a) and (71d), respectively.
C.4 Equilibrium Dynamics
Inserting the short-run static solutions for labor in the non-traded sector and consumption in non-
tradables given by (74) and (68), respectively, into the non traded good market clearing condition
(64), and linearizing around the steady-state implies that the dynamics for the relative price of non
tradables degenerate, i.e., P (t) = P˜ .
Inserting the short-run static solutions for labor in the traded sector and consumption in trad-
ables given by (74) and (68) into the accumulation equation of foreign bonds (65), respectively, and
linearizing around the steady-state yields:
B˙(t) = r?
(
B(t)− B˜
)
. (76)
Solving and invoking the transversality condition limt→∞ λB(t)e−r
?t = 0 leads to:
B(t) = B0. (77)
Hence, for the transversality condition to hold, the stock of traded bonds B(t) must be equal to its
initial predetermined level. Combining (77) with (65) gives:
r?B0 + Y T = CT . (78)
Because the stock of foreign bonds must stick to its initial value, for the sake of simplicity and without
loss of generality, we set B0 = 0.
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C.5 The Equilibrium
The equilibrium is defined by the following set of equations:(
1− ϕ
ϕ
)
CT
CN
= Pφ, (79a)(
1− ϑ
ϑ
)
LT
LN
= Ω−² (79b)
P = Ω
AT
AN
, (79c)
ATLT
ANLN
=
CT
CN
, (79d)
where Ω ≡ WN/WT is the non traded wage-traded wage ratio or the relative wage. Combining the
market clearing conditions in the traded and the non traded sectors given by (78) and (64), respectively,
yields (79d) which states that relative supply of tradables must be equal to relative demand of tradables.
Substituting the relative supply of labor in the traded sector given by (79b) and demand of tradables
in terms of non traded goods given by (79a) yields:
AT
AN
(
ϑ
1− ϑ
)
Ω˜−² =
(
ϕ
1− ϕ
)
Pφ.
Using (63) to eliminate the relative wage Ω, the equation can be solved for the relative price of non
tradables:
P = Γ
(
AT
AN
) ²+1
²+φ
, Γ ≡
[(
ϑ
1− ϑ
)(
ϕ
1− ϕ
)] 1
²+φ
> 0 (80)
Denoting by a hat the percentage deviation relative to initial steady-state, (80) can be rewritten as:
pˆ = (²+ 1)ΘL
(
aˆT − aˆN) , ΘL = 1
²+ φ
. (81)
Plugging (63) into (80) allows us to solve for the relative wage:
Ω = Γ
(
AT
AN
)−φ−1²+φ
, Γ ≡
[(
ϑ
1− ϑ
)(
ϕ
1− ϕ
)] 1
²+φ
> 0 (82)
Taking logarithm and differentiating (82) yields:
ωˆ = − (φ− 1)ΘL (aˆT − aˆN) , ΘL = ( 1
²+ φ
)
. (83)
C.6 Graphical Apparatus
To build intuition, we characterize the equilibrium graphically. We denote the logarithm of variables
with lower-case letters. The steady state can be described by considering alternatively the goods
market or the labor market.
Goods Market Equilibrium- and Labor Market Equilibrium- Schedules
The model can be summarized graphically by Figure 3(b) that traces out two schedules in the
(yT −yN , p)-space. System (79a)-(79d) described above can be reduced to two equations. Substituting
(79a) into eq. (79d) yields the goods market equilibrium (henceforth labelled GME) schedule:
ln
(
Y T
Y N
) ∣∣∣GME = (yT − yN) ∣∣GME = φp+ x, (84)
where x = ln
(
ϕ
1−ϕ
)
. Since a rise in the relative price p raises consumption in tradables, the goods
market equilibrium requires a rise in the traded output-non traded output ratio. Hence the goods
market equilibrium is upward-sloping in the (yT − yN , p)-space where the slope is equal to 1/φ.
Substituting (79b) into (79c) to eliminate ω yields the labor market equilibrium (LME) schedule:(
yT − yN) ∣∣LME = −²p+ (1 + ²) (aT − aN)+ z, (85)
14
where z = ln
(
ϑ
1−ϑ
)
. A rise in the relative price p raises the relative wage ω which induces agents to
supply more labor in the non traded sector, and more so if ² is larger (i.e., agents are more willing to
move across sectors). Hence the labor market equilibrium is downward-sloping in the (yT − yN , p)-
space where the slope is equal to −1/². Assuming that the shift of labor across sectors is costless,
i.e. ² tends to infinity, wages between traded and non traded sectors are equalized. Graphically, the
LME-schedule becomes an horizontal line. Conversely, as labor mobility becomes more costly, i.e. ²
is smaller, the LME-schedule becomes steeper in the (yT − yN , p)-space.
For a given relative price of non tradables, a rise in relative productivity AT /AN , shifts to the
right the LME-schedule by raising traded output relative to non traded output. Since the supply of
traded goods is increased, the price of non traded goods in terms of traded goods p must rise, and less
so as the elasticity of substitution φ between CT and CN is larger.
Further, the more costly (in utility terms) labor mobility is, i.e., the smaller ², the less agents are
willing to move from the traded towards the non traded good. Graphically, the LME-schedule shifts
to the right by a smaller amount.
Labor Demand- and Labor Supply- Schedules
The labor market is summarized graphically in Figure 3(a). Eq. (79b) describes the labor supply-
schedule (LS henceforth) in the (lT − lN , ω)-space. Taking logarithm yields:
ln
(
LT
LN
) ∣∣∣LS = (lT − lN) ∣∣LS = −²ω + d, (86)
where d = ln
(
ϑ
1−ϑ
)
. A rise in the non traded wage-traded wage ratio ω provides an incentive to
shift labor supply from the traded sector towards the non traded sector. Hence the LS-schedule is
downward-sloping in the (lT − lN , ω)-space where the slope is equal to −1/².
Substituting demand for traded goods in terms of non traded goods (79a) into the market clearing
condition given by (79d) yields:
Y˜ T
Y˜ N
=
(
ϕ
1− ϕ
)
Pφ. (87)
Substituting first-order conditions from the firms’ maximization problem given by (63) and using
production functions, i.e. LT = Y T /AT and LN = Y N/AN , we get:
LT
LN
=
(
ϕ
1− ϕ
)(
AT
AN
)φ−1
Ωφ.
Taking logarithm yields the labor demand-schedule (LD henceforth) in the (lT − lN , ω)-space is given
by (
lT − lN) ∣∣LD = φω + (φ− 1) (aT − aN)+ x, (88)
where x = ln
(
ϕ
1−ϕ
)
. A rise in the relative wage ω raises the cost of labor in the non traded sector
relative to the traded sector. To compensate for the increased labor cost, the non traded sector sets
higher prices which induces agents to substitute traded for non traded goods and therefore produces an
expansionary effect on labor demand in the traded sector. Hence the LD-schedule is upward-sloping
in the (lT − lN , ω)-space where the slope is equal to 1/φ.
Using (86) to eliminate ω and differentiating (88), the percentage change in the ratio LT /LN is
given by: (
lˆT − lˆN
)
=
² (φ− 1)
(²+ φ)
(
aˆT − aˆN) . (89)
Hence, depending on whether φ ≷ 1, a rise in the sectoral labor productivities ratio aT − aN raises or
lowers lT − lN .
C.7 Relative Price and Relative Wage Effects
We now analyze graphically and analytically the consequences on the relative price and the relative
wage of an increase in the relative productivity aT /aN . Because our estimates capture the long-
term effects of an increase in aT /aN , we compare the steady state of the model before and after the
productivity shock biased towards the traded sector.
To begin with, an inspection of (88) shows that higher productivity in tradables relative to non
tradables has an expansionary effect on labor demand in the traded sector relative to the non traded
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sector, if and only if the elasticity of substitution φ between traded and non traded goods is larger
than one. The reason is as follows. Higher productivity in tradables increases output of tradables
relative to non tradables. For the market clearing condition to hold, the relative price of non tradables
must rise. With an elasticity of substitution φ greater than one, the demand for tradables rises more
than proportionately. The increased share of tradables in total expenditure has an expansionary
effect on labor demand in tradables relative to non tradables and therefore lowers the relative wage
ω. Graphically, as shown in Figure 3(a), the LD-schedule shifts to the right along the LS-schedule,
producing a fall in the relative wage from ω0 to ω1. Because the traded sector pays higher wages,
workers shift hours worked towards that sector. The new steady state is E1 and the ratio LT /LN is
higher.
Equating labor demand given by (88) and labor supply described by (87), differentiating and
denoting by a hat the deviation from initial steady state in percentage terms, we find that the (log)
relative wage wN/wT declines in the long run as a result of a productivity differential between tradables
and non tradables only if φ > 1:
ωˆ = − (φ− 1)ΘL (aˆT − aˆN) , ΘL = ( 1
²+ φ
)
. (90)
As workers are more reluctant to shift hours worked from the non traded to the traded sector, as
reflected by a lower ², the response of the relative wage to a productivity differential is amplified
because the traded sector must pay higher wages to attract workers. Graphically, the LD-schedule
shifts along a steeper LS-schedule. When ²→∞, the new steady state is BS1 and ωˆ = 0.
Having explored the change in the relative wage, let us now examine the response of the relative
price of non tradables to a productivity differential between tradables and non tradables. Graphically,
irrespective of whether φ ≷ 1, an increase in aT − aN shifts the LME-schedule to the right, as shown
in Figure 3(b). As long as φ > 1, the LME-schedule shifts along a flatter GME-schedule than the 45◦
line which implies that p increases less than aT /aN , in line with our evidence. To show it formally, we
equate (84) to (85) and differentiate:
pˆ = (²+ 1)ΘL
(
aˆT − aˆN) , (91)
where ΘL is given by (90). According to (91), following a productivity differential of 1%, pmust increase
by less than 1% only if φ > 1. In this case, the lower ², the smaller pˆ. Intuitively, because workers
are more reluctant to shift hours worked across sectors, the ratio LT /LN increases less, requiring a
lower pˆ to clear the market. Graphically, the LME-schedule shifts to the right by a smaller amount.
When ² → ∞, we have pˆ = aˆT − aˆN , i.e., a strict proportional relationship between p and and the
productivity differential aT − aN .
In conclusion, when assuming imperfect labor mobility, the two-sector model can account for our
set of empirical findings but only if the elasticity of substitution is larger than one.
D Introducing Physical Capital Accumulation
This Appendix presents the formal analysis underlying the results discussed in section 4 of the main
text. We extend the small open economy model with tradables and non tradables and imperfect mo-
bility of labor across sectors to physical capital accumulation. We assume that investment expenditure
are non traded but relaxes this assumption in section F. We further impose perfect mobility of capital
across sectors. This assumption is relaxed in section H.2 and section I.
D.1 Consumer’s Maximization Problem
The representative household chooses consumption, decides on labor supply, and investment that
maximizes his/her lifetime utility:
U =
∫ ∞
0
{
1
1− 1σC
C(t)1−
1
σC − γ 1
1 + 1σL
L(t)1+
1
σL
}
e−βtdt, (92)
where β is the consumer’s discount rate, σC > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for
consumption, and σL > 0 is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
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Denoting the capital rental cost by R(t), the stock of physical capital by K(t) and investment by
I(t) which is assumed to be non-traded, the flow budget constraint is:
B˙(t) = r?B(t) +R(t)K(t) +W
(
WT (t),WN (t)
)
L(t)− PC (P (t))C(t)− P (t)I(t), (93)
and capital accumulation which evolves as follows:
K˙(t) = I(t)− δKK(t), (94)
where I corresponds to investment expenditure and 0 ≤ δK < 1 is a fixed depreciation rate.
Denoting the co-state variables associated with (93) and (94) by λ(t) and ψ(t), respectively, the
first-order conditions characterizing the representative household’s optimal plans are:
C(t) = (PC(P (t))λ(t))
−σC , (95a)
L(t) =
(
W (t)λ(t)
γ
)σL
, (95b)
λ˙(t) = λ(t) (β − r?) , (95c)
R(t)
P (t)
− δK +
˙P (t)
P (t)
= r?, (95d)
and the transversality conditions limt→∞ λ¯B(t)e−βt = 0 and limt→∞ P (t)K(t)e−βt = 0; to derive
(95d), we used the fact that ψ(t) = λP (t). For the sake of clarity, we drop the time argument below
when this causes no confusion.
Eqs. (95a) and (95b) can be solved for consumption and labor:
C = C
(
λ¯, P
)
, L = L
(
λ¯,WT ,WN
)
, (96)
where partial derivatives are given by (67).
D.2 Firm’s Maximization Problem
Both the traded and non-traded sectors use physical capital, KT and KN , and labor, LT and LN , ac-
cording to constant returns to scale production functions: Y T = ZTF
(
KT , LT
)
and Y N = ZNH
(
KN , LN
)
,
which are assumed to have the usual neoclassical properties of positive and diminishing marginal prod-
ucts:
Y j = Zj
(
Lj
)θj (
Kj
)1−θj
, j = T,N. (97)
Both sectors face two cost components: a capital rental cost equal to R, and a labor cost equal to the
wage rate, i.e., WT in the traded sector and WN in the non traded sector. Both sectors are assumed
to be perfectly competitive.
Denoting by ki ≡ Ki/Li the capital-labor ratio for sector i = T,N , enables us to express the
production functions in intensive form, i.e., f
(
kT
) ≡ F (KT , LT ) /LT and h (kN) ≡ H (KN , LN) /LN .
Production functions are supposed to take a Cobb-Douglas form: f
(
kT
)
=
(
kT
)1−θT and h (kN) =(
kN
)1−θN , where θT and θN represent the labor income share in output in the traded and the non
traded sector, respectively. Since capital can move freely between the two sectors while the shift of
labor across sectors is costly, only marginal revenues of capital in the traded and the non-traded sector
equalize:
ZT
(
1− θT ) (kT )−θT = PZN (1− θN) (kN)−θN ≡ R, (98a)
ZT θT
(
kT
)1−θT ≡WT , (98b)
PZNθN
(
kN
)1−θN ≡WN . (98c)
These static efficiency conditions state that the sectoral marginal products must equal the labor cost
W j and capital rental rate R.
The resource constraint for capital is:
kTLT + kNLN = K. (99)
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D.3 Solving the Model
Before providing details of derivation, we find convenient to describe the procedure to solve the model.
Short-Run Static Solutions
Eqs. (95a)-(95b) can be solved for consumption C = C
(
λ¯, P
)
with Cλ¯ < 0, CP < 0, and for labor
L = L
(
λ¯,WT ,WN
)
with Lλ¯ > 0, LWT > 0 and LWN > 0. A rise in the shadow value of wealth
induces agents to cut their real expenditure and to supply more labor. By raising the consumption
price index, an appreciation in the relative price of non tradables drives down consumption. A rise
in sectoral wage rates increases the aggregate wage index which provides an incentive to raise hours
worked.
Using the fact that consumption in non tradables and tradables are given by CN = ∂PC(P )∂P C
and CT = (PC − PP ′C)C and inserting the short-run static solution for consumption yields: CN =
CN
(
λ¯, P
)
with CN
λ¯
< 0 and CNP < 0, and C
T = CT
(
λ¯, P
)
with CT
λ¯
< 0 and CTP ≷ 0 (depending on
whether φ ≷ σC).
Using the fact that hours worked in the traded and the non traded sector are given by LT =
∂W(WT ,WN)
∂WT
L and LN =
∂W(WT ,WN)
∂WN
L, respectively, and inserting the short-run static solution for
labor yields: LT = LT
(
λ¯,WT ,WN
)
with LT
λ¯
> 0, LTWT > 0, L
T
WN ≶ 0, and LN = LN
(
λ¯,WT ,WN
)
with LN
λ¯
> 0, LNWN > 0, L
N
WT ≶ 0. The interpretation of these results deserves attention. A rise in
the shadow value of wealth induces agents to supply more labor in both sectors. When the traded
sector pays higher wages, i.e., WT rises, workers supply more labor in that sector. Higher wages in
the traded sector exerts opposite effects on LN . On the one hand, because increased WT raises the
aggregate wage index in proportion of (1− αL), workers are induced to supply more labor in the non
traded sector. On the other hand, if the cost of shifting is not too high, i.e. if ² is not too small,
workers are induced to reallocate hours worked towards the traded sector. If ² < σL, a rise in WT
lowers LN . The same logic applies when analyzing the effect of a rise in WN .
Plugging the short-run static solutions for LT and LN , into the resource constraint for capital (99),
(98a)-(98c) and (99) can be solved for the sectoral capital-labor ratio kj = kj
(
λ¯,K, P, ZT , ZN
)
and
the sectoral wage W j = W j
(
λ¯,K, P, ZT , ZN
)
(with j = T,N). Inserting short-run static solutions
for sectoral capital-labor ratios and sectoral labor into production functions (97) allows us to solve
for sectoral output: Y j = Y j
(
λ¯,K, P, ZT , ZN
)
. As in a model assuming perfect labor mobility, an
increase in Zj stimulates output of sector j. A rise in the relative price of non tradables P exerts
opposite effects on sectoral outputs by shifting resources away from the traded sector towards the non
traded output. Unlike the standard BS model, an increase in λ¯ (in K) raises Y T and Y N as well,
regardless of sectoral capital intensities, by raising labor (kj) in both sectors as long as ² is not too
large.
Solving for Sectoral Wage Rates and Sectoral Capital-Labor Ratios
Plugging the short-run static solutions for LT and LN given by (70) into the resource constraint
for capital (99), the system of four equations comprising (98a)-(98c) and (99) can be solved for the
sectoral wage rates W j and sectoral capital-labor ratios kj . Log-differentiating (98a)-(98c) and (99)
yields in matrix form:
−θT θN 0 0(
1− θT ) 0 −1 0
0
(
1− θN) 0 −1
(1− ξ) ξ ΨWT ΨWN


kˆT
kˆN
WˆT
WˆN
 =

Pˆ + ZˆN − ZˆT
−ZˆT
−Pˆ − ZˆN
Kˆ −Ψλ¯ ˆ¯λ
 . (100)
where we set:
ΨWT = (1− ξ)
LTWTW
T
LT
+ ξ
LNWTW
T
LN
, (101a)
ΨWN = (1− ξ)
LTWNW
N
LT
+ ξ
LNWNW
N
LN
, (101b)
ξ ≡ k
NLN
K
, (101c)
(101d)
Ψλ¯ = (1− ξ)σL + ξσL. (101e)
The determinant is:
G ≡ −{θT [(1− θN)ΨWN + ξ]+ θN [(1− θT )ΨWT + (1− ξ)]} ≶ 0, (102)
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where
ΨWT = (1− ξ) ²+ (1− αL) (σL − ²) , (103a)
ΨWN = ξ²+ αL (σL − ²) , (103b)
ΨWT +ΨWN = σL. (103c)
Because the sign of σL − ² is ambiguous, we cannot sign G; while for the baseline calibration, we have
σL < ², because the discrepancy is small, we find convenient to assume σL = ² so that a rise in WT
(WN ) does not affect LN (LT ). Hence, we have G < 0. In the following, for clarity purpose, when
discussing the results, we assume that σL ' ² so that determinant G is negative.
Sectoral wages can be solved as follows:
WT =WT
(
λ¯,K, P, ZT , ZN
)
, WN =WN
(
λ¯,K, P, ZT , ZN
)
, (104)
with
WˆT
Kˆ
= −
(
1− θT ) θN
G
> 0, (105a)
WˆN
Kˆ
= −
(
1− θN) θT
G
> 0, (105b)
WˆT
Pˆ
=
(
1− θT ) (ΨWN + ξ)
G
< 0, (105c)
WˆN
Pˆ
= −
{
θT ξ + θN (1− ξ) + +θN (1− θT )ΨWT }
G
> 0, (105d)
and sectoral capital labor ratios:
kT = kT
(
λ,K, P, ZT , ZN
)
, kN = kN
(
λ¯,K, P, ZT , ZN
)
, (106)
with
kˆT
Kˆ
= −θ
N
G
> 0, (107a)
kˆN
Kˆ
= −θ
T
G
> 0, (107b)
kˆT
Pˆ
=
ΨWN + ξ
G
< 0, (107c)
kˆN
Pˆ
=
{
θTΨWN −
[(
1− θT )ΨWT + (1− ξ)]}
G
> 0, (107d)
(107e)
Partial derivatives of short-run static solutions for sectoral capital-labor ratios are: kj
λ¯
< 0 and
kjK > 0 (with j = T,N), k
N
P ≷ 0 and kTP < 0, kNZT < 0 and kTZT > 0, kNZN > 0 and kTZN < 0.
Partial derivatives of short-run static solutions for sectoral wage rates are: W j
λ¯
< 0 and W jK > 0 (with
j = T,N), WNP > 0 and W
T
P > 0, W
N
ZT < 0 and W
T
ZT > 0, W
N
ZN > 0 and W
T
ZN < 0.
44 An increase
in the capital stock K raises capital-labor ratios and thereby wage rates in both sectors. A rise in
λ induces agents to supply more labor which reduces capital-labor ratios and thereby wage rates in
both sectors. In the standard model assuming perfect mobility of labor across sectors, an appreciation
in the relative price of non tradables shifts resources in the non-traded sector and increases (lowers)
kN and kT if the traded sector is more (less) capital intensive than the non-traded sector. As in the
standard model, kN increases or decrease as P appreciates depending on whether kT ≷ kT . But the
difficulty of reallocating labor across sectors, reduces the possibility to shift labor across sectors which
moderates changes in sectoral capital-labor ratios. When ² is small, an appreciation in P may result
in a decline in kT .45
44We do not discuss the effects of Zj (with j = T,N) since the interpretation is straightforward.
45The reason is that the traded sector experiences a substantial outflow of capital since it is costless to
reallocate capital. When workers are reluctant to shift hours worked across sectors, the capital outflow is large
enough to reduce kT .
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Solving for Sectoral Labor and Output
Inserting sectoral wages (104) into (70) allows us to solve for sectoral labor:
LT = LT
(
λ¯,K, P, ZT , ZN
)
, LN = LN
(
λ¯,K, P, ZT , ZN
)
. (108)
where
LˆT
Kˆ
= −
{
σL
(
1− θT ) θN + αL (σL − ²) (θT − θN)
G
}
≷ 0, (109a)
LˆN
Kˆ
= −
{
σL
(
1− θN) θT + (1− αL) (σL − ²) (θN − θT )
G
}
≷ 0, (109b)
LˆT
Pˆ
=
σL
(
1− θT ) (ΨWN + ξ)− αL (σL − ²) [ξ + θN (1− ξ) + (1− θT ) (ΨWN + θNΨWT )]
G
≶ 0,(109c)
LˆN
Pˆ
= σL
WˆN
Pˆ
+
(1− αL) (σL − ²)
[
ξ + θN (1− ξ) + (1− θT ) (ΨWN + θNΨWT )]
G
≷ 0. (109d)
Substituting short-run static solutions for sectoral capital-labor ratios (106) and sectoral labor
(108) into the production function of the traded and non traded sectors (97) yields:
Y T = Y T
(
λ¯,K, P, ZT , ZN
)
, Y N = Y N
(
λ¯,K, P, ZT , ZN
)
. (110)
where
Yˆ T
Kˆ
=
LˆT
Kˆ
+
(
1− θT ) kˆT
Kˆ
= −
{
(σL + 1)
(
1− θT ) θN + αL (σL − ²) (θT − θN)
G
}
≷ 0, (111a)
Yˆ N
Kˆ
=
LˆN
Kˆ
+
(
1− θN) kˆN
Kˆ
= −
{
(σL + 1)
(
1− θN) θT + (1− αL) (σL − ²) (θN − θT )
G
}
≷ 0, (111b)
Yˆ T
Pˆ
=
LˆT
Pˆ
+
(
1− θT ) kˆT
Pˆ
=
(σL + 1)
(
1− θT ) (ΨWN + ξ)− αL (σL − ²) [ξ + θN (1− ξ) + (1− θT ) (ΨWN + θNΨWT )]
G
≶ 0,(111c)
Yˆ N
Pˆ
=
LˆN
Pˆ
+
(
1− θN) kˆN
Pˆ
≷ 0. (111d)
D.4 Model Closure
The non traded goods market must clear:
Y N = CN + I = CN + K˙ − δKK. (112)
Using the fact that Y T = RTKT +WTLT and Y N = RNKN +WNLN and inserting (112) into the
flow budget constraint (93) gives the current account equation:
B˙ = r?B + Y T − CT . (113)
D.5 Equilibrium Dynamics
Inserting the short-run static solutions (110), (106) and (68) into the physical capital accumulation
equation (112) and the dynamic equation for the relative price of non tradables (95d), the dynamic
system is:
K˙ = Y N
(
K,P, λ¯
)− CN (λ¯, P )− δKK, (114a)
P˙ = P
[
r? + δK − ZNhk
(
K,P, λ¯
)]
, (114b)
where for the purposes of clarity, we abstract from time-constant arguments of short-run static solu-
tions, i.e., λ¯, ZT , and ZN .
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Denoting with a tilde long-run values, linearizing these two equations around the steady-state
yields in matrix form:(
K˙(t)
P˙ (t)
)
=
( (
Y NK − δK
) (
Y NP − CNP
)
−P˜ZNhkkkNK −P˜ZNhkkkNP
)(
K(t)− K˜
P (t)− P˜
)
. (115)
After some manipulations, we find that the trace of the Jacobian matrix denoted by Tr J is:(
Y NK − δK
)− P˜ZNhkkkNP = r? > 0, (116)
where we used the fact that Y
N
K =
ZNξhk
1−θN and PZ
Nhkkk
N
P = Z
Nhkθ
N k
N
P P˜
kN
.
The determinant of the Jacobian matrix denoted by Det J is:(
Y NP − CNP
)
P˜ZNhkkk
N
K −
(
Y NK − δK
)
P˜ZNhkkk
N
P . (117)
Saddle-path stability requires that (117) is negative. For all parametrization and irrespective of the
relative capital intensities, this inequality holds. The stable solutions are:
K(t) = K˜ +
(
K0 − K˜
)
eµ1t, (118a)
P (t) = P˜ + ω12
(
K0 − K˜
)
eµ1t, (118b)
where K0 is the initial capital stock and
(
1, ω12
)′ is the eigenvector associated with the stable negative
eigenvalue µ1 < 0:
ω12 =
µ1 −
(
Y NK − δK
)(
Y NP − CNP
) (119)
For all plausible sets of parameter values, we find numerically ω12 < 0, regardless of sectoral capital
intensities, which implies that the relative price of nontradables is negatively correlated with investment
along the stable transitional path.
Inserting short-run static solutions for traded output (110) and consumption in tradables (68) into
the market clearing condition for the traded good (113) gives:
B˙ = r?B + Y T
(
K,P, λ¯
)− CT (P, λ¯) . (120)
Linearizing (120) around the steady state, substituting the solutions for K(t) and P (t), and invoking
the transversality condition, yields the stable solution for the stock of foreign bonds:
B(t) = B˜ +Φ(K0 − K˜)eµ1t, (121)
where Φ =
[
Y TK +
(
Y TP − CTP
)
ω12
]
/ (µ1 − r?) is found to be negative numerically.
Finally, the intertemporal solvency condition of the economy is:
B˜ −B0 = Φ
(
K˜ −K0
)
, (122)
where B0 is the initial stock of traded bonds.
D.6 The Steady-State
We now characterize the steady-state and use tilde to denote long-run values. Setting P˙ = K˙ = B˙ = 0
into (114b), (114a) and (120) yields the following set of equations:
ZN
(
1− θN) [kN (K˜, P˜ , λ¯, ZT , ZN)]−θN = r? + δK , (123a)
Y N
(
K˜, P˜ , λ¯, ZT , ZN
)
− CN
(
P˜ , λ¯
)
− δKK˜ = 0, (123b)
r?B˜ + Y T
(
K˜, P˜ , λ¯, ZT , ZN
)
− CT
(
P˜ , λ¯
)
= 0, (123c)
B˜ −B0 = Φ
(
K˜ −K0
)
. (123d)
These four equations jointly determine P˜ , K˜, B˜ and λ¯.
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D.7 Graphical Apparatus
To build intuition regarding steady-state changes, we investigate graphically the long-run effects of
higher productivity of tradables relatives to non tradables. To do so, it is convenient to rewrite the
steady-state as follows:
C˜T
C˜N
=
ϕ
1− ϕP˜
φ, (124a)
L˜T
L˜N
=
ϑ
1− ϑω˜
−², (124b)
Y˜ T (1 + υB)
Y˜ N (1− υI)
=
C˜T
C˜N
, (124c)
ZN
(
1− θN) (k˜N)−θN ≡ r? + δK , (124d)
ZT
(
1− θT ) (k˜T)−θT = P˜ZN (1− θN) (k˜N)−θN ≡ R˜, (124e)
ZT θT
(
k˜T
)1−θT
≡ W˜T , (124f)
PZNθN
(
k˜N
)1−θN
≡ W˜N , (124g)
where ω˜ = W˜N/W˜T is the steady-state relative wage and R˜/P˜ = r? + δK . We denote by υI ≡ δKK˜Y˜ N
the ratio of investment to non traded output and by υB ≡ r?B˜Y˜ T the ratio of interest receipts to traded
output. Remembering that Y˜ T = ZT L˜T
(
k˜T
)1−θT
and Y˜ N = ZN L˜N
(
k˜N
)1−θN
, the system (124)
can be solved for C˜T /C˜N , L˜T /L˜N , k˜T , k˜N , W˜T , W˜N and P˜ as functions of ZT , ZN ,
(
1−υI
1+υB
)
. Then
substituting these functions into Y˜ N = C˜N + I˜, K˜ = k˜T L˜T + k˜N L˜N and B˜ − B0 = Φ
(
K˜ −K0
)
and substituting short-run static solutions for LT and LN (see eq. (70)) which obviously hold at the
steady-state, the system can be solved for K˜, B˜ and λ¯ as functions of ZT and ZN . Hence, when
solving the system (124), we assume that the aggregate capital stock, foreign bonds and the marginal
utility of wealth are exogenous which allows us to separate the static reallocations (or intratemporal)
effects from the dynamic (or intertemporal) effects.
Before breaking down the three channels analytically, we characterize the steady state graphically.
We denote the logarithm of variables with lower-case letters. Because we restrict ourselves to the
analysis of the long-run effects, the tilde is suppressed for the purposes of clarity. The steady state
can be described by considering alternatively the labor market or the goods market.
D.8 The Goods Market
To begin with, we characterize the goods market equilibrium. The steady state can be summarized
graphically in Figure 4(b) if φ > 1 and Figure 5(b) if φ < 1. Each figure traces out two schedules in
the (yT −yN , p)-space which are derived below. System (124) which is described below can be reduced
to two equations.
Combining (124a) and the market clearing condition (124c) yields:
CT
CN
=
ϕ
1− ϕP
φ =
Y T + r?B
Y N − δKK , (125)
The ratio of traded output to non traded output is:
Y T
Y N
=
(1− υI)
(1 + υB)
ϕ
1− ϕP
φ. (126)
Taking logarithm yields: (
yT − yN) ∣∣GME = φp+ x′, (127)
where x′ = ln
(
ϕ
1−ϕ
)
+ ln
(
1−υI
1+υB
)
.
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According to (127), as in the model without capital, the goods market equilibrium is upward-
sloping in the (yT − yN , p)-space and the slope of the GME-schedule is equal to 1/φ.
Combining (124b) with the steady-state relative wage given by (124f)-(124g), and using the pro-
duction functions for the traded sector and non traded sectors which imply LT = Y
T
ZT (kT )1−θ
T and
LN = Y
N
ZN (kN )1−θ
N , yields:
Y T
Y N
=
ϑ
1− ϑ
(
ZT
ZN
)²+1
P−²
(
θT
θN
)² (kT )1−θT
(kN )1−θ
N
1+² .
To eliminate the sectoral capital-labor ratios, we use (124d)-(124e):
(
kT
)1−θT
(kN )1−θ
N = P
− 1−θT
θT (r? + δK)
1−θN
θN
− 1−θT
θT
(
ZT
) 1−θT
θT
(ZN )
1−θN
θN
(
1− θT ) 1−θTθT
(1− θN ) 1−θ
N
θN
.
Using the equation above, we have:
Y T
Y N
= P−
[
²+
(
1−θT
θT
)
(1+²)
] (
ZT
) 1+²
θT
(ZN )
1+²
θN
Π′, (128)
where we set
Π′ ≡ ϑ
1− ϑ (r
? + δK)
(
θT−θN
θT θN
)
(1+²)
[(
θT
)²θT (1− θT )(1−θT )(1+²)]1/θT[
(θN )²θ
N
(1− θN )(1−θN )(1+²)
]1/θN > 0. (129)
Taking logarithm, (128) can be rewritten as follows:
(
yT − yN) ∣∣LME = − [²+ (1− θT
θT
)
(1 + ²)
]
p+
(
1 + ²
θT
)
zT −
(
1 + ²
θN
)
zN + pi′, (130)
where pi′ = lnΠ′.
If θT = 1, (130) reduces to (85). If θT < 1, the LME-schedule (labelled LMEK in Figures
4(b) and 5(b)) becomes flatter than that in a model abstracting from physical capital in the (yT −
yN , p)-space. The LME-schedule is downward-sloping in the (yT − yN , p)-space with a slope equal
to −1/
[
²+
(
1−θT
θT
)
(1 + ²)
]
. A rise in the relative price of non tradables p allows the non traded
sector to pay higher wages. Because the relative wage ω rises, workers are induced to shift hours
worked from the traded sector to the non traded sector. As a consequence, the ratio of sectoral
outputs Y T /Y N declines. Introducing capital rotates to the left the LME-schedule due to the shift of
capital across sectors triggered by a change in p. Following an appreciation in p, the non traded sector
experiences a capital inflow which amplifies the expansionary effect on non traded output triggered by
the reallocation of labor, which results in a flatter LME-schedule.
To sum up, the slope of the GME-schedule remains unchanged while the LME-schedule is flatter
than that in a model without capital. Higher productivity in tradables relative to non tradables
produces a shift to the right the LME-schedule. The relative price of non tradables rises more or
increases less than in a model abstracting from physical capital depending on whether φ > 1 or φ < 1.
D.9 The Labor Market
When focusing on the labor market, the model can be summarized graphically by two schedules in
the (lT − lN , ω)-space, Applying logarithm to (124b) yields the labor supply-schedule (henceforth
LS-schedule): (
lT − lN) ∣∣LS = −²ω + d, (131)
where d = ln
(
ϑ
1−ϑ
)
.
According to (131), as in the model without capital, a rise in the non traded wage-traded wage
ratio ω provides an incentive to shift labor supply from the traded sector towards the non traded
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sector. Hence the LS-schedule is downward-sloping in the (lT − lN , ω)-space where the slope is equal
to −1/².
We turn to the derivation of the labor demand-schedule. Dividing (124g) by (124f) yields:
PZNθN
(
k˜N
)1−θN
ZT θT
(
k˜T
)1−θT ≡ Ω. (132)
To eliminate the sectoral capital-labor ratios, we use eqs. (124d)-(124e):
(
kN
)1−θN
(kT )1−θ
T = P
1−θT
θT (r? + δK)
1−θT
θT
− 1−θN
θN
[
ZN
(
1− θN)] 1−θNθN
[ZT (1− θT )] 1−θ
T
θT
. (133)
To eliminate the relative price of non tradables, we combine the market-clearing condition (124c) and
the demand for tradables in terms of non traded goods (124a) together with production functions (97):
P =
1− ϕ
ϕ
1 + υB
1− υI
ZTLT
(
kT
)1−θT
ZNLN (kN )1−θ
N
 1φ . (134)
Substituting (134) into (133) yields:
(
kN
)1−θN
(kT )1−θ
T = (r
? + δK)
φ(θN−θT )
θN [1+θT (φ−1)]
[
1− ϕ
ϕ
1 + υB
1− υI
LT
LN
] (1−θT )
[1+θT (φ−1)]
×
(1− θN)
(1−θN)θT
θN
(1− θT )(1−θT )

φ
[1+θT (φ−1)] (
ZN
) [(1−θN)θT φ−(1−θT )θN ]
θN [1+θT (φ−1)]
(ZT )
(1−θT )(φ−1)
[1+θT (φ−1)]
. (135)
Substituting first (134) into (132) and then plugging (135) allows us to relate relative labor demand
to the relative wage:
LT
LN
(
ZN
) (φ−1)θT
θN
(ZT )(φ−1)
Θ = Ω[1+θ
T (φ−1)]. (136)
where we set
Θ ≡ (r? + δK)
(θN−θT )(φ−1)
θN
(
1− ϕ
ϕ
)(
1 + υB
1− υI
)(
θN
θT
)[1+θT (φ−1)] (1− θN)(1−θN) θTθN
(1− θT )(1−θT )
(φ−1) . (137)
Applying logarithm to (136) yields the labor demand-schedule (henceforth LD-schedule):
(
lT − lN) ∣∣LD = [1 + θT (φ− 1)]ω + (φ− 1)(zT − θT
θN
zN
)
− lnΘ. (138)
Eq. (138) states that, as in a model abstracting from physical capital, the LD-schedule is upward-
sloping in the (lT − lN , ω)-space since an increase in ω induces non traded producers to set higher
prices, increasing the demand for traded goods and therefore labor demand in that sector relative to
the non traded sector.
When θT < 1, the LD-schedule (labelled LDK in Figures 4(a) and 5(a)) is steeper or flatter
than that in a model abstracting from physical capital (i.e., when θT = 1) depending on whether φ
is larger or smaller than one. In both cases, following an increased non tradable labor cost, the non
traded sector is induced to use more capital which raises non traded output and thereby produces a
decline in p. Depending on whether φ is larger or smaller than one, the share of non tradables in total
expenditure increases or decreases, as a result of the shift of capital towards the non traded sector.
Hence, a given rise in ω produces a smaller or a larger expansionary effect on labor demand in the
traded sector depending on whether φ exceeds or falls below unity.
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D.10 The Relative Price and Relative Wage Effects: Imperfect Substi-
tutability of Hours Worked across Sectors
In this subsection, we derive the long-run responses of the relative price of non tradables to a produc-
tivity differential between tradables and non tradables by assuming limited substitutability of hours
worked across sectors.
Plugging (124b) into (136) to eliminate LT /LN yields:
Ω[(²+1)+θ
T (φ−1)] = Λ
(
1 + υB
1− υI
) ZT
(ZN )
θT
θN
−(φ−1) , (139)
where
Λ ≡ (r? + δK)
(θN−θT )(φ−1)
θN
(
1− ϕ
ϕ
)(
ϑ
1− ϑ
)(
θN
θT
)[1+θT (φ−1)] (1− θN)(1−θN) θTθN
(1− θT )(1−θT )
(φ−1) . (140)
Taking logarithm and differentiating (139) yields the percentage deviation of the relative wage
from its initial steady-state following a productivity differential between tradables and non tradables:
ωˆ =
1
[(²+ 1) + θT (φ− 1)]
[
(dυB + dυI)− (φ− 1)
(
zˆT − θ
T
θN
zˆN
)]
. (141)
To derive the first term in brackets in the RHS of (141), take logarithm to
(
1+υB
1−υI
)
which gives
ln (1 + υB) − ln (1− υI), use a Taylor approximation at a first order which implies ln (1 + υB) −
ln (1− υI) ' υB + υI , and differentiate which yields the first term in brackets in the RHS of (141).
Since (²+ 1) + θT (φ− 1) > ² + φ, ω falls by a larger amount in a model with capital than that in a
model abstracting from physical capital (for given K and B).
Setting ΘK ≡ 1
[(²+1)+θT (φ−1)] , the long-run response of the relative wage (141) can be rewritten as
follows:
ωˆ = − (φ− 1)ΘK
(
zˆT − θ
T
θN
zˆN
)
+ΘK (dυB + dυI) .
Adding and subtracting ΘL =
(
1
²+φ
)
(see (81)), and noting that υB = −υNX where we denote by
υNX ≡
(
Y˜ T − C˜T
)
/Y˜ T the ratio of net exports to traded output, allows us to break down the relative
wage growth into three components:46
ωˆ = − (φ− 1) [ΘL + (ΘK −ΘL)] [zˆT − (θT /θN) zˆN]−ΘK (dυNX − dυI) , (142)
Eq. (142) corresponds to eq. (33) in the text.
Equating (127) and (130) to eliminate yT − yN , taking logarithm and differentiating yields the
percentage deviation of the relative price of non tradables from its initial steady-state following a
productivity differential between tradables and non tradables:
pˆ =
(1 + ²)
θT
[
(²+ φ) +
(
1−θT
θT
)
(1 + ²)
] [zˆT − θT
θN
zˆN
]
+
1[
(²+ φ) +
(
1−θT
θT
)
(1 + ²)
] (dυB + dυI) . (143)
According to (143), keeping unchanged the overall capital stock and the stock of foreign bonds (i.e.,
keeping fixed υI and υB), following a productivity differential between tradables and non tradables of
1 percentage point, p increases more or rises less than in a model abstracting from physical capital
depending on whether φ is larger or smaller than one. The reason is that when φ < 1, the non traded
sector experiences a capital inflow which exerts a negative impact on p; conversely, if φ > 1, the traded
sector experiences a capital inflow which increases traded output and thereby raises more the relative
price of non tradables.
46Remembering that at the steady state the traded good market clearing condition is r?B + Y T − CT = 0,
and rearranging terms yields −NX = r?B. Dividing the LHS and the RHS by Y T , we get υB = −υNX .
26
Adopting the same procedure as for the relative wage, i.e., adding and subtracting ΘL, yields the
deviation in percentage of the relative price from its initial steady state:
pˆ = (1 + ²)
[
ΘL +
(
ΘK −ΘL)](zˆT − θT
θN
zˆN
)
− θTΘK (dυNX − dυI) , (144)
where ΘK ≡ 1
[(²+1)+θT (φ−1)] > 0 and Θ
L ≡ 1²+φ > 0. Eq. (144) corresponds to eq. (34) in the text.
D.11 Derivation of the Accumulation Equation of Financial Wealth
Remembering that the stock of financial wealth A(t) is equal to B(t)+P (t)K(t), differentiating w.r.t.
time, plugging the dynamic equation (95d) for the relative price, inserting the accumulation equations
for physical capital (94) and traded bonds (93), yields the accumulation equation for the stock of
financial wealth or private savings dynamic equation:
A˙(t) = r?A(t) +W (t)L(t)− PC (P (t))C(t). (145)
We first determine short-run static solutions for aggregate labor supply and aggregate wage index. In-
serting short-run static solutions for sectoral wages (104) into the short-run static solution for aggregate
labor supply (96), we can solve for total hours worked:
L = L
(
λ¯,K, P, ZT , ZN
)
(146)
where partial derivatives are given by
LK ≡ ∂L
∂K
= LWTW
T
K + LWNW
N
K , (147a)
LP ≡ ∂L
∂P
= LWTW
T
P + LWNW
N
P . (147b)
Substituting (104) into W ≡W (WT ,WN), we can solve for the aggregate wage index:
W =W
(
λ¯,K, P, ZT , ZN
)
, (148)
where partial derivatives are given by
WK ≡ ∂W
∂K
=WWTW
T
K +WWNW
N
K , (149a)
WP ≡ ∂W
∂P
=WWTW
T
P +WWNW
N
P , (149b)
where WWT =
(
W/WT
)
(1− αL) and WWN =
(
W/WN
)
αL.
Inserting short-run static solutions (146) and (148) into (145), and linearizing around the steady-
state yields:
A˙(t) = r?
(
A(t)− A˜
)
+M1
(
P (t)− P˜
)
,
with M1 given by
M1 =
{(
WKL˜+ W˜LK
)
+
[(
WP L˜+ W˜LP
)
− C˜N − PCCP
]
ω12
}
.
D.12 Solving the Full Model
Plugging the short-run static solutions for consumption in tradables and non tradables given by (68)
and for hours worked in the traded and non traded sector given by (70), the steady-state is defined by
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the following set of equations:
ZN
(
1− θN) (k˜N)−θN ≡ r? + δK , (150a)
ZT
(
1− θT ) (k˜T)−θT = P˜ZN (1− θN) (k˜N)−θN , (150b)
ZT θT
(
k˜T
)1−θT
≡ W˜T , (150c)
PZNθN
(
k˜N
)1−θN
≡ W˜N , (150d)
k˜TLT
(
λ¯, W˜T , W˜N
)
+ k˜NLN
(
λ¯, W˜T , W˜N
)
= K˜, (150e)
Y˜ N = CN
(
λ¯, P˜
)
+ δKK˜, (150f)
Y˜ T = CT
(
λ¯, P˜
)
− r?B˜, (150g)
B˜ −B0 = Φ
(
K˜ −K0
)
, (150h)
where Y˜ T = ZTLT
(
λ¯, W˜T , W˜N
)(
k˜T
)1−θT
and Y˜ T = ZNLN
(
λ¯, W˜T , W˜N
)(
k˜N
)1−θN
. This system
of eight equations jointly solve for sectoral capital-labor ratios, k˜T and k˜N , sectoral wage rates, W˜T
and W˜N , the relative price of non tradables, P˜ , the capital stock, K˜, the stock of foreign assets, B˜,
and the shadow value of wealth λ¯.
Because we restrict ourselves to the analysis of the long-run effects, the tilde is suppressed for the
purposes of clarity. Denoting by a hat the percentage deviation relative to initial steady-state, (150a)
can be rewritten as:
ZˆN − θN kˆN = 0, kˆN = Zˆ
N
θN
> 0. (151)
Hence a rise in ZN raises kN . Taking logarithm and differentiating (150b) yields:
ZˆT − θT kˆT = Pˆ + ZˆN − θN kˆN = Pˆ > 0, kˆT = Zˆ
T − Pˆ
θT
(152)
where we used (151) to get the last equality on the LHS. Taking logarithm and differentiating (150d)
yields:
WˆN = Pˆ + ZˆN +
(
1− θN) kˆN = Pˆ + ZˆN
θN
> 0, (153)
where use has been made of (151). Hence a rise in ZN increases WN directly and indirectly by raising
P and kN . Taking logarithm and differentiating (150c) yields:
WˆT = ZˆT +
(
1− θT ) kˆT = Pˆ + kˆT = ZˆT
θT
−
(
1− θT
θT
)
Pˆ > 0, (154)
where use has been made of (152).
Before taking logarithm and differentiating the market-clearing condition, we express production
functions for the traded and non traded sector as percentage deviations relative to initial steady-state.
For traded output, we have:
Yˆ T = ZˆT + LˆT +
(
1− θT ) kˆT = Pˆ + kˆT + LˆT = ZˆT
θT
+ LˆT −
(
1− θT
θT
)
Pˆ (155)
where use has been made of (152). For non traded output, we have:
Yˆ N = ZˆN + LˆN +
(
1− θN) kˆN = LˆN + kˆN = ZˆN
θN
+ LˆN , (156)
where use has been made of (151).
To determine the steady-state changes of sectoral labor, we take logarithm and differentiate short-
run static solutions (70). For hours worked in the traded sector, we have:
LˆT = σL ˆ¯λ+ [²αL + σL (1− αL)] WˆT + αL (σL − ²) WˆN .
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For hours worked in the non-traded sector, we have:
LˆN = σL ˆ¯λ+ (1− αL) (σL − ²) WˆT + [² (1− αL) + σLαL] WˆN .
Plugging the steady-state changes of sectoral wage rates given by (153) and (154), the percentage
deviation relative to steady-state for hours worked in the traded sector is:
LˆT = σL ˆ¯λ+
{
αL (σL − ²)− [²αL + σL (1− αL)]
(
1− θT
θT
)}
Pˆ
+
[²αL + σL (1− αL)]
θT
ZˆT +
αL (σL − ²)
θN
ZˆN , (157)
= σL ˆ¯λ+
[²αL + σL (1− αL)]
θT
ZˆT +
αL (σL − ²)
θN
ZˆN
+
[
αL (σL − ²)−
(
1− θT )σL
θT
]
Pˆ .
Applying a similar procedure for hours worked in the non-traded sector, we have:
LˆN = σL ˆ¯λ+
{
[² (1− αL) + σLαL]− (1− αL) (σL − ²)
(
1− θT
θT
)}
Pˆ
+
(1− αL) (σL − ²)
θT
ZˆT +
[² (1− αL) + σLαL]
θN
ZˆN , (158)
= σL ˆ¯λ+
(1− αL) (σL − ²)
θT
ZˆT +
[² (1− αL) + σLαL]
θN
ZˆN
+
[
σLθ
T − (1− αL) (σL − ²)
θT
]
Pˆ .
Denoting by ωN ≡ PY N/Y the non-tradable share of output, ωC ≡ PCC/Y the consumption-
to-GDP ratio, υI ≡ PI/Y the investment-to-GDP ratio, taking logarithm and differentiating the
market-clearing condition for the non traded goods Y N = CN + IN with IN = I = δKK yields:
ωN Yˆ
N = −ωCαCσC ˆ¯λ− ωCαC [(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ] Pˆ + υIKˆ.
Substituting (158) into (156) and collecting terms allows us to rewrite the market-clearing condition
for non-tradables as follows:
ˆ¯λ [ωNσL + σCωCαC ] + Pˆ {ωNΨN + ωCαC [(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ]} − υIKˆ
= −ωN (1− αL) (σL − ²) Zˆ
T
θT
− ωN [(²+ 1) + αL (σL − ²)] Zˆ
N
θN
, (159)
where
ΨN =
{
[² (1− αL) + σLαL]− (1− αL) (σL − ²)
(
1− θT
θT
)}
,
= σL − (1− αL) (σL − ²)
θT
. (160)
Denoting by 1− ωN ≡ Y T /Y the tradable share of output, υB ≡ r?B/Y the interest receipts-to-
GDP ratio, inserting the intertemporal solvency condition (122), taking logarithm and differentiating
the market-clearing condition for traded goods r?B + Y T = CT with B = B0 +Φ(K −K0) yields:
(1− ωN ) Yˆ T = −σCωC (1− αC) ˆ¯λ+ ωC (1− αC)αC (φ− σC) Pˆ − υBΦK
B
Kˆ,
Plugging (155) into (157) and collecting terms allows us to rewrite the market-clearing condition for
tradables as follows:
ˆ¯λ [(1− ωN )σL + σCωC (1− αC)] + Pˆ {(1− ωN )ΨT − ωC (1− αC)αC (φ− σC)}+ υBΩK˜
B˜
Kˆ
= − (1− ωN ) [(²+ 1) + (1− αL) (σL − ²)] Zˆ
T
θT
− (1− ωN )αL (σL − ²) Zˆ
N
θN
, (161)
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where we set
ΨT =
{
αL (σL − ²)− [(²+ 1) + (1− αL) (σL − ²)]
(
1− θT
θT
)}
= (σL + 1)− [(²+ 1) + (1− αL) (σL − ²)]
θT
. (162)
Finally, denoting by ξN ≡ KN/K the non-tradable share of capital stock, taking logarithm and
differentiating the resource constraint for capital given by (99) yields:
(1− ξN ) kˆT + (1− ξN ) LˆT + ξN kˆN + ξN LˆN = Kˆ.
Plugging the steady-state changes of sectoral labor given by (157) and (158) into the equation above
yields:
σL
ˆ¯λ− Kˆ + Pˆ
{
σL + (1− ξN )− [(1− ξN ) (²+ 1) + (1− αL) (σL − ²)]
θT
}
= − Zˆ
T
θT
[(1− ξN ) (²+ 1) + (1− αL) (σL − ²)]− Zˆ
N
θN
[ξN (²+ 1) + αL (σL − ²)] , (163)
where σL + (1− ξN )− [(1−ξN )(²+1)+(1−αL)(σL−²)]θT = (1− ξN )ΨT + ξNΨN .
The system (150) expressed in steady-state deviation relative to the steady-state can be reduced
to three equations: i) the market-clearing condition for the non-traded good given by (159), ii) the
market-clearing condition for the traded good given by (161), and iii) the resource constraint for
physical capital given by (163). This system comprising three equations jointly determines P˜ , K˜, λ¯ in
terms of exogenous productivity parameters ZT and ZN . Denoting with a tilde the long-term values
to avoid confusion, the system (150) can be solved for the relative price of non tradables, physical
capital and the marginal utility of wealth:
P˜ = P
(
ZT , ZN
)
, K˜ = K
(
ZT , ZN
)
, λ¯ = λ
(
ZT , ZN
)
. (164)
Inserting Pˆ , eqs. (153) and (154) can be solved for WˆN and WˆT . Hence, we have:
W˜N =WN
(
ZT , ZN
)
, W˜T =WT
(
ZT , ZN
)
, Ω˜ = Ω
(
ZT , ZN
)
. (165)
D.13 Introducing Physical Capital: The Steady-State in a Compact Form
In section 4 in the main text and in section D.8-D.9 in the Technical Appendix, we use a specific
procedure to solve for the steady-state which allows us to break down analytically the relative wage
and relative price responses to a productivity differential in three components. Below, we characterize
the whole steady-state and use tilde to denote long-run values. Setting P˙ = K˙ = B˙ = 0 into (114b),
(114a) and (120), and inserting short-run static solutions for kN , Y N and Y T , CN and CT yields the
following set of equations:
ZN
(
1− θN) [kN (K˜, P˜ , λ¯, ZT , ZN)]−θN = r? + δK , (166a)
Y N
(
K˜, P˜ , λ¯, ZT , ZN
)
− CN
(
P˜ , λ¯
)
− δKK˜ = 0, (166b)
r?B˜ + Y T
(
K˜, P˜ , λ¯, ZT , ZN
)
− CT
(
P˜ , λ¯
)
= 0, (166c)
B˜ −B0 = Φ
(
K˜ −K0
)
. (166d)
As shown in section D.12, these four equations jointly solve for the steady-state values for P˜ , K˜, B˜
and λ¯, in terms of exogenous productivity parameters ZT and ZN .
E Introducing Non-Separability between Consumption and La-
bor
In this section, we consider a more general form for preferences taken from Shimer [2011]. Since such
preferences do not affect the first-order conditions from profit maximization, we do not repeat them
and indicate major changes when solving the model.
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E.1 Households
Previously, we assumed that preferences are separable in consumption and leisure. We relax this
assumption which implies that consumption and leisure are substitutes. In particular, this more
general specification implies that consumption can be affected by the wage rate while labor supply
can be influenced by the change in the relative price of non tradables. As previously, the household’s
period utility function is increasing in its consumption C and decreasing in its labor supply L, with
functional form:
C1−σV (L)σ − 1
1− σ , if σ 6= 1, V (L) ≡
(
1 + (σ − 1) γ σL
1 + σL
L
1+σL
σL
)
(167)
and
logC − γ σL
1 + σL
L
1+σL
σL , if σ = 1. (168)
These preferences are characterized by two crucial parameters: σL is the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply, and σ > 0 determines the substitutability between consumption and leisure; it is worthwhile
noticing that if σ > 1, the marginal utility of consumption is increasing in hours worked. Importantly,
such preferences imply that the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is constant.
The representative household maximizes lifetime utility subject to the flow budget constraint (93)
and the accumulation of physical capital (94).
Denoting the co-state variables associated with (93) and (94) by λ and ψ, respectively, the first-
order conditions characterizing the representative household’s optimal plans are:
C−σV (L)σ = PCλ, (169a)
C1−σσγL1/σLV (L)σ−1 =Wλ, (169b)
λ˙ = λ (β − r?) , (169c)
R
P
− δ + P˙
P
= r?, (169d)
and the transversality conditions limt→∞ λ¯B(t)e−βt = 0 and limt→∞ ψ(t)K(t)e−βt = 0; to derive
(169d), we used the fact that ψ(t) = λP (t).
First-order conditions (169a) and (169b) can be solved for consumption and labor as follows:
C = C
(
λ¯, P,W
)
, L = L
(
λ¯, P,W
)
. (170)
To derive the partial derivatives, we take logarithm and totally differentiate the system which yields
in matrix form: −σ σ ( 1+σLσL ) [V (L)−1V (L) ]
(1− σ)
{
1
σL
+ (σ − 1)
(
1+σL
σL
) [
V (L)−1
V (L)
]} ( Cˆ
Lˆ
)( ˆ¯λ+ αC Pˆ
ˆ¯λ+ Wˆ
)
, (171)
where we denote by a hat the deviation in percentage.
Partial derivatives are:
Cˆ
ˆ¯λ
=
(1 + σL)
σ
[
V (L)− 1
V (L)
]
− 1
σ
< 0, (172a)
Lˆ
ˆ¯λ
=
σL
σ
> 0, (172b)
Cˆ
Wˆ
= (1 + σL)
[
V (L)− 1
V (L)
]
> 0, (172c)
Lˆ
Wˆ
= σL > 0, (172d)
Cˆ
Pˆ
= −αC
σ
{
1 + (σ − 1) (1 + σL)
[
V (L)− 1
V (L)
]}
< 0, (172e)
Lˆ
Pˆ
= −αC (σ − 1)σL
σ
< 0. (172f)
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Using the fact that W =W
(
WT ,WN
)
with ∂W
∂WT
WT
W = (1− αL) and ∂W∂WN W
N
W = αL, we get:
L = L
(
λ¯, P,WT ,WN
)
, (173)
where
Lˆ
WˆT
= (1− αL)σL > 0, (174a)
Lˆ
WˆN
= σLαL > 0. (174b)
Inserting first the short-run static solution for consumption given by (170), consumption in non-
tradables, i.e., CN = P ′CC and tradables, i.e., C
T = [PC − PP ′C ]C, can be solved for CN and CT as
follows:
CT = CT
(
λ¯, P,WT ,WN
)
, CN = CN
(
λ¯, P,WT ,WN
)
, (175)
where partial derivatives are given by:
CTP =
CT
P
(
αCφ+
CPP
C
)
≶ 0, (176a)
CNP = −
CN
P
[
(1− αC)φ− CPP
C
]
< 0, (176b)
CTWT =
CT
WT
(1− αL) CWW
C
> 0, (176c)
CNWT =
CN
WT
(1− αL) CWW
C
> 0, (176d)
CTWN =
CT
WN
αL
CWW
C
> 0, (176e)
CNWN =
CN
WN
αL
CWW
C
> 0. (176f)
Inserting first the short-run solution for labor (173), into LT =
∂W(WT ,WN)
∂WT
L and LN =
∂W(WT ,WN)
∂WN
L,
we are able to solve for LT and LN :
LT = LT
(
λ¯,WT ,WN , P
)
, LN = LN
(
λ¯,WT ,WN , P
)
, (177)
where partial derivatives w.r.t. WT and WN are given by (71) and partial derivatives w.r.t. P are:
LˆT
Pˆ
=
LT
P
αC (1− σ) σL
σ
> 0, (178a)
LˆN
Pˆ
=
LN
P
αC (1− σ) σL
σ
> 0. (178b)
(178c)
E.2 Solving the Model
Plugging the short-run static solutions for LT and LN given by (177) into the resource constraint for
capital (99), the system of four equations comprising (98a)-(98c) and (99) can be solved for sectoral
wages and sectoral capital-labor ratios. Taking logarithm and differentiating (98a)-(98c) and (99)
yields in matrix form:
−θT θN 0 0(
1− θT ) 0 −1 0
0
(
1− θN) 0 −1
(1− ξ) ξ ΨWT ΨWN


kˆT
kˆN
WˆT
WˆN
 =

Pˆ + ZˆN − ZˆT
−ZˆT
−Pˆ − ZˆN
Kˆ −Ψλ¯ ˆ¯λ−ΨP Pˆ
 , (179)
where ΨWT and ΨWN are given by (103a) (103b), respectively, ξ ≡ k
NLN
K and we set:
ΨP = (1− ξ) L
T
PP
LT
+ ξ
LNP P
LN
= −αC (σ − 1)σL
σ
< 0. (180)
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Only the partial derivatives w.r.t. P are modified when preferences are non separable in consump-
tion and leisure. Hence, we limit ourselves to these partial derivatives. Short-run static solutions for
sectoral wages are:
WT =WT
(
λ¯,K, P, ZT , ZN
)
, WN =WN
(
λ¯,K, P, ZT , ZN
)
, (181)
with
WˆT
Pˆ
= −
(
1− θT ) (ΨWN + θNΨP + ξ+)
G
< 0, (182a)
WˆN
Pˆ
= −
{
1 +
(
1− θT )ΨWT − (1− θT ) ξ − θT (1− θN)ΨP}
G
> 0, (182b)
and sectorial capital-labor ratios:
kT = kT
(
λ,K, P, ZT , ZN
)
, kN = kN
(
λ¯,K, P, ZT , ZN
)
, (183)
with
kˆT
Pˆ
=
ΨWN + ξ + θNΨP
G
< 0, (184a)
kˆN
Pˆ
=
{
θT
(
ΨW
N
+ΨP
)
− [(1− θT )ΨWT + (1− ξ)]}
G
> 0, (184b)
(184c)
To solve the model, insert first short-run static solutions for sectoral wages (181) into sectoral
labor (177), then substitute the resulting solutions for sectoral labor and capital-labor ratios (184),
production functions can be solved for sectoral outputs.
As mentioned in the text, we break down the long-run relative price and relative wage responses
to a productivity differential into three channels: i) a productivity channel when keeping fixed sectoral
capital-labor ratios and the overall capital stock, ii) a capital reallocation effect induced by the shift of
capital across sectors, iii) a capital accumulation effect stemming from the investment boom causing
a current account deficit in the short-run and therefore requiring a trade balance surplus in the long-
run. As expected, non separable preferences in consumption and leisure modifies only the capital
accumulation channel by influencing private savings and thereby the current account adjustment in
the short-run.
E.3 Numerical Results: Discussion
We now briefly assess numerically to what extent our results depend on the assumptions regarding
the form of preferences. We consider a more general specification for preferences which are assumed
to be non-separable in consumption and leisure. Considering non separability in preferences implies
a positive relationship between consumption and the aggregate wage index which modifies only the
capital accumulation channel. More precisely, by raising the aggregate wage index, the productivity
differential now induces agents to consume more and to reduce private savings further, thus resulting
in a larger current account deficit. Because the economy must run a larger surplus in the balance of
trade, the demand for tradables rises more, producing a larger negative impact on p and ω.
When numerically exploring the implications of non-separability in preferences between consump-
tion and leisure, we set the substitutability between consumption and leisure captured by σ to 2, as
in Shimer [2011], keeping unchanged the baseline calibration discussed in section 5.1. The results for
the case of non-separability in preferences are shown in column 3 of Table 13, for our three alternative
scenarios, i.e., φ = 1, φ < 1 and φ > 1. Neither the productivity channel nor the capital reallocation
channel are modified when considering non-separability in preferences. As shown in the fourth line of
panel A and B of Table 13, non-separability in preferences substantially amplifies the capital accumu-
lation channel, in line with the theoretical predictions. When setting φ to 1, ω falls by 0.54% instead
of 0.45% for the benchmark scenario while p rises by 0.66% instead of 0.72%.
F Introducing Traded Investment
The section examines implications of a two-sector model that differentiate between tradable
and non-tradable goods in investment. The small open economy produces a traded and a
33
Table 13: Long-Term Relative Price and Relative Wage Responses to a Productivity Differ-
ential between Tradables and Non Tradables (in %)
BS Bench Non sep. Traded inv.
(² =∞) (² = 0.8) (σ = 2) (ϕI = 0.42)
φ = 1
A.Relative Wage
Relative wage, ωˆ 0.00 -0.45 -0.54 -0.42
Baseline effect 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Capital reallocation effect 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Capital accumulation effect 0.00 -0.45 -0.54 -0.42
B.Relative Price
Relative price, pˆ 1.00 0.72 0.66 0.72
Baseline effect 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Capital reallocation effect 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Capital accumulation effect 0.00 -0.27 -0.33 -0.27
φ < 1
C.Relative Wage
Relative wage, ωˆ 0.00 -0.24 -0.39 -0.22
Baseline effect 0.00 0.38 0.38 0.38
Capital reallocation effect 0.00 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
Capital accumulation effect 0.00 -0.57 -0.72 -0.56
D.Relative Price
Relative price, pˆ 1.00 0.85 0.76 0.85
Baseline effect 1.00 1.38 1.38 1.38
Capital reallocation effect 0.00 -0.18 -0.18 -0.17
Capital accumulation effect 0.00 -0.34 -0.43 -0.36
φ > 1
E.Relative Wage
Relative wage, ωˆ 0.00 -0.58 -0.64 -0.56
Baseline effect 0.00 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22
Capital reallocation effect 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
Capital accumulation effect 0.00 -0.34 -0.41 -0.33
F.Relative Price
Relative price, pˆ 1.00 0.64 0.60 0.63
Baseline effect 1.00 0.78 0.78 0.78
Capital reallocation effect 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.07
Capital accumulation effect 0.00 -0.21 -0.25 -0.21
Notes: Effects of a labor share-adjusted TFPs diffential between tradables and non tradables
of 1%. Panels A and B show the deviation in percentage relative to steady-state for the
(log) relative price of non tradables p ≡ pN − pT and the (log) relative wage of non traded
workers ω ≡ wN−wT , respectively, and break down changes in a productivity effect (keeping
unchanged sectoral capital-labor ratios kj , the overall capital stockK and the stock of foreign
bonds B), a capital reallocation effect (induced by changes in kj keeping unchanged K and
B), a capital accumulation effect (stemming from the investment boom causing a current
account deficit in the short-run and therefore requiring a steady-state improvement in the
balance of trade). While panels A and B show the results when setting φ to one, panels C
and D show results for φ < 1 and panels E and F show results for φ > 1; φ is the elasticity
of substitution between tradables and non tradables; ² captures the degree of labor mobility
across sectors.
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non traded good by means of a production technology described by Cobb-Douglas production
functions that uses capital and labor. As previously, the output of the non traded good (Y N )
can be used for private (CN ) and public consumption (GN ), and for investment (IN ). The
output of the traded good (Y T ) can be consumed by households and the government (CT and
GT ), invested (IT ), or exported (Y T − CT −GT − IT ).
As in De Cordoba and Kehoe [2000], the investment good is produced using inputs of the
traded good and the non-traded good according to a constant-returns-to-scale function which
is assumed to take a CES form:
I ≡ I (IT , IN) = [ϕ 1φII (IT )φI−1φI + (1− ϕI) 1φI (IN)φI−1φI ]
φI
φI−1
, (185)
where ϕI is the weight of the investment traded input (0 < ϕI < 1) and φI corresponds to the
intratemporal elasticity of substitution between investment traded goods and investment non
traded goods. At each instant, the investment sector minimizes the cost or total expenditure
measured in terms of traded goods:
EI ≡ PIN + IT , (186)
for a given level of output, I, where P is the relative price of the non traded good. For any
chosen I, the optimal basket (IT , IN ) is a solution to:
PI (P ) I = min{IT ,IN}
{
IT + PIN : I
(
IT , IN
) ≥ I} . (187)
The aggregator function (185) is linear homogeneous implies that total expenditure in con-
sumption goods can be expressed as EI = PI (P ) I, with PI (P ) is the unit cost function dual
(or consumption-based price index) to I. The unit cost dual function, PI (.), is defined as the
minimum total expense in investment goods, EI , such that I = I
(
IT , IN
)
= 1, for a given
level of the relative price of non tradables, P . Its expression is given by:
PI =
[
ϕI + (1− ϕI)P 1−φI
] 1
1−φI . (188)
Intra-temporal allocations between non tradable goods and tradable goods follow from
Shephard’s Lemma (or the envelope theorem) applied to (187):
IN = P ′II = (1− ϕI)
(
P
PI
)−φI
I, and
PIN
PII
= αI , (189a)
IT =
[
PI − PP ′I
]
I = ϕI
(
1
PI
)−φI
I, and
IT
PII
= (1− αI) , (189b)
where the non tradable and tradable shares in total investment expenditure are:
αI =
(1− ϕI)P 1−φI
ϕI + (1− ϕI)P 1−φI , (190a)
1− αI = ϕI
ϕI + (1− ϕI)P 1−φI . (190b)
F.1 Households
The representative household chooses consumption C, decides on labor supply L, and invest-
ment I that maximizes his/her lifetime utility (92) subject to the flow budget constraint:
B˙(t) = r?B(t)+R(t)K(t)+W
(
W T (t),WN (t)
)
L(t)−PC (P (t))C(t)−PI (P (t)) I(t), (191)
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and capital accumulation which evolves as follows:
K˙(t) = I(t)− δKK(t), (192)
where I corresponds to investment expenditure and 0 ≤ δK < 1 is a fixed depreciation rate.
Denoting the co-state variables associated with (191) and (192) by λ(t) and ψ(t), respec-
tively, the first-order conditions characterizing the representative household’s optimal plans
are:
C(t) = (PC(P (t))λ)
−σC , (193a)
L(t) =
(
W (t)λ(t)
γ
)σL
, (193b)
λ˙(t) = λ(t) (β − r?) , (193c)
R(t)
PI(P (t))
− δK + αI P˙ (t)
P (t)
= r?, (193d)
and the transversality conditions limt→∞ λ¯B(t)e−βt = 0 and limt→∞ ψ(t)K(t)e−βt = 0; to
derive (193d), we used the fact that ψ(t) = λ¯PI . Eqs. (193a) and (193b) can be solved for
consumption and labor (see eq. (96)). For the sake of clarity, we drop the time argument
below when this causes no confusion.
F.2 Equilibrium Dynamics
First-order conditions from profit maximization remains unchanged and therefore we do not
repeat them (see section D.5). To solve the model, we adopt the same reasoning as in section
D.5.
Remembering that the non traded input IN used to produce the capital good is equal
to P ′II, using the fact that I
N = Y N − CN − GN and inserting I = K˙ + δK , the capital
accumulation equation becomes:
K˙ =
Y N − CN −GN
P ′I
− δKK. (194)
Inserting short-run static solutions for non traded output (110), consumption in non tradables
(68), and the capital-labor ratio in the non traded sector (106) into the physical capital
accumulation equation (194) and the dynamic equation for the relative price of non tradables
(193d), the dynamic system is:
K˙ =
Y N
(
K,P, λ¯
)− CN (λ¯, P )−GN
P ′I
− δKK, (195a)
P˙ =
P
αI
[
(r? + δK)− P
PI (P )
ZNhk
(
K,P, λ¯
)]
, (195b)
where for the purposes of clarity, we abstract from time-constant arguments of short-run static
solutions, i.e., ZT , and ZN .
Denoting with a tilde long-run values, linearizing these two equations around the steady-
state yields in matrix form:(
K˙(t)
P˙ (t)
)
=
(
a11 a12
a21 a22
)(
K(t)− K˜
P (t)− P˜
)
, (196)
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where
a11 =
(
Y NK
P ′I
− δK
)
> 0, (197a)
a12 =
(
Y NP − CNP
)
P ′I
+
I˜NφI (1− αI)
P˜P ′I
, (197b)
a21 = − P˜
2ZNhkkk
N
K
αIPI
> 0, (197c)
a22 =
P˜ZNhk
αIPI
[
θN
kNP P˜
k˜N
− (1− αI)
]
. (197d)
Saddle path stability requires the determinant of the Jacobian matrix DetJ given by
a11a22 − a21a12 to be negative. The term a21a12 is always negative, regardless of sectoral
capital intensities while the term. If kT > kN , we have Y NK < 0 and k
N
P > 0; a11 is negative
while a22 is positive as long as (1− αI) which is the tradable content of investment expenditure
is not too large. In this case, we have a11a22 < 0. If kN > kT , we have Y NK > 0 and k
N
P < 0.
Hence, a11 becomes positive while a22 becomes unambiguously negative. As a result, we have
a11a22 < 0. To conclude, the saddle-path stability condition is fulfilled regardless of sectoral
capital intensities as long as (1− αI) does not exceed the elasticity of kN with respect to P .
Assuming that the saddle-path stability condition is fulfilled, the stable solutions for K
and P are:
K(t) = K˜ +
(
K0 − K˜
)
eµ1t, (198a)
P (t) = P˜ + ω12
(
K0 − K˜
)
eµ1t, (198b)
where K0 is the initial capital stock and
(
1, ω12
)′ is the eigenvector associated with the stable
negative eigenvalue µ1:
ω12 =
µ1 − a11
a12
(199)
For all plausible sets of parameter values, we find numerically ω12 < 0, regardless of sectoral
capital intensities, which implies that the relative price of non tradables and the stock physical
capital move in opposite direction.
Remembering that IT = (1− αI)PII with I = K˙ + δKK, the current account equation is
given by:
B˙ = Y T − CT −GT − (1− αI)PI
(
K˙ + δKK
)
. (200)
Substituting the short-run static solutions for traded output (110) and consumption in
tradables (68) into the accumulation equation of foreign bonds (200), linearizing, solving and
invoking the transversality condition yields:
B(t) = B˜ +Φ(K0 − K˜)eµ1t, (201)
where Φ ≡ N1µ1−r? and
N1 =
[
Y TK −
(
1− αI
αI
)
P˜ Y NK
]
+
{(
Y TP − CTP
)
−
(
1− αI
αI
)
P˜
(
Y NK − CNP
)− φI (1− αI
αI
)
I˜N
}
ω12. (202)
The intertemporal solvency condition of the economy is:
B˜ −B0 = Φ
(
K˜ −K0
)
, (203)
where B0 is the initial stock of traded bonds.
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F.3 The Steady-State
We now describe the steady-state by abstracting from government spending for clarity pur-
pose. Plugging the short-run static solutions for consumption in tradables and non tradables
given by (68) and for hours worked in the traded and non traded sector given by (70), the
steady-state is defined by the following set of equations:
P˜ZN (1− θN )
(
k˜N
)−θN ≡ PI (P˜) (r? + δK) , (204a)
ZT (1− θT )
(
k˜T
)−θT
= P˜ZN (1− θN )
(
k˜N
)−θN ≡ R˜, (204b)
ZT θT
(
k˜T
)1−θT ≡ W˜ T , (204c)
PZNθN
(
k˜N
)1−θN ≡ W˜N , (204d)
k˜TLT
(
λ¯, W˜ T , W˜N
)
+ k˜NLN
(
λ¯, W˜ T , W˜N
)
= K˜, (204e)
Y˜ N = CN
(
λ¯, P˜
)
+ P ′I
(
P˜
)
δKK˜, (204f)
Y˜ T = CT
(
λ¯, P˜
)
+ (1− αI)PI
(
P˜
)
δKK˜ − r?B˜, (204g)
B˜ −B0 = Φ
(
K˜ −K0
)
, (204h)
where Y˜ T = ZTLT
(
λ¯, W˜ T , W˜N
)(
k˜T
)1−θT
and Y˜ T = ZNLN
(
λ¯, W˜ T , W˜N
)(
k˜N
)1−θN
. This
system of equations jointly solve for sectoral capital-labor ratios, k˜T and k˜N , for sectoral wages,
W˜ T and W˜N , the relative price of non tradables, P˜ , the capital stock, K˜, the stock of foreign
assets, B˜, and the shadow value of wealth λ¯, in terms of exogenous productivity parameters
ZT and ZN .
F.4 Graphical Apparatus: Rewriting the Steady-State
Before breaking down the three channels analytically, we characterize the steady state graph-
ically, which allows us to emphasize how introducing traded investment modifies the results.
We assume that I
(
IT , IN
)
takes a Cobb-Douglas form as evidence that φI = 1 (see Bems
[2008]). The steady-state can be rewritten as follows:
C˜T
C˜N
=
ϕ
1− ϕP˜
φ, (205a)
L˜T
L˜N
=
ϑ
1− ϑ Ω˜
−², (205b)
Y˜ T (1 + υB − υIT )
Y˜ N (1− υIN )
=
C˜T
C˜N
, (205c)
P˜ZN (1− θN )
(
k˜N
)−θN ≡ PI (P˜) (r? + δK) , (205d)
ZT (1− θT )
(
k˜T
)−θT
= P˜ZN (1− θN )
(
k˜N
)−θN ≡ R˜, (205e)
ZT θT
(
k˜T
)1−θT ≡ W˜ T , (205f)
PZNθN
(
k˜N
)1−θN ≡ W˜N , (205g)
where ω˜ = W˜N/W˜ T is the steady-state relative wage and R˜/P˜ = r? + δK . We denoted by
υIN ≡ I˜
N
Y˜ N
(υIT ≡ I˜
T
Y˜ T
) the ratio of non traded (traded) investment to non traded (traded)
output and by υB ≡ r?B˜Y˜ T the ratio of interest receipts to traded output.
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Because we restrict ourselves to the analysis of the long-run effects, the tilde is suppressed
for the purposes of clarity.
F.5 Goods Market Equilibrium
Applying the same procedure as in section D.8, combining (205a) with (205c) yields the
GME-equilibrium schedule described by:(
yT − yN) ∣∣GME = φp+ x′, (206)
where x′ = ln
(
ϕ
1−ϕ
)
+ ln
(
1−υ
IN
1+υB−υIT
)
. The goods market equilibrium is upward-sloping in
the (yT − yN , p)-space and its slope is equal to 1/φ.
Combining (205b) with (205f)-(205g) and production functions, we get:
Y T
Y N
=
ϑ
1− ϑ
(
ZT
ZN
)²+1
P−²
(
θT
θN
)² [ (kT )1−θT
(kN )1−θN
]1+²
.
Combining (205d) and (205e) yields:
(
kN
)1−θN
(kT )1−θT
= P
1−θN
θN [PI (r? + δK)]
1−θT
θT
− 1−θN
θN
[
ZN (1− θN )
] 1−θN
θN
[ZT (1− θT )]
1−θT
θT
. (207)
Inserting (207) to eliminate sectorial capital-labor ratios yields the LME-schedule:
Y T
Y N
= P−
[
²+
(
1−θN
θN
)
(1+²)
]
P
(
θT−θN
θT θN
)
(1+²)
I
(
ZT
) 1+²
θT
(ZN )
1+²
θN
Π′, (208)
where we set
Π′ ≡ ϑ
1− ϑ (r
? + δK)
(
θT−θN
θT θN
)
(1+²)
[
(θT )
²θT (1− θT )(1−θT )(1+²)
]1/θT
[
(θN )
²θN (1− θN )(1−θN )(1+²)
]1/θN > 0. (209)
As mentioned above, we assume that the aggregator function for inputs of the investment
good is Cobb-Douglas since data suggest that φI = 1. Taking logarithm, (208) can be
rewritten as follows:(
yT − yN) ∣∣LME = −{²+ (1 + ²) [(1− θN
θN
)
− (1− ϕI)
(
θT − θN
θT θN
)]}
p+
(
1 + ²
θT
)(
zT − θ
T
θN
zN
)
+pi′,
(210)
where pi′ = lnΠ′.
Setting ϕI = 0 into (210) implies that the LME-schedule is unambiguously negative in
the (yT − yN , p)-space. This result holds when ϕI > 0 as long as θT > θN or if θT is close to
θN as data suggest. The slope of the LME-schedule in the (yT − yN , p)-space is
dp
d(yT − yN )
∣∣LME
ϑI>0
= − 1{
²+ (1 + ²)
[(
1−θN
θN
)
− (1− ϕI)
(
θT−θN
θT θN
)]} (211)
The slope of the LME-schedule in the (yT − yN , p)-space is unambiguously negative and
varies between 1
²+(1+²)
(
1−θN
θN
) if investment expenditure are traded only (i.e., ϕI is set to one)
and 1
²+(1+²)
(
1−θT
θT
) if investment expenditure are non-traded only (i.e., ϕI is set to zero).
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First, we compare the slope of the LME-schedule when investment expenditure are both
traded and non traded with the slope of the LME-schedule in a model abstracting from physi-
cal capital. We find that that the LME-schedule in a model abstracting from physical capital
is steeper in the (yT − yN , p)-space if the following condition θN (1− θT ) > ϕI (θN − θT )
holds.
Second, we compare the slope of the LME-schedule when investment expenditure are both
traded and non traded with the slope of the LME-schedule when investment expenditure are
non-traded only (i.e., ϕI is set to 0). Formally, we find that the former is steeper than the
latter in the (yT − yN , p)-space if the following condition holds:
(θN − θT )ϕI > 0,
where θT and θN correspond to the labor share in the traded and the non traded sectors,
respectively. The LME-schedule when ϕI > 0 is steeper than the LME-schedule when
ϕI = 0 in the (yT − yN , p)-space as long as θN > θT , i.e. if the traded sector is more capital
intensive than the non traded sector.
At this stage, it is useful to summarize our results when focusing on the goods market
equilibrium in the (yT − yN , ω)-space. We have to consider two cases, depending on whether
the traded sector is more or less capital intensive then the non traded sector:
• If θN > θT , the following inequalities hold:
dp
d (yT − yN )
∣∣LME < dp
d (yT − yN )
∣∣LME
ϑI>0
<
dp
d (yT − yN )
∣∣LME
ϑI=0
< 0.
• If θT > θN , the following inequalities hold:
dp
d (yT − yN )
∣∣LME < dp
d (yT − yN )
∣∣LME
ϑI=0
<
dp
d (yT − yN )
∣∣LME
ϑI>0
< 0.
F.6 Labor Market Equilibrium
Taking logarithm, (205b) can be rewritten to give the labor supply-schedule (henceforth LS-
schedule): (
lT − lN) ∣∣LS = −²ω + d, (212)
where d = ln
(
ϑ
1−ϑ
)
. The LS-schedule is downward-sloping in the (lT − lN , ω)-space where
the slope is equal to −1/².
We turn to the derivation of the labor demand-schedule. Dividing (205g) by (205f) yields:
PZNθN
(
kN
)1−θN
ZT θT (kT )
1−θT = Ω. (213)
To eliminate the sectoral capital-labor ratios, we use (205d)-(205e), i.e.
(
kN
)1−θN
(kT )1−θT
= P
1−θN
θN [PI (r? + δK)]
θN−θT
θT θN
[
ZN (1− θN )
] 1−θN
θN
[ZT (1− θT )]
1−θT
θT
. (214)
To eliminate the relative price of non tradables, combine the market-clearing condition (205c)
and the demand for traded goods in terms of non traded goods (205a) together with production
functions (97):
P =
[
1− ϕ
ϕ
1 + υB − υIT
1− υIN
ZTLT
(
kT
)1−θT
ZNLN (kN )1−θN
] 1
φ
. (215)
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Substituting (215) into (214) yields:
(
kN
)1−θN
(kT )1−θT
= (r? + δK)
φ(θN−θT )
ψ
[
1− ϕ
ϕ
1 + υB − υIT
1− υIN
LT
LN
] [(1−θN)θT+(1−ϕI)(θN−θT )]
ψ
×
(1− θN )( 1−θNθN )
(1− θT )
(
1−θT
θT
)

φθT θN
ψ (
ZN
) [θT (1−θN)(φ−1)−(1−ϕI)(θN−θT )]
ψ
(ZT )
(1−θT )φθN−[(1−θN )θT+(1−ϕI)(θN−θT )]
ψ
, (216)
where we set
ψ ≡ θT [1 + θN (φ− 1)]+ (1− ϕI) (θN − θT ) (217)
Substituting first (215) into (213), we get:
Ω =
θN
θT
[(
1 + υB − υIT
1− υIN
)(
1− ϕ
ϕ
)
LT
LN
] 1
φ
(
ZN
ZT
)φ−1
φ
[(
kN
)1−θN
(kT )1−θT
]φ−1
φ
.
Then plugging (216) enables us to find a relationship between labor in tradables relative to
non tradables and the relative wage along the LD-schedule:
LT
LN
= Ω
ψ
[θT+(1−ϕI)(θN−θT )] +
 ZT
(ZN )
θT
θN

(φ−1)θN
[θT+(1−ϕI)(θN−θT )]
Θ′, (218)
where we set
Θ′ ≡
(
1− υIN
1 + υB − υIT
)(
ϕ
1− ϕ
)[
(r? + δK)
(θT−θN )
(
θT
θN
) ψ
φ−1 (1− θT )(1−θT )θ
N
(1− θN )(1−θN )θT
] (φ−1)
[θT+(1−ϕI)(θN−θT )]
.
(219)
Taking logarithm, (218) can be rewritten to yield the labor demand-schedule (henceforth
LD-schedule):
(
lT − lN) ∣∣LD = ψ
[θT + (1− ϕI) (θN − θT )]ω+
(φ− 1) θN
[θT + (1− ϕI) (θN − θT )]
(
zT − θT
θN
zN
)
+lnΘ′.
(220)
The slope of the LD-schedule in the (lT − lN , p)-space is:
dω
d (lT − lN )
∣∣∣∣LD
ϑI>0
=
θT + (1− ϕI)
(
θN − θT )
θT [1 + θN (φ− 1)] + (1− ϕI) (θN − θT ) > 0. (221)
First, we compare the slope of the LD-schedule when investment expenditure are both
traded and non traded with the slope of the LD-schedule in a model abstracting from physical
capital. We find that the LD-schedule in a model abstracting from physical capital is steeper
in the (lT − lN , ω)-space if the following condition holds:
(1− φ) [θT + (1− ϕI) (θN − θT )] > 0. (222)
The LD-schedule in a model abstracting from physical capital is steeper in the (lT − lN , ω)-
space than the LD-schedule in a model where ϕI > 0 as long as φ < 1.
Second, we compare the slope of the LD-schedule when investment expenditure are both
traded and non traded with the slope of the LD-schedule when investment expenditure are
non traded only (i.e., ϕI is set to 0). Formally, we find that the former is flatter than the
latter in the (lT − lN , ω)-space if the following condition holds:
(φ− 1) (θN − θT )ϕI > 0. (223)
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According to (223), when φ < 1 and the traded sector is more capital intensive (i.e., θN > θT ),
the LD-schedule when investment expenditure are both traded and non traded is flatter than
the LD-schedule when investment expenditure are non traded.
At this stage, it is useful to summarize our results when focusing on the labor market
equilibrium in the (lT − lN , ω)-space. We have to consider two cases, depending on whether
φ is larger or smaller than one. For clarity purpose, we assume that the traded sector is more
capital intensive than the non-traded sector (i.e., we impose θN > θT ):
• If φ > 1 and θN > θT , these inequalities hold:
dω
d (lT − lN )
∣∣LD
ϑI=0
>
dω
d (lT − lN )
∣∣LD
ϑI>0
>
dω
d (lT − lN )
∣∣LD > 0.
• If φ < 1 and θN > θT , these inequalities hold:
dω
d (lT − lN )
∣∣LD > dω
d (lT − lN )
∣∣LD
ϑI>0
>
dω
d (lT − lN )
∣∣LD
ϑI=0
> 0.
F.7 The Relative Price and Relative Wage Effects of a Productivity Dif-
ferential
The Relative Price Effect
Equating (206) and (210) to eliminate yT − yN and differentiating yields the percent-
age deviation of the relative price of non tradables from its initial steady-state following a
productivity differential between tradables and non tradables:
pˆ =
(1 + ²)
[
θN
θT
zˆT − zˆN
]
+ θNd ln
(
1+υB−υIT
1−υ
IN
)
θN
{
(²+ φ) + (1 + ²)
[(
1−θN
θN
)
− (1− ϕI)
(
θT−θN
θT θN
)]} . (224)
To ease the interpretation of the equation, we rewrite the term ln
(
1+υB−υIT
1−υ
IN
)
as ln (1 + υB − υIT )−
ln (1− υIN ), by using a Taylor approximation at a first order which implies ln (1 + υB − υIT )−
ln (1− υIN ) ' υB − υIT + υIN . Then using the fact that υB = −υNX , (224) reads:
pˆ =
(1 + ²)
[
θN
θT
zˆT − zˆN
]
+ θN (dυNX + dυIT − dυIN )
θN
{
(²+ φ) + (1 + ²)
[(
1−θN
θN
)
− (1− ϕI)
(
θT−θN
θT θN
)]}
When considering that investment is both non traded and traded investment, the labor
share-adjusted TFP differential becomes:[
θN
θT
zˆT − zˆN
]
ϑI + θ
N
θT
(1− ϑI)
. (225)
Using (225) and rearranging terms, the long-run response of the relative price given by (224)
becomes:
pˆ = (1 + ²)ΘKT
[
θN
θT
zˆT − zˆN
]
ϑI + θ
N
θT
(1− ϑI)
− θ
T θN
θTϑI + θN (1− ϑI)Θ
KT (dυNX + dυIT − dυIN ) (226)
where we set
ΘKT =
θTϑI + θN (1− ϑI)
θN
{
(²+ φ) + (1 + ²)
[(
1−θN
θN
)
− (1− ϕI)
(
θT−θN
θT θN
)]} ,
=
θTϑI + θN (1− ϑI)
(1 + ²) [θTϑI + θN (1− ϑI)] + (φ− 1) θT θN . (227)
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We now break down the long-run relative price response to a productivity differential into
three components by adding and subtracting the following terms ΘK and ΘL in the RHS of
(226):
pˆ = (1 + ²)
[
ΘL +
(
θK − θL)+ (ΘKT −ΘK)]
[
θN
θT
zˆT − zˆN
]
ϑI + θ
N
θT
(1− ϑI)
− θ
T θN
θTϑI + θN (1− ϑI)Θ
KT (dυNX + dυIT − dυIN ) , (228)
where
ΘKT −ΘK = − θ
T (φ− 1)ϑI
(
θN − θT )
{(1 + ²) [θTϑI + θN (1− ϑI)] + (φ− 1) θT θN} {(1 + ²) + (φ− 1) θT } ≶ 0.
(229)
While the sign of the numerator is ambiguous as it depends on φ ≷ 1 and θN ≷ θT , the sign
of the denominator is unambiguously positive.
The Relative Wage Effect
Equating (212) and (220) to eliminate lT − lN , taking logarithm and differentiating yields
the percentage deviation of the relative wage ω from its initial steady-state following a pro-
ductivity differential:
ωˆ = −
(φ− 1) θN
(
zˆT − θTθN zˆN
)
+
[
θT + (1− ϕI)
(
θN − θT )]− d ln( 1−υIN1+υB−υIT )
(1 + ²) [θT + (1− ϕI) (θN − θT )] + θT θN (φ− 1) ,
−
(φ− 1) θN
(
zˆT − θTθN zˆN
)
+
[
θT + (1− ϕI)
(
θN − θT )] (dυNX + dυIT − dυIN )
(1 + ²) [θT + (1− ϕI) (θN − θT )] + θT θN (φ− 1) ,(230)
where the second line has been obtained by using a Taylor approximation at the first order to
rewrite ln
(
1−υ
IN
1+υB−υIT
)
as ln (1− υIN )−(1 + υB − υIT ) ' −υIN−υB+υIT = (υNX + υIT − υIN ).
Inserting ΘKT given by (227) and using the labor share-adjusted TFPs differential (225),
the long-run response of the relative wage (230) can be rewritten as follows:
ωˆ = − (φ− 1)ΘKT
[
θN
θT
zˆT − zˆN
]
ϑI + θ
N
θT
(1− ϑI)
−ΘKT
[
θT + (1− ϕI)
(
θN − θT )]
ϑI + θ
N
θT
(1− ϑI)
(dυNX + dυIT − dυIN ) .
(231)
We now break down the long-run relative wage response to a productivity differential into
three components by adding and subtracting ΘK and ΘL in the RHS of (231). We get:
ωˆ = − (φ− 1) [ΘL + (θK − θL)+ (ΘKT −ΘK)]
[
θN
θT
zˆT − zˆN
]
ϑI + θ
N
θT
(1− ϑI)
−ΘKT [θT + (1− ϕI) (θN − θT )] (dυNX + dυIT − dυIN ) , (232)
where − (φ− 1) (ΘKT −ΘK) is positive as long as the non-traded sector is more labor inten-
sive than the traded sector:
− (φ− 1) (ΘKT −ΘK) = θT (φ− 1)2 ϑI (θN − θT ){(1 + ²) [θTϑI + θN (1− ϑI)] + (φ− 1) θT θN} {(1 + ²) + (φ− 1) θT } ≷ 0.
(233)
In order to shed light analytically on the implications of considering that investment expen-
diture are both traded and non-traded, it is useful to break down the reallocation channel as
follows − (φ− 1) [(θKT − θK)+ (θK − θL)]. While − (φ− 1) (θKT − θK) reflects the reallo-
cation channel when investment is non-tradable, the novel term− (φ− 1) (θKT − θK) captures
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the user capital cost channel arising when investment expenditure are both traded and non-
traded. To keep things simple, let us assume that the traded sector is more capital intensive
than the non-traded sector (i.e., we set θN > θT ). In this case, − (φ− 1) (ΘKT −ΘK) > 0.47
Hence, irrespective of whether φ is larger or smaller than one, introducing traded investment
raises the relative wage compared with a model assuming ϕI = 0. Intuitively, the user capital
cost PI (r? + δK) increases less when 0 < ϕI < 1 since the investment price index increases in
proportion of the non tradable content of investment expenditure, following an appreciation
in the relative price, which mitigates the decline in the traded capital-labor ratio kT . As long
as the traded sector is more capital intensive (i.e., θN > θT ), the non-traded sector experi-
ences a smaller capital inflow which moderates the rise in non traded output compared with
that in a model abstracting from traded investment. Graphically, the LDK-schedule shown
in Figure 4(a) would become flatter if φ > 1 while the LDK-schedule in Figure 5(a) would
become steeper if φ < 1. Hence, in either cases, introducing traded investment moderates the
decline in the relative wage induced by the capital reallocation channel.
F.8 Calibration and Discussion of Numerical Results
To split investment expenditure into traded and non traded goods, we follow the methodology
proposed by Burstein et al. [2004] who treat Housing and Other Constructions as non-
tradable investment and Products of agriculture, forestry, fisheries and aquaculture, Metal
products and machinery, Transport Equipment as tradable investment expenditure (Source:
OECD Input-Output database [?]). Due to the lack of information, we consider the item
’Other products’ as both tradable (50%) and non tradable (50%) with equal shares. For each
country, the period is running from 1990 to 2007, except for Sweden (1993-2007). Time series
are not available for Belgium and Korea, for which we rely on Bems’s [2008] estimates and set
αI = 0.59 for both countries. Non tradable share of investment shown in column 3 of Table
14 averages to 58%, in line with estimates provided by Burstein et al. [2004] and Bems [2008].
When assuming that investment expenditures are both traded and non traded, we set
the elasticity of substitution φI between IT and IN to 1, in line with the empirical findings
documented by Bems [2008] for OECD countries. Further, the weight of non traded investment
(1− ϕI) is set to 0.58 to target a non-tradable content of investment expenditure of 58%, in
line with our estimates shown in the last line of column 3 of Table 14.
It is worth noting that introducing traded investment modifies the labor share-adjusted
TFPs differential; more precisely, assuming perfect mobility of labor across sectors and con-
sidering both tradable and non-tradable investments, the long-run response of the relative
price becomes pˆ =
[
θN
θT
zˆT − zˆN
]
/
[
αI + θ
N
θT
(1− αI)
]
. Hence, when running the simulations
we now consider an increase by 1% in the modified labor share-adjusted TFPs differential.
When introducing traded investment (i.e., ϕI is set to 0.42), the relative wage and rel-
ative price responses (in %) following a productivity differential between tradables and non
tradables of 1% are shown in the last column of Table 13 for three alternative scenarios.
Considering traded investment merely affects the capital reallocation channel by influencing
the user cost of capital PI (r? + δK).48 Because the relative price and relative wage responses
are almost unchanged if not identical, numerical results when considering traded investment
47The sign of ΘKT −ΘK depends on sectoral capital intensities. Formally, we have:
− (φ− 1)
(
ΘKT −ΘK
)
=
θT (φ− 1)2 ϑI
(
θN − θT )
{(1 + ²) [θTϑI + θN (1− ϑI)] + (φ− 1) θT θN} {(1 + ²) + (φ− 1) θT } ≷ 0.
While the denominator is unambiguously positive, the sign of the numerator depends on
(
θN − θT ). If θN > θT ,
we have − (φ− 1) (ΘKT −ΘK) > 0.
48Intuitively, following an appreciation in the relative price, the user cost of capital PI (r
? + δK) increases
by a smaller amount when 0 < ϕI < 1 since PI rises in proportion to the non-tradable content of investment
expenditure. Thus, an appreciation in the relative price of non tradables raises the ratio kN/kT but less than
if ϕI = 0 as long as θ
N > θT .
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do not merit further comment.
F.9 The Relative Price and Relative Wage Effects: Imperfect vs. Perfect
Substitutability of Hours Worked across Sectors
In this subsection, we derive long-run adjustments of the relative price and relative wage
following a productivity differential by emphasizing the role of the degree of labor mobility.
Assuming that capital is perfectly mobile and labor is imperfectly mobile across sectors,
first-order conditions from the firm’s profit maximization are:
ZT
(
1− θT ) (kT )−θT = PZN (1− θN) (kN)−θN ≡ R, (234a)
ZT θT
(
kT
)1−θT ≡W T , (234b)
PZNθN
(
kN
)1−θN ≡WN , (234c)
where R is the capital rental cost and W j the labor cost in sector j = T,N .
Setting P˙ = 0 into (193d), the capital rental cost can be written as follows:
R = PI (r? + δK) . (235)
Dividing the marginal product of labor by the marginal product of capital in each sector
yields the sectoral capital-labor ratios:
kT =
1− θT
θT
W T
R
, kN =
1− θN
θN
WN
R
. (236)
Substituting sectoral capital-labor ratios (236) into (234b) and (234c) yields an expression
of the steady-state relative price of non tradables :
P =
ΨT
ΨN
ZT
ZN
(
WN
)θN (R)1−θN
(W T )θ
T
(R)1−θ
T
, (237)
where
Ψj =
(
θj
)θj (1− θj)1−θj , j = T,N. (238)
According to (237), the relative price of non tradables is equal to unit cost of producing in the
non traded sector relative to the unit cost for producing in the traded sector. The unit cost
function is a weighted average of the wage rate W j and the rental rate of capital R, divided
by the sectoral TFP Zj .
Substituting the sectoral capital-labor ratio given by (236) into (234b), the wage rate in
the traded sector can be rewritten as follows:
W T =
(
ZT
) 1
θT
(
ΨT
) 1
θT R
−
(
1−θT
θT
)
. (239)
Multiplying and dividing the RHS of (237) by
(
W T
)θN and substituting (239) yields:
P =
ΨT
ΨN
ZT
ZN
(
WN
W T
)θN (
W T
)(θN−θT )
Rθ
T−θN ,
=
(
ΨT
) θN
θT
ΨN
(ZT )
θN
θT
ZN
(
WN
W T
)θN
R
θT−θN
θT . (240)
Totally differentiating (240) and (235), collecting terms, and denoting the percentage
deviation from its initial steady-state by a hat gives:
pˆ =
zˆT − θT
θN
zˆN
αI + (1− αI) θTθN
+
θT
αI + (1− αI) θTθN
ωˆ, (241)
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where ωˆ = WˆN − Wˆ T and we used the fact that Rˆ = αI Pˆ = θNθT
[
αI + (1− αI) θTθN
]
.
A closed-form solution for the steady-state level of the relative price of non-tradables can
be found when assuming that investment is non traded which implies that (235) reduces to:
R = P (r? + δK) . (242)
Inserting (242) into (240) and collecting termes yields:
P =
ΨT
(ΨN )θ
T /θN
ZT
(ZN )θ
T /θN
(
WN
W T
)θT
(r? + δK)
θT−θN
θN . (243)
Eq. (243) corresponds to eq. (3) in the text.
Depending on whether investment is either traded or non trade, or both, three cases
emerge:
• When investment is traded, i.e., setting αI = 0 into (241), the productivity differential
reduces to:
θN
θT
zˆT − zˆN . (244)
• When investment is non-traded, i.e., setting αI = 1 into (241), the productivity differ-
ential reduces to:
zˆT − θ
T
θN
zˆN . (245)
• When investment is non-traded, i.e., assuming that αI > 0, the productivity differential
reduces to:
zˆT − θT
θN
zˆN
αI + (1− αI) θTθN
. (246)
The standard Balassa-Samuelson model imposes perfect mobility of labor across sectors
so that sectoral wages increase at the same speed WˆN = Wˆ T . Since ωˆ = 0, eq. (240) implies
that following a productivity differential
zˆT− θT
θN
zˆN
αI+(1−αI) θT
θN
by one percentage point, the relative
price of non tradables appreciates by one percentage point. To avoid unnecessary complica-
tions, we assume that investment is non traded by setting αI = 1 so that the productivity
differential reduces to zˆT − θT
θN
zˆN . As shown above, our numerical results are unsensitive to
this assumption. As discussed in the next section, our empirical results are unsensitive to the
assumption related to the non tradables content of investment expenditure as well.
G Robustness Analysis
In this section we explore the extent to which our estimates of the relative price (i.e., γˆ)
and relative wage (i.e., βˆ) responses to a productivity differential between tradables and non
tradables are robust to a variety of specification checks. More precisely, we run the regression
of the relative wage and the relative price on the relative productivity of tradables (see eqs.
(6)):
ωi,t = δi + β .relative productivity of tradablesi,t + vi,t, (247a)
pi,t = αi + γ .relative productivity of tradablesi,t + ui,t. (247b)
To assess the robustness of the estimation results, we re-run the regressions and compare
our empirical findings with those shown in column 1 of Table 2. Table 15 gives results
when carrying out different types of robustness tests including alternatives measures of the
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productivity of tradables in terms of non tradables, excluding Korea, calculating sectoral
capital stocks using disaggregated capital stock data at the sectoral level obtained form the
EU KLEMS database instead of breaking down physical capital into traded and non traded
capital by using sectoral value added shares in the lines of Garofalo and Yamarik [2002].
Because DOLS and FMOLS estimates are very similar, for clarity purposes, Table 15 shows
FMOLS estimates only.
G.1 Alternative Measures of Technological Change Biased toward the Traded
Sector
We first conduct a robustness check by considering alternative measures of the productivity
differential between tradables and non tradables. In section F.9, we show that, when invest-
ment is both traded and non traded, technological change biased toward the traded sector is
given by:  ZT
(ZN )
θT
θN

 1
αI+(1−αI) θ
T
θN

, (248)
where αI is the non tradable share in total investment expenditure.
Panel A of Table 15 summarizes our estimates for baseline regressions. In the main text,
productivity of tradables in termes of non tradables is calculated as the ratio of the traded
TFP to the labor share-adjusted non traded TFP when assuming that investment is non
traded, i.e., setting αI = 1 into (248).
Panel B of Table 15 shows estimates for the relative price and relative wage responses
when considering alternative measures of productivity of tradables in terms of non tradables:
- Because earlier studies analyzing the effects of biased technological change toward the
traded sector on the relative price of non tradables, see e.g., Canzoneri, Cumby and
Diba [1999], or the real exchange rate, see e.g., Bergin, Glick and Rogoff [2006], use
sectoral labor productivity, in order to make our results comparable, the first line of
panel B of Table 15 gives results when technological change is measured by using the
labor productivity index denoted by Aj . In this case, relative productivity of tradables
(248) reduces to AT /AN . To measure labor productivity, we divide value-added at
constant prices (VA QI in KLEMS) by the total hours worked (H EMP in KLEMS) for
each sector in each country from 1970 to 2007 (from 1974 to 2007 for Japan). Source:
EU KLEMS database.
- Kakkar [2003] analyzes the effects of a productivity differential between tradables and
non tradables by assuming that investment is traded only, i.e., αI = 0. In this case,
relative productivity of tradables (248) reduces to:
(
ZT
) θN
θT
ZN
. (249)
The second line of panel B of Table 15 gives the relative wage and relative prices re-
sponses when the relative productivity of tradables is given by (249)
- The third line of panel B of Table 15 shows the relative wage and relative price effects
of technological change biased toward the traded sector when assuming that investment
is both traded and non traded. In this case, the relative productivity of tradables is
given by (248). Because the formula includes the non tradable share of investment ex-
penditure, αI , we have to calculate it. To do so, we follow the methodology proposed by
Burstein et al. [2004] who treat ”Housing” and ”Other Constructions” as non-tradable
investment and ”Products of Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries and Aquaculture”, ”Metal
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Products and Machinery”, ”Transport Equipment” as tradable investment expenditure
(Source: OECD Input-Output database [?]). Due to the lack of information, we con-
sider the item ”Other Products”’ as both tradable (50%) and non tradable (50%) with
equal shares. For each country, the period is running from 1970 to 2007, except for
Ireland (1990-2007) and Sweden (1993-2007). Time series are not available for Belgium
and Korea, for which we rely on Bems’s [2008] estimates (see Tables 7 and 8) and set
αI = 0.59 for both countries.
G.2 Robustness Check
Because Figures 1(a) and 1(b) could suggest that Korea is an outlier, we exclude that country
from our sample when running the regression of the relative wage and the relative price on the
relative productivity of tradables. Results are shown in panel C of Table 15. Additionally,
in order to check that the trend line in Figures 1(a) and 1(b) is not driven by Korea, as
a second attempt to circumvent this potential source of bias, we re-estimate the slope of
the slope coefficient for the trend line by the method of quantile regressions (Koenker and
Bassett [1978]). Because this approach uses the absolute value rather than the square of the
residuals, it is less sensitive to extreme values and will be more efficient that OLS with respect
to outliers.
Another concern is the way the tradable and non-tradable sectors are constructed. In
particular, the classification of the items ”Wholesale and Retail Trade”, ”Hotels and Restau-
rants”, ”Transport, Storage and Communication”, ”Financial Intermediation” and ”Real Es-
tate, Renting and Business Services” is somewhat problematic. In order to address this issue,
we replicate regressions (6a)-(6b) and (8a)-(8a) by adopting alternative classifications in which
one of the five mentioned above industries initially marked as tradable (non-tradable resp.)
is treated as non tradable (tradable resp.), keeping the classification unchanged for the rest
of industries. In doing so, the classification of only one industry is altered, allowing us to see
if results are sensitive to the inclusion of a particular industry in the tradable or non-tradable
sector. Results are shown in panel D of Table 15.
Finally, we examine whether our approach to construct series for sectoral capital stock,
based on Garofalo and Yamarik [2002], could affect the main results. To do so, we rely on
the EU KLEMS database which provides disaggregated capital stock data at the 1-digit level
for up to 11 industries (K GFCF), but only for eight countries of our sample for the period
1970-2007 (Denmark, Finland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, and
the United States).49 Results are shown in panel E of Table 15. For comparison purposes,
the bottom part of panel E shows our estimates when exploring empirical relationships (6)
for the same panel of countries (i.e., eight instead of fourteen countries) when adopting the
methodology of Garofalo and Yamarik [2002] to split the national gross capital stock into
traded and non traded industries by using sectoral output shares (see eq. (A.2)).
Remarkably, the cointegrating vectors estimates are robust across all these runs. For the
response of the relative wage to a productivity differential of 1%, the estimated coefficient of β
ranges from a low of -0.379 when the industry ”Transport, Storage and Communication” moves
to sector N (see panel D of Table 15) to a high of -0.213 when ”Financial Intermediation”
is classified as non tradable (see panel D of Table 15). Across all specifications, estimates
of β are significantly different from zero. Additionally, estimates of γ, which captures the
reaction of the relative price of non tradables to a productivity differential between tradables
and non tradables of 1%, vary from a low of 0.689 when technological change is measured
with labor productivity (see Panel B of Table 15) to a high of 0.830 for the sample of eight
countries providing data on capital stock data at the sectoral level (see panel E of Table 15).
49For Japan the time span is 1974-2006. Belgium, France, Korea and Ireland do not provide disaggregated
capital stock series, and, due to data limitation, we exclude from the econometric analysis Germany (1991-2007)
and Sweden (1993-2007).
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Table 15: Robustness Tests: Panel FMOLS Estimates of Cointegrating Vectors
Relative wage (ω) Relative price (p) Number of
eq. (6a) eq. (8a) eq. (6b) eq. (8b) countries
β β βL γ γ γL
A. Benchmark −0.270a
(−27.83)
−0.269a
(−30.85)
0.164c
(1.80)
0.779a
(108.91)
0.780a
(118.24)
0.126b
(2.38)
14
B. Technological change
Labor productivity −0.239a
(−30.50)
−0.237a
(−33.61)
0.165
(1.62)
0.689a
(83.90)
0.691a
(92.56)
0.177b
(2.57)
14
TFP with IT −0.262a
(−27.83)
−0.262a
(−30.88)
0.164c
(1.78)
0.738a
(108.91)
0.739a
(118.34)
0.127b
(2.37)
14
TFP with IT & IN −0.267a
(−27.83)
−0.267a
(−30.86)
0.164c
(1.80)
0.763a
(108.91)
0.764a
(118.27)
0.127b
(2.38)
14
C. Without Korea −0.253a
(−25.50)
−0.253a
(−28.52)
0.212a
(2.41)
0.788a
(98.47)
0.790a
(108.86)
0.135b
(2.43)
13
D. Classification
Wholesale/Retail Trade in T −0.237a
(−21.05)
−0.235a
(−23.14)
0.214a
(3.37)
0.820a
(117.15)
0.818a
(128.91)
0.158a
(2.79)
14
Hotels/Restaurants in T −0.246a
(−17.91)
−0.247a
(−20.73)
0.115b
(2.07)
0.788a
(87.71)
0.792a
(97.41)
0.129c
(1.89)
14
Transport/Communication in N −0.379a
(−33.96)
−0.382a
(−39.49)
0.155b
(2.32)
0.743a
(89.49)
0.746a
(99.43)
0.099c
(1.93)
14
Financial Intermediation in N −0.213a
(−24.34)
−0.216a
(−27.35)
0.163c
(1.83)
0.797a
(117.71)
0.798a
(132.26)
0.179a
(3.88)
14
Real Estate in T −0.370a
(−34.65)
−0.365a
(−37.91)
0.128c
(1.69)
0.724a
(77.58)
0.731a
(79.90)
0.227a
(3.35)
14
E. Capital stock
KLEMS data −0.304a
(−20.87)
−0.310a
(−24.49)
0.104
(1.33)
0.794a
(17.13)
0.822a
(18.12)
0.093
(1.24)
8
Garofalo and Yamarik [2002] −0.249a
(−20.25)
−0.251a
(−23.99)
0.089
(1.36)
0.830a
(80.86)
0.823a
(87.27)
0.001
(0.38)
8
Notes: a, b and c denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. In benchmark specifications, we use the
labor share-adjusted TFP differential zT − (θT /θN) zN and the labor reallocation index measuring changes in sectoral
employment over two years LR(2).
Table 16: Quantile regressions
Dependent variable Relative wage (ω) Relative price (p)
α = 0.25 α = 0.50 α = 0.75 α = 0.25 α = 0.50 α = 0.75
(zT − (θT /θN )zN ) −0.507a
(−3.39)
−0.408a
(−3.59)
−0.434b
(−2.65)
0.594a
(5.75)
0.494a
(4.81)
0.392b
(2.65)
Observations 14 14 14 14 14 14
Notes: variables are expressed in terms of average growth rates. All regressions include a constant. t-statistics
are reported in parentheses. a and b denotes significance at 1% and 5% levels respectively.
Reassuringly, across all specifications, panel data estimations of γ are significantly smaller
than one. All these findings lend strong support to our results reported in Table 2. We
provide more details below.
First, our estimates are robust to the measure of technological change biased toward the
traded sector. Whether we measure technological change biased toward the traded sector with
labor productivity, or sectoral TFPs with alternative assumptions regarding the non tradable
content of investment expenditure, our main conclusions hold.
Next, when estimating cointegrating vectors by excluding Korea, our results reveal it
merely moderates the decline of the relative wage from 0.27% to about 0.25% while the
relative price response (captured by γˆ) is virtually unchanged.
Another concern is related to the trend line in Figures 1(a) and 1(b). Because Korea could
be viewed as an outlier in Figures 1(a) and 1(b), as a robustness check, following Koenker
and Bassett [1978], we estimate the quantile regressions for different values of the quantiles,
say α = 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 where α is the quantile requested. When including Korea, Figure
1(a) (Figure 1(b) resp.) reveals that there exists a clear positive (negative resp.) relation
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between the average relative price (relative wage resp.) of non tradables growth and the
average productivity differential between tradables and non tradables. Also reported in both
Figures is a regression line. For the relative price, the slope coefficient and t-statistic are
0.64 and 6.92, respectively, implying that the estimated coefficient is significant at the 1%
level (the R-squared is 0.78). For the relative wage, the slope coefficient is -0.44 (with a
t-statistic of -3.86) and a R-squared of 0.52. Table 16 shows estimates when adopting the
quantile regression procedure that allows us to check whether Korea is an outlier or not; each
column gives the estimate of the slope coefficient when running the regression of the average
relative price (relative wage) growth on the average productivity differential, each of which
is a quantile regression using one of the above weights α. In all regressions, our estimates of
the slope coefficients are reassuringly robust (varying from -0.41 to -0.51 for the relative wage
equation and from 0.39 to 0.59 for the relative price). While there are some differences across
estimates, the estimated coefficients are all statistically significant and of similar magnitude
to OLS estimates.
Furthermore, classification issues do not seem to drive the results. Specifically, when
contrasting our estimates in panel A of Table 15 for the baseline scenario with those shown in
panel D of Table 15 for alternative classifications, our main conclusions hold: the relative price
of non tradables increases less than proportionately, the relative wage falls, the relative price
response is larger while the relative wage reaction becomes more muted when labor mobility
increases (i.e., coefficients of interaction terms βL and γL are both positive and statistically
significant, see eqs. (8)).
Finally, empirical findings related to the use of an alternative measure of sectoral capital
stock series, which are shown in panel E of Table 15, suggest that our estimates obtained
in the baseline regression (see panel A of Table 15) stay valid. Note that that across all
specifications reported in panel E of 15, estimates of coefficients of interaction terms, βˆL and
γˆL, do not appear to be significant at conventional level. A possible explanation is that our
sample covers only 8 countries instead of 14. Given the shortened sample size, one should not
be too demanding in terms of statistical significance for interaction term estimates.
H Labor and Capital Adjustment Costs
In this subsection, we analyze an alternative modelling strategy to explain cross-sector differ-
ences in wages by introducing sectoral labor adjustment cost along the lines of Shi [2011]. We
show that the optimal allocation rule of total hours worked to the traded and non traded sec-
tor is similar whether we produce imperfect mobility of labor by introducing a sectoral labor
adjustment cost or assuming limited substitutability of hours worked across sectors along the
lines of Horvath [2000], except that in a model with intersectoral adjustment cost, wages do
no longer equalize in the long-run as the switching cost is in effect only along the transitional
path.
We also analyze the implications of introducing imperfect capital mobility across sectors
by considering sectoral capital adjustment cost along the lines of Morshed and Turnovsky
[2004]. The framework with intersectoral capital adjustment costs developed by Morshed and
Turnovsky [2004] is an interesting but analytically untractable model. While the authors
solve numerically the model by assuming that capital does not depreciate, setting δK = 0
implies that the relative price of non tradables appreciates by the same amount as the rise
in productivity of tradables relative to productivity of non tradables. When considering that
physical capital depreciates and abstracting from the goods market clearing condition, we
show that a productivity differential between tradables and non tradables of 1% produces
an appreciation in the relative price of non tradables by less than 1%, as in a model with
imperfect labor mobility.
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H.1 A Small Open Economy Model with Labor Adjustment Costs
Shi [2011] develops a two-sector small open economy model which can be viewed as an ex-
tension of the framework constructed by Devereux, Lane and Xu [2006]. Because we aim
at comparing our two-sector model with limited substitutability of hours worked across sec-
tors along the lines of Horvath [2000] with a two-sector setup with sectoral labor adjustment
cost, we present a version of Shi’s [2011] model in continuous time by abstracting from price
stickiness and portfolio adjustment costs.
At each instant of time t, the representative agent consumes traded goods and non-traded
goods denoted by CT (t) and CN (t), respectively, which are aggregated by a constant elasticity
of substitution function:
C
(
CT (t), CN (t)
)
=
[
ϕ
1
φ
(
CT (t)
)φ−1
φ + (1− ϕ) 1φ (CN (t))φ−1φ ] φφ−1 . (250)
The subutility function (250) is linear homogeneous which implies that total expenditure in
consumption goods can be expressed as EC(t) = PC (P (t))C(t), with PC (P (t)) is the unit
cost function dual (or consumption-based price index) to C(t). The unit cost dual function
PC(P (t)) is given by
PC(P (t)) =
[
ϕ+ (1− ϕ)P (t)1−φ
] 1
1−φ
. (251)
The agent is endowed with a unit of time and supplies a fraction L(t) of this unit as labor,
while the remainder, 1 − L(t), is consumed as leisure. At any instant of time, households
derive utility from their consumption and experience disutility from working. Households
decide on consumption and worked hours by maximizing lifetime utility:
U =
∫ ∞
0
{
1
1− 1σC
C(t)1−
1
σC − 1
1 + 1σL
L(t)1+
1
σL
}
e−βtdt, (252)
where β is the consumer’s discount rate, σC > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
for consumption, and σL > 0 is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
Following Shi [2011], when the household wishes to supply more labor in sector j, the real-
location of employment toward sector j produces an adjustment cost given by χ
j
2
(
Lj(t)− L˜j
)2
where L˜j corresponds to the labor supply to sector j = T,N in steady-state and χj is a param-
eter that measures the size of the switching cost. Factor income is derived by supplying labor
Lj(t) at a wage rate W j(t), and capital K(t) at a rental rate R(t). For simplicity purpose, we
assume that labor adjustment costs are supported by the traded sector. In addition, house-
holds accumulate internationally traded bonds, B(t), that yield net interest rate earnings of
r?B(t). The households’ flow budget constraint can be written as:
B˙(t) = r?B(t) +R(t)K(t) +W T (t)LT (t) +WN (t)LN (t)− PC (P (t))C(t)− P (t)I(t)
−χ
T
2
(
LT (t)− L˜T
)2 − χN
2
(
LN (t)− L˜N
)2
(253)
where P (t)I(t) corresponds to investment expenditure. Aggregate investment gives rise to
overall capital accumulation according to the dynamic equation:
K˙(t) = I(t)− δKK(t), (254)
where 0 ≤ δK < 1 is a fixed depreciation rate. Aggregating labor and capital over the two
sectors gives us the resource constraints:
LT (t) + LN (t) = L(t), kT (t)LT (t) + kN (t)LN (t) = K(t). (255)
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For the sake of clarity, we drop the time argument below when this causes no confusion.
Households choose consumption, worked hours and investment in physical capital by max-
imizing lifetime utility (252) subject to (253) and (254). Denoting by λ and ψ the co-state
variables associated with (253) and (254), the first-order conditions characterizing the repre-
sentative household’s optimal plans are:
C = (PCλ)
−σC , (256a)
L1/σL = λ
[
W T − χT
(
LT − L˜T
)]
, (256b)
L1/σL = λ
[
WN − χN
(
LN − L˜N
)]
, (256c)
λ˙ = λ (β − r?) , (256d)
R/P − δK + P˙ /P = r?, (256e)
and the transversality conditions limt→∞ λB(t)e−βt = 0, limt→∞ ψ(t)K(t)e−βt = 0.50
Combining (256b) and (256c), we find that the sectoral wage differential depends on the
relative size of mobility cost:
WN −W T = χN
(
LN − L˜N
)
− χT
(
LT − L˜T
)
. (257)
In order to compare the optimal rule for the intra-temporal allocation of hours worked across
sectors when workers experience a utility loss when switching from one sector to another with
that when considering labor adjustment costs, it is useful to log-linearize (16) shown in the
main text: (
1− ϑ
ϑ
)
LT
LN
= Ω−².
Denoting the percentage deviation from its initial steady-state by a hat, eq. (16) can be
written as follows: [
LˆN − LˆT
]
= ²
[
WˆN − Wˆ T
]
, (258)
where ² captures the extent to which workers wish to shift hours worked between sectors. In
order to derive a similar equation to (258), we totally differentiate (257), divide the LHS and
the RHS by the initial steady-state value of aggregate wage L˜:
dLN
L˜
− dL
T
L˜
= Γ
[
dWN
W˜
− dW
T
W˜
]
,
where we denote the share of the aggregate wage in switching costs W˜
χL˜
by Γ and assume
that the intersectoral adjustment cost parameter χj is identical across sectors, i.e., χj = χ.
Denoting by the percentage deviation from initial steady-state by a hat, the above equation
can be rewritten ad follows: [
LˆN − LˆT
]
= Γ
[
WˆN − Wˆ T
]
. (259)
When Γ tends toward infinity, the mobility cost are so small that the sectoral wage differential
is eliminated, as in the Horvath’s[2000] model. In the calibration of the model, Shi [2011] sets
χ = W˜
L˜
1
Γ to match estimates of the elasticity ².
The major difference between a model with imperfect mobility of labor across sectors along
the lines of Horvath’s [2000] and a model with sectoral labor adjustment costs is that in the
former case, the wage differential is persistent in the long-run while the discrepancy between
sectoral wages is eliminated in the long-run in the latter case. Because unit root tests suggest
a persistent wage differential across sectors in the long-run, it is appropriate to consider the
model with limited substitutability of hours worked across sectors along the lines of Horvath
[2000].
50To derive (256e), we used the fact that ψ(t) = λP (t).
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H.2 A Small Open Economy Model with Capital Adjustment Costs
Following Morshed and Turnovsky [2004], we develop a two-sector model in which intersectoral
capital movements involve adjustment costs, expressed as capital lost in the transformation
process. For clarity purposes, we abstract from labor and rather assume that traded and
non traded goods are produced by firms using capital as the sole input in a linear (constant
returns to scale) technology:
Y T (t) = ATKT (t), Y N (t) = ANKN (t). (260)
The output of the non traded good (Y N ) can be used for consumption (CN ) and for investment
(IN ). The output of the traded good (Y T ) can be consumed (CT ) or exported (Y T − CT ).
Factor income is derived by supplying capital Kj(t) in sector j = T,N at a rental rate
Rj(t). In addition, households accumulate internationally traded bonds, B(t), that yield net
interest rate earnings of r?B(t). The households’ flow budget constraint can be written as:
B˙(t) = r?B(t) +RT (t)KT (t) +RN (t)KN (t)− PC (P (t))C(t)− P (P (t)) I(t), (261)
where PC(P (t)) is the consumption-based price index and P (t)I(t) corresponds to investment
expenditure.
Following Morshed and Turnovsky [2004], only non-traded new output can be converted
into capital, and once it becomes capital good in the nontraded sector, it takes extra re-
sources to transform it into capital suitable for use in the traded sector. Accordingly, capital
accumulation in this economy is described by:
K˙T (t) = X(t)− δKKT (t), (262a)
K˙N (t) = I(t)−X(t)
(
1 +
hX(t)
2KN (t)
)
− δKKN (t), (262b)
where 0 ≤ δK < 1 is a fixed depreciation rate. Summing (262a) and (262b), we find that
aggregate investment gives rise to overall capital accumulation according to the following
dynamic equation:
K˙(t) = I(t)− h(X(t))
2
2KN (t)
− δK
(
KT (t) +KN (t)
)
. (263)
where h(X(t))
2
2KN (t)
> 0 represents the intersectoral adjustment costs.
Abstracting from labor supply, the representative household maximizes the following ob-
jective function:
U =
∫ ∞
0
{
1
1− 1σC
C(t)1−
1
σC
}
e−βtdt, (264)
where β is the discount rate, σC > 0 corresponds to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
for consumption.
Households choose consumption, investment in physical capital, the capital allocation
decisions, KT (t) and KN (t), and the rate of accumulation of traded bonds by maximizing
lifetime utility (264) subject to (261), (262a), (263). Denoting by λ(t), ψT,′(t), and ψN,′(t), the
co-state variables associated with (261), (262a), (263), the first-order conditions characterizing
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the representative household’s optimal plans are:
C(t) = (PC(t)λ(t))
−σC , (265a)
ψN (t) = P (t), (265b)
ψT (t) = ψN (t)
(
1 +
hX(t)
KN (t)
)
, (265c)
λ˙(t) = λ(t) (β − r?) , (265d)
ψ˙T (t) = −RT (t) + (r? + δK)ψT (t), (265e)
ψ˙N (t) = −RN (t)− ψN (t)h
2
(
X(t)
KN (t)
)2
+ (r? + δK)ψN (t), (265f)
and the transversality conditions limt→∞ λB(t)e−βt = 0, limt→∞ λψT (t)KT (t)e−βt = 0,
limt→∞ λψN (t)KN (t)e−βt = 0 where we denote by ψj ≡ ψj,′/λ with j = T,N , and λ(t) ≡ λ¯.
Using (265b), eq. (265f) states that that that the relative price of non tradables equalize the
rate of return on domestic capital to the rate of return on traded bonds:
RN
P (t)
+
h
2
(
X(t)
KN (t)
)2
+
P˙ (t)
P (t)
− δK = r?,
where RN = P ∂Y
N
∂KN
= PAN . We suppress the time index below.
Denoting the long-run values with a tilde, the steady-state is given by:
ANK˜N = P ′CC˜ + I˜ , (266a)
X˜ = δKK˜T , (266b)
I˜ =
hX˜2
2K˜N
− δK
(
K˜T + K˜N
)
, (266c)
r?B˜ +AT K˜T = (1− αC)PCC˜, (266d)
R˜T = (r? + δK) ψ˜T , (266e)
R˜N =
(r? + δK)− h2
(
X˜
K˜N
)2 ψ˜N , (266f)
ψ˜T = ψ˜N
(
1 +
hX˜
K˜N
)
, (266g)
ψ˜N = P˜ , (266h)(
B˜ −B0
)
= ΦT
(
K˜T −KT0
)
+ΦN
(
K˜N −KN0
)
. (266i)
where C˜ =
(
PC λ¯
)−σC and (266i) is the (linearized version of the) intertemporal solvency
condition with Kj0 the initial (predetermined) initial capital stock in sector j = T,N .
Substituting first X˜ = δKK˜T into (266f) and (266g), denoting by k˜ ≡ K˜T /K˜N the steady-
state ratio of the traded capital stock to the non traded capital stock, dividing (266f) by (266e)
and eliminating ψ˜N/ψ˜T by using (266g), we get:
P˜ =
AT
AN
[
(r? + δK)− h2 (δK)2
(
k˜
)2]
(r? + δK)
(
1 + hδK k˜
) , (267)
where we used the fact that R˜T = AT and R˜N = P˜AN . If the capital stock does not depreciate
as in Morshed and Turnovsky [2004], i.e., setting δK = 0, we have P˜ = A
T
AN
; the reason is that
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capital reallocation ceases in the long-run so that intersectoral adjustment costs do no longer
influence the relative price in the long-run. When assuming that capital depreciates, eq. (267)
reveals that the rise in k˜ moderates the appreciation in the relative price of non-tradables, and
more so as the parameter h in the adjustment cost function increases. Hence, intersectoral
adjustment costs moderate the relative price appreciation following a productivity differential
between tradables and non tradables by increasing R˜T relative to R˜N . Intuitively, investors
ask for higher return when capital shifts toward the traded sector in order to cover intersectoral
adjustment costs.
I Imperfect Capital Mobility across Sectors
The framework with intersectoral capital adjustment costs developed by Morshed and Turnovsky
[2004] is an interesting but analytically untractable model. While the authors solve numer-
ically the model by assuming that capital does not depreciate, setting δK = 0 into (267)
implies that the relative price of non tradables appreciates by the same amount as the rise in
productivity of tradables relative to productivity of non tradables. When introducing capi-
tal depreciation, as highlighted by eq. (267), the relative price appreciates by less than the
productivity differential. Yet, eq. (267) has been determined by abstracting from the goods
market equilibrium which implies that sectoral output changes trigger an adjustment in the
relative price of non tradables in order to clear the goods market. Instead of considering inter-
sectoral capital adjustment costs, we show below that introducing imperfect substitutability
of capital across sectors along the lines of Horvath [2000], can produce similar results to those
obtained in a model assuming intersectoral capital adjustment costs and has the advantage
to be analytically tractable. This section presents the formal analysis when introducing im-
perfect mobility of capital across sectors while abstracting from labor to avoid unnecessary
complications.
I.1 Households
The representative agent consumes traded goods and non-traded goods denoted by CT (t) and
CN (t), respectively, which are aggregated by a constant elasticity of substitution function:
C
(
CT (t), CN (t)
)
=
[
ϕ
1
φ
(
CT (t)
)φ−1
φ + (1− ϕ) 1φ (CN (t))φ−1φ ] φφ−1 , (268)
At any instant of time t, households derive utility from their consumption. The represen-
tative household maximizes the following objective function:
U =
∫ ∞
0
{
1
1− 1σC
C(t)1−
1
σC
}
e−βtdt, (269)
where β is the discount rate, σC > 0 corresponds to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
for consumption.
Factor income is derived by supplying capital K(t) at a rental rate R(t). In addition,
households accumulate internationally traded bonds, B(t), that yield net interest rate earnings
of r?B(t). The households’ flow budget constraint can be written as:
B˙(t) = r?B(t) +R
(
RT (t), RN (t)
)
K(t)− PC (P (t))C(t)− P (t)I(t), (270)
where P (t)I(t) corresponds to investment expenditure and the consumption-based price index
PC(.) is increasing with the relative price of non tradables P (t). Aggregate investment gives
rise to overall capital accumulation according to the dynamic equation:
K˙(t) = I(t)− δKK(t), (271)
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where 0 ≤ δK < 1 is a fixed depreciation rate. For the sake of clarity, we drop the time
argument below when this causes no confusion.
The representative household supplies capital KT and KN in the traded and non traded
sectors, respectively. The standard BS model assumes that sectoral capital goods are perfect
substitutes. Because agents are willing to devote their whole investment expenditure to the
sector that pays the highest return, sectors pay the same return, i.e., RT = RN = R. A
shortcut to produce imperfect capital mobility is to introduce limited substitutability in capital
across sectors; along the lines of Horvath [2000] who introduce limited substitutability of hours
worked, we assume that capital in the traded and the non traded sectors are aggregated by
means of a CES function:
K
(
KT ,KN
)
=
[
ϑ−
1
²
(
KT
) ²+1
² + (1− ϑ)− 1² (KN) ²+1² ] ²²+1 , (272)
where 0 < ϑ < 1 is the fraction of aggregate capital supplied in the traded sector and ² mea-
sures the ease with which capital can be substituted for each other and thereby captures the
degree of capital mobility. The case of perfect capital mobility is nested under the assumption
that ² tends towards infinity; in this case, (272) reduces to K = KT +KN which implies that
capital is perfectly substitutable across sectors. When ² < ∞, sectoral capital goods are no
longer perfect substitutes. More specifically, as ² becomes smaller, capital mobility across sec-
tors becomes lower as investors perceive a higher cost of shifting capital and therefore become
more reluctant to reallocate capital across sectors. The aggregate capital rental rate index
R(.) associated with the above defined capital index (272) is:
R =
[
ϑ
(
RT
)²+1
+ (1− ϑ) (RN)²+1] 1²+1 , (273)
where RT and RN are capital rental rates paid in the traded and the non traded sectors,
respectively.
Households choose consumption, worked hours and investment in physical capital by max-
imizing lifetime utility (269) subject to (270) and (271). Denoting by λ and ψ the co-state
variables associated with (270) and (271), the first-order conditions characterizing the repre-
sentative household’s optimal plans are:
C = (PCλ)
−σC , (274a)
λ˙ = λ (β − r?) , (274b)
R/P − δK + P˙ /P = r?, (274c)
and the transversality conditions limt→∞ λB(t)e−βt = 0, limt→∞ ψ(t)K(t)e−βt = 0.51
Applying Shephard’s lemma (or the envelope theorem) yields expenditure in tradables
and non tradables, i.e., CN = ∂PC∂P C, and C
T = PCC − PP ′CC. Intra-temporal allocation of
consumption follows from the following optimal rule:(
1− ϕ
ϕ
)
CT
CN
= P φ, (275)
where αC is the share of non traded goods in consumption expenditure.52 An appreciation in
the relative price of non tradables P increases expenditure on tradables relative to expenditure
on non tradables (i.e. CT /PCN ), only when φ > 1.
As for consumption, intra-temporal allocation of capital across sectors follows from Shep-
hard’s Lemma. We therefore obtain capital income from supplying capital in the non traded
51To derive (274c), we used the fact that ψ(t) = λP (t).
52Specifically, we have αC =
(1−ϕ)P1−φ
ϕ+(1−ϕ)P1−φ . Note that αC depends negatively on the relative price P as long
as φ > 1.
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and the traded sectors, i.e. RNKN = αKRK and RTKT = (1− αK)RK, with αK being the
share of non-tradable capital revenue in total capital income.53 Denoting by Γ ≡ RN/RT the
relative capital income, investors allocate capital in the traded and the non traded sectors
according to the following optimal rule:(
1− ϑ
ϑ
)
KT
KN
= Γ−². (276)
If the traded sector pays higher capital income (i.e., if Γ falls) investors are induced to shift
capital towards the traded sector, but less so as ² is lower.
I.2 Firms
A large number of identical and perfectly competitive firms produces a traded and a non
traded good using capital as the sole input in a linear (constant returns to scale) technology:
Y T = ATKT , Y N = ANKN , (277)
where AT and AN are capital productivity index in the traded and non traded sector, re-
spectively. Since the capital market is assumed to be competitive, capital is paid its marginal
products:
AT = RT , and PAN = RN (278)
Hence the relative price of non tradables must equalize with the capital unit cost in the non
traded sector relative to the traded sector:
P = Γ
AT
AN
, Ω ≡ R
N
RT
. (279)
Relaxing the perfect capital mobility assumption implies that a sectoral capital income dis-
crepancy captured by Γ also influences the price of non tradables in terms of tradables.
I.3 Model Closure and Equilibrium
To fully describe the equilibrium, we impose two good market clearing conditions. The non
traded good market clearing condition requires that non traded output is equalized with
consumption in non-tradables and investment:
Y N = CN + I, I = K˙ + δKK. (280)
Plugging this condition into the flow budget constraint (270) and substituting (278) yields
the market clearing condition for tradables or the current account dynamic equation:
B˙ = r?B + Y T − CT , (281)
where the second term on the RHS, i.e., Y T − CT , corresponds to net exports .
I.4 Solving the Model
Short-Run Static Solutions
Intratemporal allocation of capital between the traded and the non traded sector follows
from Shephard’s Lemma (or the envelope theorem):
KT =
∂R
∂RT
K = RTL, and
RTKT
RK
= 1− αK , (282a)
KN =
∂R
∂RN
K = RNK, and
RNKN
RK
= αK , (282b)
53Specifically, we have αK =
(1−ϑ)(KN)²+1[
ϑ(KT )²+1+(1−ϑ)(KN)²+1
] .
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where
∂R
∂RT
≡ RT = ϑ
(
RT
)²
R−², (283a)
∂R
∂RN
≡ RN = (1− ϑ)
(
RN
)²
R−², (283b)
with the aggregate capital rental rate index R is given by (273).
We write out some useful properties:
∂R
∂RT
RT
R
= (1− αK) , ∂R
∂RN
RN
R
= αL, (284a)
∂RT
∂RT
=
∂2R
∂ (RT )2
= ϑ²
(
RT
)²−1
R−²αL, (284b)
∂RT
∂RT
RT
RT
= ²αK > 0, (284c)
∂RT
∂RN
RN
RT
= −²αK < 0, (284d)
∂RN
∂RN
RN
R
= ² (1− αK) > 0, (284e)
∂RN
∂RT
RT
R
= −² (1− αK) < 0, (284f)
where Rj = ∂R∂Rj (with j = T,N).
We compute short-run static solution for consumption supply. Static efficiency conditions
(274a) can be solved for consumption which of course must hold at any point of time:
C = C
(
λ¯, P
)
, (285)
with
Cλ¯ =
∂C
∂λ¯
= −σCC
λ¯
< 0, (286a)
CP =
∂C
∂P
= −αCσCC
P
< 0, (286b)
where σC corresponds to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption.
Intratemporal allocation between non tradable goods and tradable goods follows from
Shephard’s Lemma (or the envelope theorem):
CN = P ′CC = (1− ϕ)
(
P
PC
)−φ
C, and
PCN
PCC
= αC , (287a)
CT =
[
PC − PP ′C
]
C = ϕ
(
1
PC
)−φ
C, and
CT
PCC
= (1− αC) , (287b)
where the non tradable and tradable shares in total consumption expenditure are:
αC =
(1− ϕ)P 1−φ
ϕ+ (1− ϕ)P 1−φ , , (288a)
1− αC = ϕ
ϕ+ (1− ϕ)P 1−φ . (288b)
Inserting first the short-run solution for consumption (286), (287) can be solved for CT
and CN :
CT = CT
(
λ¯, P
)
, CN = CN
(
λ¯, P
)
, (289)
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where partial derivatives are
CTλ¯ = −σC
CT
λ¯
< 0, (290a)
CTP = αC
CT
P
(φ− σC) ≶ 0, (290b)
CNλ¯ = −σC
CN
λ¯
< 0, (290c)
CNP = −
CN
P
[(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ] < 0, (290d)
where we used the fact that −P ′′CP
P ′C
= φ (1− αC) > 0 and P ′CC = CN .
Inserting first the short-run solution R = R
(
RT , RN
)
into KT =
∂R(RT ,RN)
∂RT
K and KN =
∂R(RT ,RN)
∂RN
K, we are able to solve for KT and KN :
KT = KT
(
RT , RN ,K
)
, KN = KN
(
RT , RN ,K
)
, (291)
where partial derivatives are
KTK =
∂KT
∂K
=
∂R
∂RT
> 0, (292a)
KTRT =
∂KT
∂RT
=
KT
RT
²αK > 0, (292b)
KTRN =
∂KT
∂RN
= −K
T
RN
αK² < 0, (292c)
KNK =
∂KN
∂K
=
∂R
∂RN
> 0, (292d)
KNRN =
∂KN
∂RN
=
KN
RN
² (1− αK) > 0, (292e)
KNRT =
∂KN
∂RT
= −K
N
RT
(1− αK) ² < 0, (292f)
(292g)
where we used the fact that RTTR
T
RT
= ²αK , RTNR
N
RT
= −²αK , RNNRNRN = ² (1− αK),
RNTR
T
RN
=
−² (1− αK).
Inserting first-order conditions (278), we can solve for the aggregate capital rental rate
index R = R
(
RT , RN
)
as follows:
R = R
(
AT , AN , P
)
, (293)
where
∂R
∂P
P
RN
= AN
P
RN
= 1. (294)
Equilibrium Dynamics
Inserting the short-run static solutions for consumption in non tradables (289) and non
traded capital (291) into the physical capital accumulation equation (280) and the short-run
static solution for the aggregate capital rental rate index (293) into the dynamic equation for
the relative price of non tradables (274c), the dynamic system is:
K˙ = ANKN
[
RT
(
AT
)
, RN
(
AN , P
)
,K
]− CN (λ¯, P )− δKK, (295a)
P˙ = P
[
r? + δ − R
(
AT , AN , P
)
P
]
. (295b)
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Denoting with a tilde long-run values, linearizing (295a) around the steady-state yields:
K˙ =
[
ANK˜N
P˜
∂KN
∂RN
R˜N
K˜N
∂RN
∂P
P˜
R˜N
− CNP
](
P (t)− P˜
)
+
(
AN
KN
∂K
− δK
)(
K(t)− K˜
)
.
and ∂K
N
∂RN
RN
KN
= ² (1− αK), CNP is given by (290d), AN K
N
∂K =
AN
K˜
KN
∂K K˜ =
AN K˜N
K˜
= R˜
N K˜N
R˜K˜
R˜
P˜
=
αK (δK + r?).
Linearizing (295a) around the steady-state yields:
P˙ = − R˜
P˜
(1− αK)
(
P (t)− P˜
)
,
where R˜
P˜
= (δK + r?).
In matrix form, we get:(
K˙(t)
P˙ (t)
)
=
(
αK (δK + r?)− δK a12
0 (δK + r?) (1− αK)
)(
K(t)− K˜
P (t)− P˜
)
, (296)
where
a12 =
Y˜ N
P˜
{
² (1− αK) + αCωC
ωN
[(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ]
}
> 0, (297)
with PC
N
PY N
= PC
N
PCC
PCC
Y
Y
PY N
= αCωCωN and ωN =
PY N
Y ,
PCC
Y = ωC .
Using the fact that the Trace is the sum of the diagonal elements, we find that the trace
of the Jacobian matrix denoted by Tr J is:
Tr J = r? > 0. (298)
The determinant of the Jacobian matrix denoted by Det J is:
Det J = [αK (δK + r?)− δK ] (δK + r?) (1− αK) (299)
Saddle-path stability requires that (1− αK) δK > αKr? which can be rewritten as ANK˜N =
Y˜ N < δKK˜ = I˜. Since such a condition is not consistent with the market clearing condition
for the non traded good (280), in order to eliminate unstable paths, both the relative price and
the capital stock are jump variables which must adjust instantaneously to their steady-state:
P (t) = P˜ , K(t) = K˜. (300)
Inserting the short-run static solutions for capital in the traded sector (291) and con-
sumption in tradables (289) into the accumulation equation of foreign bonds (281), linearizing
around the steady-state and inserting (300) yields:
B˙(t) = r?
(
B(t)− B˜
)
. (301)
Solving and invoking the transversality condition limt→∞ λB(t)e−r
?t = 0 yields:
B(t) = B0. (302)
Hence, for the transversality condition to hold, the stock of traded bonds B(t) must be equal
to its initial predetermined level. Combining (302) with (300) yields:
r?B0 + Y T = CT . (303)
Because the stock of foreign bonds must stick to its initial value, for the sake of simplicity
and without loss of generality, we set B0 = 0.
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I.5 The equilibrium
Because the dynamics degenerate, we drop the superscript tilde for the sake of simplicity. The
equilibrium is defined by the following set of equations:(
1− ϕ
ϕ
)
CT
CN
= Pφ, (304a)(
1− ϑ
ϑ
)
KT
KN
= Γ−² (304b)
P = Γ
AT
AN
, (304c)
ATKT
ANKN
=
CT
CN
, (304d)
where Γ ≡ RN/RT is the ratio of the non traded rental rate to the traded rental rate or the
relative capital rental rate.
I.6 Long-Run Change of the Relative Capital Rental Rate
We denote the logarithm in lower case and the percentage deviation from its initial steady-
state by a hat. When focusing on the capital market, the model can be summarized graphically
by two schedules in the (kT /kN , γ)-space, Applying logarithm to eq. (304b) yields the capital
supply-schedule (CS henceforth):
kT
kN
∣∣∣∣CS = −² ln γ + d, (305)
where d = ln
(
ϑ
1−ϑ
)
and γ = lnΓ. A rise in γ provides an incentive to shift capital from the
traded sector towards the non traded sector. Hence the CS-schedule is downward-sloping in
the (kT /kN , γ)-space where the slope is equal to −1/².
Substituting demand for traded goods in terms of non traded goods (304a) into the market
clearing condition given by (304d) yields:
Y T
Y N
=
(
ϕ
1− ϕ
)
P φ. (306)
Substituting first-order conditions from the firms’ maximization problem given by (304c) and
using production functions, i.e. KT = Y T /AT and KN = Y N/AN , we get:
KT
KN
=
(
ϕ
1− ϕ
)(
AT
AN
)φ−1
γφ.
Taking logarithm yields the labor demand-schedule (LD henceforth) in the (kT /kN , γ)-space
is given by
kT
kN
∣∣∣CD = φω + (φ− 1) aT
aN
+ x, (307)
where x = ln
(
ϕ
1−ϕ
)
. A rise in the relative rental rate γ raises the cost of capital in the non
traded sector relative to the traded sector. To compensate for the increased capital cost, the
non traded sector sets higher prices which induces agents to substitute traded for non traded
goods and therefore produces an expansionary effect on capital demand in the traded sector.
Hence the LD-schedule is upward-sloping in the (kT /kN , γ)-space where the slope is equal to
1/φ.
Equating capital demand given by (307) and capital supply described by (305), differen-
tiating and denoting by a hat the deviation from initial steady state in percentage terms,
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we find that the relative capital rental rate rN/rT declines in the long run as a result of a
productivity differential between tradables and non tradables only if φ > 1:
γˆ = − (φ− 1)ΘC (aˆT − aˆN) , ΘC = ( 1
²+ φ
)
. (308)
As investors are more reluctant to shift capital from the non traded to the traded sector, as
reflected by a lower ², the response of the relative rental rate to a productivity differential is
amplified because the traded sector must pay higher return to attract investors. Graphically,
the CD-schedule shifts along a steeper CS-schedule. When ²→∞, the relative capital rental
rate is unaffected, as in the standard BS model.
I.7 Long-Run Change of the Relative Price of Non Tradables
The model can be summarized graphically in the (yT /yN , p)-space. System (304a)-(304d)
described above can be reduced to two equations. Substituting (304a) into eq. (304d) yields
the goods market equilibrium (henceforth labelled GME) schedule:
yT
yN
∣∣∣GME = φp+ x, (309)
where x = ln
(
ϕ
1−ϕ
)
. Since a rise in the relative price p raises consumption in tradables, the
goods market equilibrium requires a rise in the traded output-non traded output ratio. Hence
the goods market equilibrium is upward-sloping in the (yT /yN , p)-space where the slope is
equal to 1/φ.
Substituting (304c) into (304b) to eliminate γ yields the capital market equilibrium (CME)
schedule:
yT
yN
∣∣∣LME = −²p+ (1 + ²) aT
aN
+ z, (310)
where z = ln
(
ϑ
1−ϑ
)
. A rise in the relative price p raises the relative capital rental rate γ
which induces agents to supply more capital in the non traded sector, and more so if ² is
larger (i.e., agents are more willing to shift capital across sectors). Hence the capital market
equilibrium is downward-sloping in the (yT /yN , p)-space where the slope is equal to −1/².
Assuming that the shift of capital across sectors is costless, i.e. ² tends to infinity, capital
rental rates between traded and non traded sectors are equalized. Graphically, the CME-
schedule becomes an horizontal line. Conversely, as capital mobility becomes more costly, i.e.
² is smaller, the CME-schedule becomes steeper in the (yT /yN , p)-space.
Equating (309) and (310) and differentiating, we find that the relative price p increases
less than the productivity differential between tradables and non tradables only if φ > 1:
pˆ = (²+ 1)ΘC
(
aˆT − aˆN) , (311)
where ΘL is given by (308). According to (311), following a productivity differential of 1%, p
must increase by less than 1% only if φ > 1. In this case, the lower ², the smaller pˆ. Intuitively,
because investors are more reluctant to shift capital across sectors, the ratio kT /kN increases
less, requiring a lower pˆ to clear the market. Graphically, the CME-schedule shifts to the
right by a smaller amount. When ² → ∞, we have pˆ = aˆT − aˆN , i.e., a strict proportional
relationship between p and aT /aN .
J A Two-Sector Model With Labor Market Frictions
In this section, we explore the link between the relative price (and relative wage) and tech-
nological change biased toward the traded sector by developing a two-sector framework with
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unemployment in the labor market. We see our setup as an extension of the framework by Hei-
jdra and Ligthart [2009] who solve analytically a dynamic open economy model with search
unemployment and endogenous labor force participation.54 In the tradition of Diamond-
Mortensen-Pissarides, unemployment arises because it takes time for firms to hire workers
and for unemployed workers to find a job. Because firms face a cost by maintaining job va-
cancies, they receive a surplus equal to the marginal product of labor less the product wage.
Symmetrically, so as to compensate for the cost of searching for a job, unemployed workers
receive a surplus equal to the product wage less the reservation wage. Nash bargaining be-
tween firms and workers yields a product wage defined as the weighted sum of the marginal
product of labor and a reservation wage. As Heijdra and Ligthart, we depart from the usual
practice by assuming endogenous labor force participation which implies that the reservation
wage varies over time.
The country is small in terms of both world goods and capital markets, and faces a given
world interest rate, r?.55 The small open economy is populated by a constant number of
identical households and firms that have perfect foresight and live forever. Households decide
on labor market participation and consumption while firms decide on hours worked. The
economy consists of two sectors. A sector produces a traded good denoted by the superscript
T that can be exported while the other sector produces a non-traded good denoted by the
superscript N . The setup allows for traded and non-traded goods to be used for consumption.
The traded good is chosen as the numeraire. The labor market, in the tradition of Diamond-
Mortensen-Pissarides, consists of a matching process within each sector between the firms
who post job vacancies and unemployed workers who search for a job.
J.1 Households
The economy that we consider consists of a representative household with a measure one
continuum of identical infinitely lived members. At any instant, members in the household
derive utility from consumption goods C and experience disutility from working and searching
efforts. More precisely, the representative household comprises members who engage in only
one of the following activities: working and searching a job in each sector, or enjoying leisure.
Assuming that the representative individual is endowed with one unit of time, leisure is defined
as l ≡ 1 − LT − LN − UT − UN , where Lj denotes units of labor time and U j corresponds
to time spent on searching for a job in sector j (with j = T,N). Hence, the labor force
is not constant which enables us to focus on both the transition between employment and
unemployment on the one hand, and the transition between leisure and labor force on the
other. Unemployed agents are randomly matched with job vacancies according to a matching
function described later. Since the timing of a match is random, agents face idiosyncratic
risks. To simplify the analysis, we assume that members in the household perfectly insure
each other against variations in labor income.
We consider that the utility function is additively separable in the disutility received by
working and searching in the two sectors. As will become clear later, such specification makes
it impossible to switch immediately from one sector to the other. This can be justified on the
grounds of sector specific skills. Technically, in order to work more in sector j the agent must
raise the time spent on searching for a job in sector j. The representative household chooses
the time path of consumption and labor force to maximize the following objective function:
U =
∫ ∞
0
 11− 1σC C(t)1−
1
σC − 1
1 + 1
σTL
F T (t)
1+ 1
σT
L − 1
1 + 1
σNL
FN (t)
1+ 1
σN
L
 e−ρtdt, (312)
54Our framework also builds upon Merz [1995], Andolfatto [1996], Shi and Wen [1999] who construct dynamic
general equilibrium models with labor markets characterized by search frictions. We depart from these papers
by considering a two-sector framework.
55The price of the traded good is determined on the world market and exogenously given for the small open
economy.
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where ρ is the consumer’s subjective time discount rate, σC > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution for consumption, and σjL > 0 is the elasticity of labor supply at the extensive
margin in sector j = T,N . For later use, we denote by uj the sectoral unemployment rate
defined as uj = U
j
Uj+Lj
= U
j
F j
with F j = Lj + U j the labor force in sector j.
At each instant of time, mjU j unemployed agents find a job in sector j = T,N and sjLj
employed individuals lose their job. Employment in sector j evolves gradually according to:
L˙j(t) = mjU j(t)− sjLj(t), j = T,N, (313)
where mj denotes the rate at which unemployed agents find jobs and sj is the constant rate
of job separation; 1/mj can be interpreted as the average unemployment duration; mj is
a function of labor market tightness θj which is defined as the ratio of the number of job
vacancies over unemployed agents in sector j.
Households supply Lj(t) units of labor services for which they receive the product wage
wj(t) in sector j = T,N . They accumulate internationally traded bonds, B(t), that yield
net interest rate earnings r?B(t). We denote by A(t) the stock of financial wealth held by
households which comprises the shadow value of employment defined later. Denoting by T
the lump-sum taxes, the flow budget constraint is equal to households’ real disposable income
less consumption expenditure PCC:
A˙(t) = r?A(t) + wT (t)LT (t) + wN (t)LN (t) +RTUT (t) +RNUN (t)− T (t)− PC (P (t))C(t),
(314)
where PC is the consumption price index which is a function of the relative price of non-traded
goods P and Rj represents unemployment benefits received by job seekers in sector j.
The representative household selects consumption, time dedicated for searching a job in
sector j, and financial wealth:56
C = (PCλ)
−σC (315a)
F j =
{
λ
[
mj
(
θj
)
ξj +Rj
]}σjL , (315b)
λ˙ = λ (ρ− r?) , (315c)
ξ˙j =
(
sj + r?
)
ξj −
(
wj − (F j)1/σjL) , (315d)
and the appropriate transversality conditions; λ and ξj denote the shadow prices of wealth
and finding a job in sector j, respectively. Eq. (315b) shows that labor market participation
is a positive function of the reservation wage wjR, which is defined as the sum of the expected
value of a job mjξj and the unemployment benefit Rj . Solving eq. (315d) forward and
invoking the transversality condition yields:
ξj(t) =
∫ ∞
t
[
wj (τ)− wjR (τ)
]
e(s
j+r?)(t−τ)dτ. (316)
Eq. (316) states that ξ is equal to the present discounted value of the surplus from an
additional job consisting of the excess of labor income over the household’s outside option.
Note that as described above, we consider a representative household who splits available
time between leisure and market activities (i.e., time devoted to job search and work). While
labor supply is elastic at the extensive margin, search effort and worked hours are supplied
56First-order conditions consist of (315a) and (315c) together with
(
F j
)1/σj
L = mjξ′,j + Rjλ and ξ˙′ =(
sj + ρ
)
ξ′,j −
[
λwj − (F j)1/σjL]. Denoting by ξj ≡ ξ′,j/λ, using (315a) and (315c), we get (315b) and (315d).
Since ξ′,j is the utility value of an additional job and λ is the marginal utility of wealth, ξj is the pecuniary
value of an additional job.
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inelastically.57 For the sake of clarity, we drop the time argument below when this causes no
confusion.
Applying Shephard’s lemma (or the envelope theorem) yields expenditure in tradables and
non tradables, i.e., PCN = αCPCC, (1− αC)PCC, with αC being the share of non traded
goods in consumption expenditure.58 Intra-temporal allocation of consumption follows from
the following optimal rule: (
1− ϕ
ϕ
)
CT
CN
= P φ. (317)
An appreciation in the relative price of non tradables P increases expenditure on tradables
relative to expenditure on non tradables (i.e. CT /PCN ), only when φ > 1.
J.2 Firms
Each sector consists of a large number of identical firms. Both the traded and non-traded
sectors use labor, LT and LN , according to constant returns to scale production functions,
Y T = ATLT and Y N = ANLN . Firms post job vacancies V j to hire workers and face a cost
per job vacancy κj which is assumed to be constant and measured in terms of the traded good.
Firms pay the wage wj decided by the generalized Nash bargaining solution. As producers
face a labor cost wj per employee and a cost per hiring of κj , the profit function of the
representative firm in the traded sector is:
piT = ATLT − wTLT − κTV T + xT L˙T , (318)
where xT is a firing tax when layoffs are higher than hirings, i.e., if L˙T < 0 is negative (see
e.g., Heijdra and Ligthart [2002]). This variable captures the extent of employment protection
legislation. Symmetrically, denoting by P the price of non traded goods in terms of traded
goods, the profit function of the representative firm in the non traded sector is:
piT = PANLN − wNLN − κNV N + xN L˙N , (319)
where xN is a firing tax in the non traded sector when L˙N < 0.
Denoting by f j the rate at which a vacancy is matched with unemployed agents, the law
of motion for labor is given by:
L˙j = f jV j − sjLj , (320)
where f jV j represents the flow of job vacancies which are fulfilled; note that f j decreases
with labor tightness θj .
Denoting by γj the shadow price of employment to the firm, and keeping in mind that f j
is taken as given, the maximization problem yields the following first-order conditions:
γj + xj =
κj
f j (θj)
, (321a)
γ˙j = γj
(
r? + sj
)− (Ξj + r?xj − wj) , (321b)
where ΞT = AT and ΞN = PAN . Eq. (321a) requires the marginal cost of vacancy, κj , to
be equal to the marginal benefit of vacancy, f j (.)
(
γj + xj
)
. Solving equation (321b) forward
and invoking the transversality condition yields:
γj(t) =
∫ ∞
t
[
Ξj (τ)− xjsj − wj (τ)] e(sj+r?)(t−τ)dτ. (322)
57More precisely, depending on the search parameters captured by sj and mj , labor force is split between
working time and job search. Along the transitional dynamics, using the fact that U j = F j−Lj , agents supply
working time Lj according to the following accumulation equation L˙j = mjU j − sjLj = mjF j − (mj + sj)Lj ,
where F j is labor force and Lj corresponds to hours worked in sector j supplied by the representative household.
58Specifically, we have αC =
(1−ϕ)P1−φ
ϕ+(1−ϕ)P1−φ . Note that αC depends negatively on the relative price P as long
as φ > 1.
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Eq. (322) states that γj is equal to the present discounted value of the cash flow earned on an
additional worker, consisting of the excess of labor productivity Ξj over the wage wj minus
the firing cost xjsj .
Differentiating γj(t)Lj(t) w. r. t. time and inserting the law of motion for employment
L˙j(t) together with the dynamic optimality condition (321b), using (321a), i.e., γj = κj/f j −
xj , and L˙j = f jθj − sjLj , solving forward, and making use of the transversality condition, we
get:59
γj(t)Lj(t) =
∫ ∞
t
pije−r
?(τ−t)dτ, j = T,N. (323)
Eq. (323) states that the value of human assets γjLj is equal to the value of the representative
firm in sector j which corresponds to the present discounted value of profits pij .
J.3 Matching and Wage Determination
We now set the matching function and the wage determination scheme. As it is common in
the literature, the matching function is assumed to take a Cobb-Douglas form:
M j
(
V j , U j
)
= Xj
(
V j
)αjV (U j)1−αjV , αjV ∈ (0, 1) , (324)
where M j describes the number of job matches, αjV represents the elasticity of vacancies in
job matches and Xj corresponds to the matching efficiency. We express the number of labor
contracts per unemployment units:60
mj = mj
(
θj
)
= Xj
(
θj
)αjV , f j = f j (θj) = mj (θj)
θj
= Xj
(
θj
)αjV −1 , (325)
with (
f j
)′
θj
f j
= −
(
1− αjV
)
,
(m′)j θj
mj
= αjV . (326)
When a vacancy and a job-seeking worker meet, a rent is created which is equal to ξj+γj ,
where ξj is the value of an additional job and γj is the value of an additional worker and wj
is the subsidy. The division of the rent between the worker and the firm is determined by
generalized Nash bargaining over the wage rate:
max
wj
(
ξj
)αjW (γj + xj)1−αjW , αjW ∈ (0, 1) , (327)
where αjW and 1 − αjW correspond to the bargaining power of the worker and the firm,
respectively.
Solving for (327), the product wage wj is defined as a weighted sum of the labor marginal
revenue of labor and the reservation wage:
wj = αjW
(
Ξj + r?xj
)
+
(
1− αjW
) (F j)1/σjL
λ¯
. (328)
An increase in the marginal revenue of labor, which exerts an upward pressure on labor
demand, or a rise in the labor market tightness, by raising the reservation wage (see eq.
(315b)), pushes up the product wage.61
59We made use of the fact that pij = ΞjLj − wjLj + xjL˙j − κjV j since production functions are linearly
homogeneous in labor.
60Note that the flows of workers in and out of employment are equal to each other in any symmetric
equilibrium, i.e., mjU j = f jV j . Hence equations L˙j = f jV j − sjLj and L˙j = mjU j − sjLj indicate that the
demand for labor indeed equates the supply.
61Note that the Nash bargaining wage depends positively on unemployment benefits Rj . To see it more
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J.4 Government
The final agent in the economy is the government. Unemployed benefits RTUT +RNUN and
hiring subsidies xT L˙T + xN L˙N are covered by lump-sum taxes T according to the following
balanced budget constraint:62
T =
(
RTUT +RNUN
)
+
(
xT L˙T + xN L˙N
)
. (329)
J.5 Solving the Model
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium dynamics and then discuss the steady-state.
Market Clearing Conditions
To begin with, we have to impose the market clearing condition for the non traded good
according to which non traded output is only consumed domestically:
Y N (t) = CN (t). (330)
Using the definition of the stock of financial wealth A(t) ≡ B(t) + γT (t)LT (t) + γN (t)LN (t),
differentiating with respect to time, substituting the accumulation equations of labor (313)
and financial wealth (314) together with the dynamic equation for the shadow value of an ad-
ditional worker (321b), using the government budget constraint (329) and the market clearing
condition for the non traded good market (330), the accumulation equation for foreign assets
is:
B˙(t) = r?B(t) +ATLT (t)− CT (t)− κTV T (t)− κNV N (t). (331)
Note that we assume that hiring costs in the non traded sector are paid by the traded sector
to avoid unnecessary complications due to measure units for the cost per vacancy.
Short-Run Static Solutions
In an open economy model with a representative agent having perfect foresight, a constant
rate of time preference and perfect access to world capital markets, we impose β = r? in order
to generate an interior solution. This standard assumption made in the literature implies that
the marginal utility of wealth, λ, will undergo a discrete jump when individuals receive new
information and must remain constant over time from then on, i.e., λ = λ¯. Equation (315a)
can be solved for consumption:
C = C
(
λ¯, P
)
. (332)
A rise in the shadow value of wealth induces agents to cut their real expenditure (i.e., Cλ¯ <
0) while an increase in the consumption price index triggered by an appreciation in the
relative price of non-tradables P drives down consumption (i.e., CP < 0). Inserting (332) into
CT = (1− αC)PCC and non-tradables PCN = αCPCC allows us to solve for consumption in
tradables and non tradables, i.e., CT = CT
(
λ¯, P
)
and CN = CN
(
λ¯, P
)
with Cj
λ¯
< 0, CTP ≷ 0
depending on whether φ ≷ σC and CNP < 0.
Substituting first the short-run static solution for consumption in non tradables CN =
CN
(
λ¯, P
)
, the market clearing condition for the non traded good (330) can be solved for the
formally, using the fact that ξj =
α
j
W
1−αj
W
γj , γj +xj = κj/f j , mj/f j = θj , we have
(
F j
)1/σj
L /λ¯ =
α
j
W
1−αj
W
κjθj +
Rj . Plugging this term into the Nash bargaining wage (328), we have:
wj = αjW
(
Ξj + r?xj
)
+
(
1− αjW
)[ αjW
1− αjW
κjθj +Rj
]
= αW
(
Ξj + κjθj + r?xj
)
+
(
1− αjW
)
Rj .
62In the numerical analysis, we consider government spending for calibration purpose. In this case, where
eq. (329) can be rewritten as follows:
(
xT L˙T + xN L˙N
)
+T =
(
RTUT +RNUN
)
+GT +PGN where GT and
GN government spending on tradables and non tradables, respectively. When L˙j < 0, government proceeds
from the firing costs are redistributed back to agents as lump-sum transfers.
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relative price of non tradables as follows:
P = P
(
LN , λ¯, AN
)
, (333)
where PLN = ∂P/∂LN = AN/CNP < 0, Pλ¯ = −CNλ¯ /CNP < 0, and PLN = ∂P/∂LN =
LN/CNP < 0.
Saddle-Path Stability
In this subsection, we analyze saddle-path stability; hence, we first derive the system of
differential equations. To determine the dynamic equation for labor market tightness θj in
sector j, differentiate (321a) w. r. t. time, insert (321b), and eliminate γj by using (321a):
θ˙j(t) =
θj(t)(
1− αjV
)
(sj + r?)− f
j
(
θj(t)
) (
1− αjW
)
Ψj
κj
 , (334)
where we set the overall surplus from hiring in sector j denoted by Ψj :
Ψj ≡ (Ξj + r?xj)+ vjF
λ¯
. (335)
Differentiating first (315b) w. r. t. time and substituting (315d) yields the dynamic equation
for job seekers:
(
F j
) 1
σ
j
L
−1
σjLλ¯
U˙ j =
(F j)1/σjL
λ¯
−Rj
[(sj + r?)+ αjV θ˙jθj
]
−mj (θj)αjWΨj − (F j)
1
σ
j
L
−1
σjLλ¯
L˙j ,
(336)
where we used the fact that wj − wjR = αjWΨj .
Due to imperfect mobility of labor across sectors, hiring and search decisions in the traded
and non traded labor markets are independent which implies that the Jacobian matrix is block
recursive; hence, the saddle-path stability condition in the traded and non traded sectors can
be explored separately. Inserting first appropriate short-run static solutions, linearizing in
the neighborhood of the steady-state, the dynamic system for the traded (non traded) sector
which comprises three equations, i.e., the accumulation equation for employment (313), the
dynamic equation for labor market tightness (334) and the dynamic equation for job seekers
(336), we find that the determinant of the Jacobian matrix for the traded (non traded) sector
is negative.63 Hence, the linearized dynamic system possesses one negative eigenvalue denoted
by νj1 and two positive eigenvalues denoted by ν
j
2 and ν
j
3. Assuming the Hosios condition holds,
i.e., setting αjW =
(
1− αjV
)
, eigenvalues satisfy νj1 < 0 < r
? < νj2, with ν
j
2 = r
?− νj1 > 0, and
νj3 = s
j + r? > 0. Note that when considering the traded sector, the negative and the positive
eigenvalues reduce to νT1 = −
(
sT + m˜T
)
< 0 and νT2 =
(
sT + r? + m˜T
)
> 0, respectively.
Denoting the long-term values with a tilde, the stable paths for employment, labor market
tightness, and job seekers are given by:64
LT (t)− L˜T = DT1 eν
T
1 t θT (t)− θ˜T = ωT21DT1 eν
T
1 t, UT (t)− U˜T = ωT31DT1 eν
T
1 t, (337a)
LN (t)− L˜N = DN1 eν
N
1 t, θN (t)− θ˜N = ωN21DN1 eν
N
1 t, UN (t)− U˜N = ωN31DN1 eν
N
1 t,(337b)
63When focusing on the non traded sector, we have ΞN = PAN ; in this case, we have to insert the short-run
stock solution for the relative price of non tradables (333) into the dynamic equation for θN and UN .
64Elements ωN21 and ω
N
31 of the eigenvector (associated with the stable eigenvalue ν
N
1 ) are:
ωN21 =
(
2sN + r?
)
+
(
sN + r? − νNi
) ( sN+νNi
m˜N
)
+ m˜N
(
PLNA
N λ¯
vN
FF
+ 1
)
(mN)′U˜N
m˜N
(sN + m˜N + r? − νNi )
< 0, ωN31 =
(
sN + νN1
m˜
)
− (m
′)N U˜N
m˜N
ωN21 < 0.
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where we have normalized ωj11 to unity and it can be proven formally that ω
T
21 = 0, ω
T
31 = −1,
ωN21 < 0, ω
N
31 < 0.
Two features of the two-sector economy’s equilibrium dynamics deserve special attention.
First, the dynamics for labor market tightness in the traded sector θT (t) degenerate as reflected
by ωT21 = 0. Unlike, because the relative price of non tradables must adjust sluggishly to clear
the non traded good market (because LN is a state variable), θN (t) exhibits transitional
dynamics; since ωN21 < 0, L
N and θN move in opposite directions. Second, in both sectors,
the number of job seekers U j falls as employment Lj builds up.
Inserting first the short-run static solution for the relative price of non tradables (333)
into CT = CT
(
λ¯, P
)
, linearizing (331) around the steady-state, substituting the solutions
(337), and invoking the transversality condition, yields the stable solution for traded bonds
B(t)− B˜ = ΦT
(
LT (t)− L˜T
)
+ΦN
(
LN (t)− L˜N
)
consistent with the intertemporal solvency
condition:65
B˜ −B0 = ΦT
(
L˜T − LT0
)
+ΦT
(
L˜N − LN0
)
. (338)
Because ΦT < 0 and ΦN < 0, the current account is negatively related to changes in sectoral
employment.
J.6 Steady-State
We now describe the steady-state of the economy which comprises six equations. First, setting
θ˙j = 0 into eq. (334), we obtain the vacancy creation equation:
κj
f j
(
θ˜j
) =
(
1− αjW
)
sj + r?
Ψ˜j , Ψ˜j ≡ (Ξj + r?xj)− wjR, j = T,N. (339)
The LHS term of eq. (339) represents the marginal cost of recruiting in sector j = T,N .
The RHS term represents the marginal benefit of an additional worker which is equal to the
share, received by the firm, of the rent created by the encounter between a vacancy and a
job-seeking worker. A rise in labor productivity raises the surplus from hiring Ψ˜j ; as a result,
firms to post more job vacancies which raises the labor market tightness θ˜j .
Second, using the fact that ξ˜j = α
j
W
1−αjW
γ˜j , γ˜j = κ
j
f˜j
, m˜
j
f˜j
= θ˜j , to rewrite the reservation
wage, the decision of search equation reads as:
L˜j =
m˜j
m˜j + sj
[
λ¯
(
αjW
1− αjW
κj θ˜j +Rj
)]σjL
, j = T,N, (340)
where
(
αjW
1−αjW
κj θ˜j +Rj
)
corresponds to the reservation wage w˜jR reflecting the marginal
benefit from search; note that we have eliminated U˜ j from (315b) by using the fact that in
the long-run the number of unemployed agents who find a job m˜jU˜ j and workers who lose
their job sjL˜j must equalize. According to (340), higher labor market tightness increases
labor L˜j by the probability of hiring and thus the employment rate m˜
j
m˜j+sj
. Moreover, for
given λ¯, the rise in the reservation wage
(
αjW
1−αjW
κj θ˜j +Rj
)
induces agents to supply more
labor.
65The terms ΦT and ΦN are negative and given by:
ΦT ≡ Λ
T
νT1 − r?
= −
(
AT + κT θ˜T
)
(sT + m˜T + r?)
< 0, ΦN ≡ Λ
N
νN1 − r?
< 0.
where ΛN ≡ −CTLN − κN U˜N
(
1− αNV
)
ωN21 − κ
N θ˜N(sN+νN1 )
m˜N
> 0.
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Third, setting B˙ = 0 into eq. (331), we obtain the market clearing condition for the traded
good:
r?B˜ +AT L˜T − C˜T − κT U˜T θ˜T − κN U˜N θ˜N = 0, (341)
where C˜T = CT
(
L˜N , λ¯, AN
)
.
The system comprising eqs. (339)-(341) can be solved for the steady-state labor market
tightness, employment, job seekers, and traded bonds. All these variables can be expressed in
terms of the labor productivity index Aj and the marginal utility of wealth, i.e. θ˜ = θ
(
AT
)
,
L˜T = LT
(
λ¯, AT
)
, θ˜N = θN
(
λ¯, AN
)
, L˜N = LN
(
λ¯, AN
)
, and B˜ = B
(
λ¯, AT , AN
)
. Inserting
first B˜ = B
(
λ¯, AT , AN
)
, and L˜j = Lj
(
λ¯, AN
)
, the intertemporal solvency condition (338)
can be solved for the equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth:
λ¯ = λ
(
AT , AN
)
. (342)
J.7 Rewriting the Steady-State
To build intuition regarding steady-state changes, we investigate graphically the long-run
effects of a rise in the the ratio of sectoral productivity. To do so, it is convenient to rewrite
the steady-state as follows:
C˜T
C˜N
=
ϕ
1− ϕP˜
φ, (343a)
L˜T
L˜N
=
m˜T
m˜N
(
sN + m˜N
)
(sT + m˜T )
[
λ¯w˜TR
]σTL[
λ¯w˜NR
]σNL , (343b)
κT
fT
(
θ˜T
) = (1− αTW ) Ψ˜T
(sT + r?)
, (343c)
κN
fN
(
θ˜N
) = (1− αNW ) Ψ˜N
(sN + r?)
, (343d)
Y˜ T
(
1 + υB − υTV − υNV
)
Y˜ N
=
C˜T
C˜N
. (343e)
We denote by by υB ≡ r?B˜Y˜ T the ratio of interest receipts to traded output, by υ
j
V ≡ κ
j V˜ j
Y˜ T
the
share of hiring cost in sector j = T,N in traded output. Remembering that Y˜ T = AT L˜T
and Y˜ N = AN L˜N , the system (343) can be solved for C˜T /C˜N , L˜T /L˜N , θ˜T , θ˜N , and P˜ ,
as functions of AT , AN ,
(
1 + υB − υTV − υNV
)
. Inserting these functions into Y˜ N = C˜N , and
B˜−B0 = ΦT
(
L˜T − LT0
)
+ΦT
(
L˜N − LN0
)
(see eq. (338)), the system can be solved for B˜ and
λ¯ as functions of AT and AN . Hence, when solving the system (343), we assume that the stock
of foreign bonds and the marginal utility of wealth are exogenous which allows us to separate
the static reallocations (or intratemporal) effects from the dynamic (or intertemporal) effects.
Because we restrict ourselves to the analysis of the long-run effects, the tilde is suppressed
for the purposes of clarity. To characterize the steady-state, we focus on the goods market
which can be summarized graphically by two schedules in the in the (yT /yN , p)-space, where
we denote the logarithm of variables with lower-case letters.
To begin with, we characterize the goods market equilibrium. Using the fact that υB −
υTV − υNV ≡ −υNX and inserting (343a) into the market clearing condition (343e) yields:
CT
CN
=
ϕ
1− ϕP
φ =
Y T (1− υNX)
Y N
. (344)
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The ratio of traded output to non traded output is:
Y T
Y N
=
1
(1− υNX)
ϕ
1− ϕP
φ. (345)
Totally differentiating and denoting the percentage deviation from its initial steady-state by
a hat yields the goods market equilibrium-schedule (GME henceforth).:(
Yˆ T − Yˆ N
) ∣∣∣GME = φPˆ − d ln (1− υNX) . (346)
According to (346), the GME-schedule is upward-sloping in the (yT /yN , p)-space and the
slope of the GME-schedule is equal to 1/φ.
We now characterize the labor market equilibrium. To do so, we totally differentiate the
decision of search-schedule (henceforth DS) given by eq. (343b); we have:(
LˆT − LˆN
) ∣∣∣DS = (σTL − σNL ) ˆ¯λ+ [αTV u˜T + σTL χ˜T ] θˆT − [αNV u˜N + σNL χ˜N] θˆN , (347)
where we denote by χj =
α
j
W
1−αj
W
κjθj
wjR
, the share of the surplus associated with a labor contract
in the marginal benefit of search and we computed the following expressions:
d ln
(
mj
sj +mj
)
= αjV u
j θˆj ,
wˆjR = χ
j θˆj .
Totally differentiating the vacancy creation-schedule (henceforth V Cj with j = T,N) in
the traded and non traded sectors, given by eqs. (343c) and (343d), yields:
θˆT
∣∣∣V CT = AT[(
1− αTV
)
Ψ˜T + χ˜TwTR
]AˆT , (348a)
θˆN
∣∣∣V CN = PAN
(
Pˆ + AˆN
)
[(
1− αNV
)
Ψ˜N + χ˜NwNR
] . (348b)
Inserting (348) into (347), and using the production functions to eliminate sectoral labor, i.e.,
LˆT = Yˆ T − AˆT and LˆN = Yˆ N − AˆN , gives the labor market equilibrium schedule:(
Yˆ T − Yˆ N
) ∣∣∣GME = − PAN [αNV u˜N + σNL χ˜N][(
1− αNV
)
Ψ˜N + χ˜NwNR
] Pˆ + (σTL − σNL ) ˆ¯λ
+
1 + AT
[
αTV u˜
T + σTL χ˜
T
][(
1− αTV
)
Ψ˜T + χ˜TwTR
]
 AˆT
−
1 + PAN
[
αNV u˜
N + σNL χ˜
N
][(
1− αNV
)
Ψ˜N + χ˜NwNR
]
 AˆN . (349)
According to (349), the LME-schedule is downward-sloping in the (yT /yN , p)-space and the
slope of the LME-schedule is equal to − [(1−α
N
V )Ψ˜N+χ˜NwNR ]
PAN [αNV u˜N+σNL χ˜N ]
. Imposing σTL = σ
N
L implies that
the LME-schedule remains unaffected by the marginal utility of wealth. Assuming that
the labor market parameters are similar across sectors, a productivity differential between
tradables and non tradables shifts the LME-schedule to the right, as in a model with limited
substitutability of hours worked.
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J.8 Relative Price Effect of a Productivity Differential
Equating (346) and (349) to eliminate Yˆ T − Yˆ N yields the percentage deviation of the relative
price of non tradables from its initial steady-state following a productivity differential between
tradables and non tradables:
Pˆ =
AˆT
(
1 + ΘT
)− AˆN (1 + ΘN)− dυNX
(φ+ΘN )
(350)
where we set
ΘT ≡ A
T
[
αTV u˜
T + σTL χ˜
T
][(
1− αTV
)
Ψ˜T + χ˜T w˜TR
] > 0, (351a)
ΘN ≡ P˜A
N
[
αNV u˜
N + σNL χ˜
N
][(
1− αNV
)
Ψ˜N + χ˜N w˜NR
] > 0. (351b)
In order to get further insight on the relative price effect of a productivity differential, it
is useful to assume that labor markets display similar features across sectors so that Θj = Θ
(with j = T,N). In this case, eq. (351) reduces to
Pˆ =
(1 + Θ)
(φ+Θ)
(
AˆT − AˆN
)
− dυNX
(φ+Θ)
(352)
Eq. (352) looks familiar as it is similar to the relative price effect described by eq. (27) in
the main text when considering a model with limited substitutability of hours worked across
sectors and abstracting from capital accumulation. In the latter framework, the term Θ is
replaced with ² which measures the ease with which worked hours can be substituted for each
other and thereby captures the degree of labor mobility across sectors. As long as φ > 1, a
productivity differential between tradables and non tradables of 1% appreciates the relative
price of non tradables by less than 1%. The reason is as follows. Higher productivity in
tradables and the labor inflow in that sector increases output of tradables relative to non-
tradables. For the market clearing condition to hold, the relative price of non-tradables must
rise. With an elasticity of substitution φ greater than one, the demand for tradables rises
more than proportionally so that p must increase less than the productivity differential.
This configuration is depicted in Figure 6(a). Higher productivity in tradables relative to
non tradables shifts the LME-schedule along the GME-schedule which is flatter than the 45
degree line. Hence, the relative price increases from p0 to p′ which is below than pBS1 . As Θ is
higher, the more the relative price increases following a productivity differential. The reason
is that Θ captures the response of sectoral employment to a rise in labor market tightness
triggered by the productivity shock. Because traded labor and thereby Y T rises more as Θ
is higher, the relative price P must appreciate by a larger amount to clear the goods market.
Note that Θ is higher when labor supply at the extensive margin is more responsive to a rise
in the reservation wage and the unemployment rate is initially higher.
When φ < 1, the relative price of non tradables must increase more than proportionately
than the productivity differential to clear the the goods market. As depicted in Figure 6(b),
because theGME-schedule is steeper than the 45 degree line, the intersect of the two schedules
(i.e., p′) is above pBS1 .
Because we restrict ourselves to the analysis of the long-run effects, the tilde is suppressed
for the purposes of clarity. Introducing labor market frictions modifies the relative price
equation in two respects:
• First, the term Θ depends on a set of sectoral parameters:
Θ ≡ Ξ [αV u+ σLχ]
[(1− αV )Ψ + χwR] . (353)
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Figure 6: Effects of a Productivity Differential when φ > 1 and φ < 1.
These parameters are: the job destruction rate sj (because u = ss+m), the elasticity of
labor supply at the extensive margin σL, firing costs x (because Ψ ≡ Ξ + r?x − wR),
unemployment benefits R (because χ =
αW
1−αW κθ
wR
), and the worker’s bargaining power
αW (χ =
(
αW
1−αW κθ+R
)
wR
and wR ≡ αW1−αW κθ +R is the reservation wage).
We find that Θ decreases with: i) firing costs x as the labor market tightness increases
less (because firms post less job vacancies), and ii) the replacement rate as firms are less
willing to post job vacancies because higher unemployment benefits lowers the surplus
from hiring.66
We find that Θ increases with: i) the elasticity of labor supply at the extensive margin
σL as labor supply becomes more responsive to a rise in labor market tightness, ii) with
the job destruction rate s by raising the sensitivity of the employment rate to a rise in
the labor market tightness (as reflected by the term αV u) because a higher s reduces
the initial employment rate and amplifies mechanically its growth rate.
We find that Θ may increase or decrease as the worker’s bargaining power rises: on the
one hand, by raising the share of the surplus associated with a labor contract in the
marginal benefit of search χ, a higher worker’s bargaining power αW implies that agents
are more willing to search for a job (as reflected by a rise in the term σLχ) which in turn
raises further labor mobility across sectors; on the other hand, by lowering the surplus
from hiring (as reflected by a rise in the term χwR), higher αW exerts a negative impact
on labor demand and thus on job flows. Hence, higher worker’s bargaining power αW
may raise or lower labor mobility across sectors. We find numerically that raising the
worker bargaining power αW tends to lower Θ. The calibration and numerical results
are available upon request.
• Second, while the dynamics degenerate in a model with imperfect mobility of labor
across sectors along the lines of Horvath [2000], introducing labor market frictions restore
transitional dynamics. Households hold financial wealth which consists of foreign assets
and the value of firms in the traded and the non traded sector. Because labor Lj becomes
a state variable and hiring costs κjV j act like a cost of entry, profits are no longer driven
66Note that the term in the denominator of eq. (353) χwR =
αW
1−αW κθ does not depend on unemployment
benefits; moreover, a rise in R lowers the surplus form hiring Ψ ≡ Ξ + r?x− wR depends on R by raising the
reservation wage wR ≡ αW1−αW κθ +R.
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down to zero as shown by eq. (323), even in the long-run. More precisely, households
own shares on domestic firms and receive dividends γj per worker (see eq. (322)).
Revenues from holding shares on domestic firms are equal to γjLj which correspond to
the present discounted value of profits pij .
By raising the marginal product of labor and thus the value of firm above the rate of
return on traded bonds, a productivity shock triggers the accumulation of labor. Because
the economy has perfect access to external borrowing, hiring of additional workers can
be financed by running a current account deficit along the transitional path. For the
intertemporal solvency condition to hold, the country must run a trade balance surplus
in the long run. Increased net exports (i.e., dυNX > 0) raise the demand for tradables
which in turn impinges on the relative price and the relative wage. Hence, a productivity
differential affects P through a labor accumulation channel captured by dυNX(φ+Θ) > 0.
J.9 Relative Wage Effect of a Productivity Differential
In order to build intuition about the effects of a productivity differential on sectoral wages
and thereby on ln
(
wN/wT
)
, we find it useful to characterize the labor market equilibrium
both graphically and analytically. Because we restrict ourselves to the analysis of the long-run
effects, the tilde is suppressed for the purposes of clarity.
Figure 7(a) depicts the labor market equilibrium in the traded sector can be summarized
by two schedules:67
LT =
mT
mT + sT
(
λ¯wTR
)σTL , κT
fT
=
(
1− αTW
) [(
AT + r?xT
)− wTR]
sT + r?
, (354)
where wTR ≡
(
αTW
1−αTW
κT θT +RT
)
is the reservation wage in the traded sector. The first
equality in (354) represents the decision of search schedule in the traded sector (henceforth
DST ) which is upward-sloping in the (θT , LT )-space. The reason is that a rise in the labor
market tightness raises the probability of finding a job and thus increases employment LT
by reducing the number of job seekers. Moreover, because we consider an endogenous labor
force participation decision, the consecutive increase in the reservation wage induces agents
to supply more labor. The second equality in (354) represents the vacancy creation schedule
(henceforth V CT ) which is a vertical line in the (θT , L)-space.68
By raising the surplus from hiring, a rise in labor productivity in the traded sector AT
shifts the V CT -schedule to the right from V CT0 to V CT1. Because traded firms post more job
vacancies, the labor market tightness θT1 exceeds its initial level θ
T
0 .
69 While increased labor
market tightness raises traded employment by pushing up the reservation wage and reducing
unemployment, the positive wealth effect moderates the expansionary effect on labor supply.
Graphically, the fall in λ¯ shifts to the right the DST -schedule. The new steady state is ET1 .
Since we are interested in the movement of sectoral wages, it is useful to explore the
long-run adjustment in the traded wage following a rise in labor productivity AT . The labor
market in the traded sector can alternatively be summarized graphically in the (θT , wT )-space
as shown in Figure 8(a). Using the fact
(
1− αTW
)
ΨT = AT −wT sT −wT , the V CT -schedule
is downward sloping and convex toward the origin, reflecting diminishing returns in vacancy
67Totally differentiating the DST - and V CT -schedule yields:
LˆT = σTL
ˆ¯λ+
[
αTV u
T + σTLχ
T
]
θˆT , θˆT =
AT[
(1− αTV ) Ψ˜T + χ˜TwTR
] AˆT .
The slope of the DST -schedule in the (θT , LT )-space is given by
[
αTV u
T + σTLχ
T
]
> 0.
68Note that Figure 7(a) depicts the logarithm form of the system (354).
69Note that θT jumps immediately to its new higher steady-state level while traded employment builds up
over time along the isocline θ˙T = 0 until the economy reaches the new steady-state.
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creation.70 The wage setting-schedule (WST henceforth) is upward sloping (see eq. (328)).71
A rise in AT shifts the V CT -schedule to the right by stimulating labor demand which exerts
an upward pressure on the the traded wage. Because workers get a fraction αTW of the
increased surplus, the productivity shock shifts the WST -schedule to the left.72 Hence, the
new steady-state at F T1 is associated with a higher traded wage. The higher the worker
bargaining power, the larger the shift of the WST curve and thereby the more wT increases.
To see it formally, totally differentiating the Nash bargaining traded wage and eliminating θT
by using the vacancy creation schedule (i.e., the second equality (354)) yields the deviation
in percentage of the traded wage from its initial steady state:73
wˆT = ΩT AˆT > 0, ΩT =
αTW
[(
1− αTV
) (
sT + r?
)
+mT
][(
1− αTV
)
(sT + r?) + αTWmT
] AT
wT
, (355)
where ΩT > 0 represents the sensitivity of the traded wage to a change in the labor produc-
tivity index AT .
We now turn to the non traded labor market equilibrium depicted in Figure 7(b) which
is summarized by two schedules:74
LN =
mN
mN + sN
(
λ¯wNR
)σNL , κN
fN
=
(
1− αNW
) [(
P
(
LN , λ¯, AN
)
AN + r?xN
)− wNR ]
sN + r?
, (356)
where we have inserted the short-run static solution for the relative price of non tradables
(333) and wNR ≡
(
αNW
1−αNW
κNθN +RN
)
is the reservation wage in the non traded sector. While
the first equality in (356) represents the decision of search schedule (henceforth DSN) which
is upward-sloping in the (θN , LN )-space, the second equality in (356) corresponds to the
decision of search schedule in the non traded sector (henceforth DSN).75 As depicted in
Figure 7(b), the V CN -schedule is downward-sloping in the (θN , LN )-space. The reason is as
follows. Because an increase in non traded labor raises output of this sector, the relative price
70The slope of the V CT -schedule in the (θT , wT )-space is:
dwT
dθT
∣∣∣∣V CT = −
(
sT + r?
)
κT
(
1− αTV
)
fT θT
= −
(
1− αTW
)
ΨT
(
1− αTV
)
θT
< 0.
71Using the fact that
(
FT
)1/σTL /λ¯ = wTR, the WST -schedule is wT = αTW (AT + r?xT )+ (1− αTW )wTR with
a slope in the (θT , wT )-space given by:
dwT
dθT
∣∣∣∣WST =
(
1− αTW
)
χTwTR
θT
= αTWκ
T > 0.
72Note that the shift in the V CT -schedule dominates the shift in the WST -schedule because workers and
firms have to share the surplus, i.e., 0 < αTW < 1.
73To get (355), we used the fact that χTwTR = m
T α
T
WΨ
T
sT+r?
.
74Totally differentiating the first equality in (356) yields:
LˆN = σNL
ˆ¯λ+
[
αNV u
N + σNL χ
N
]
θˆN ,
The slope of the DSN -schedule in the (θN , LN )-space is given by
[
αNV u
N + σNL χ
N
]
> 0. Totally differentiating
V CN -schedule gives:
θˆN
[(
1− αTV
)
Ψ˜T + χ˜TwTR
]
[(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ] = −PAN
{
LˆN + σC
ˆ¯λ+ {1− [(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ]} AˆN
}
.
The slope of the V CN -schedule is negative and given by−
[(
1− αTV
)
Ψ˜T + χ˜TwTR
]
[(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ] /
(
PAN
)
<
0.
75Note that whether we consider the traded or the non traded sector, the same logic applies to explain the
positive relationship between the employment and the labor market tightness along the DSj-schedule (with
j = T,N).
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of non tradables must depreciate for the market clearing condition (330) to hold. The fall in
P drives down the surplus from hiring an additional worker in the non traded sector which
results in a decline in labor market tightness θN as firms post less job vacancies.
Imposing σC = 1, a rise in AN raises the surplus from hiring if and only if the elasticity
of substitution φ between traded and non traded goods is larger than one. The reason is
that only in this case, the share of non tradables in total expenditure rises which results in an
expansionary effect on labor demand in the non traded sector. In Figure 7(b), we assume that
σC = φ = 1, so that the productivity shock does no impinge on the vacancy creation decision
because the share of non tradables remains unchanged. Yet, by producing a positive wealth
effect, higher labor productivity of non tradables shifts the V SN -schedule to the right by
inducing agents to consume more which in turn raises P and thereby the surplus from hiring.
The fall in the shadow value of wealth also shifts the DSN -schedule to the right as agents are
induced to supply less labor. While θN is unambiguously higher at the new steady-state EN1 ,
the positive wealth effect exerts two conflictory effects on LN . In Figure 7(b), non traded
employment falls; note that LN may rise as well (but less than LT ).
We now explore the long-run adjustment in the non traded wage which is depicted in Figure
8(b). As for the traded sector, theWSN -schedule is upward sloping while the V CN -schedule
is downward sloping.76 Before analyzing in more details the effects of a productivity shock on
the non traded wage, it is convenient to determine analytically the long-run response of wN .
Totally differentiating the wage setting decision in the non traded sector, and eliminating θˆN
by using the vacancy creation decision equation yields the deviation in percentage of the non
traded wage from its initial steady state:77
wˆN = ΩN
(
Pˆ + AˆN
)
, ΩN =
αNW
[(
1− αNV
) (
sN + r?
)
+mN
][(
1− αNV
)
(sN + r?) + αNWmN
] PAN
wN
. (357)
According to (357), the combined effects of higher labor productivity AN and the appreciation
of the relative price of non tradables pushes up the non traded wage in the long-run. Inserting
the long-run change in the equilibrium value of the relative price of non tradables (i.e., eq.
(350)) and using the fact that χNwNR = m
N α
N
WΨ
N
sN+r?
allows us to rewrite (357) as follows:
wˆN =
ΩN
(φ+ΘN )
[
AˆT
(
1 + ΘT
)
+ AˆN (φ− 1)− dυNX
]
. (358)
Assuming an elasticity of substitution φ equal to one, labor productivity in the non traded
sector does no longer impinge on wN . In this case, the change in the non traded wage is
only driven by AˆT > 0 which appreciates the relative price of non traded goods and thereby
stimulates labor demand in that sector. Further assuming that labor market parameters are
similar across sectors so that Θj ' Θ and Ωj ' Ω (with j = T,N), we find that the non
traded wage is equal to Ω
(
AˆT − dυNX
)
. By producing a long-run improvement in the trade
76Using the fact
(
1− αNW
)
ΨN = PAN + r?xN − wN , the wage setting and vacancy creation decisions are
described by the following equalities:
wN = αNW
(
PAN + r?xN
)
+
(
1− αNW
)
wNR , w
N =
(
PAN + r?xN
)
− κ
N
(
sN + r?
)
fN
.
77To get (357), we first solve for the change in the labor market tightness θˆN =
PAN(Pˆ+AˆN)
[(1−αNV )ΨN+χNwNR ]
. Totally
differentiating the Nash bargaining non traded wage and plugging θˆN , we get:
wˆN =
PAN
wN
{
αNW
(
1− αNV
)
ΨN + χNwNR
(1− αNV )ΨN + χNwNR
}(
Pˆ + AˆN
)
.
Using the fact that χNwNR = m
N α
N
WΨ
N
sN+r?
, the above equation educes to eq. (357).
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balance NX and thereby stimulating the demand for tradables, a productivity shock exerts
a negative impact on the relative wage wN/wT . As depicted in Figure 8(b), due to the labor
accumulation effect, a productivity shock biased toward the traded sector induces smaller
shifts in the V CN - and the WSN -schedule.78
To analyze the change in the relative wage ω ≡ wN/wT , it is useful to subtract eq. (355)
from eq. (357) by inserting first the change in the relative price given by eq. (350) in order
to break down the change in percentage of the relative wage into three components:
ωˆ = −
(
ΩT AˆT − ΩN AˆN
)
+ΩN
[
AˆT
(
1 + ΘT
)− AˆN (1 + ΘN)
(φ+ΘN )
]
− dυNX
(φ+ΘN )
. (359)
In a model abstracting from labor market frictions, Θj tends toward infinity while Ωj reduces
to one. In this case, we have wˆT = AˆT and wˆN = Pˆ + AˆN where Pˆ = AˆT − AˆN so that the
relative wage ω remains unaffected by a productivity differential (i.e., ωˆ = 0). Put otherwise,
the assumption of perfect mobility of labor across sectors implies that agents are willing to
devote their whole time in the sector that pay highest wages so that sectors must pay the
same wage. By producing imperfect mobility of labor across sectors, sectoral wages do no
longer equalize so that the relative wage may change in the long-run. In order to have a sense
of the change in the relative wage that a productivity differential might generate, it is useful
to set Ωj ' Ω and Θj ' Θ; in this case, eq. (359) reduces to:
ωˆ = −Ω
[(
φ− 1
φ+Θ
)(
AˆT − AˆN
)
+
dυNX
(φ+Θ)
]
, (360)
where Θ ≡ Ξ(s+r?)Ψ
[
αV u+σLχ
(1−αV )(s+r?)+αWm
]
> 0. According to the labor market frictions effect
captured by −Ω
(
φ−1
φ+Θ
)(
AˆT − AˆN
)
, a productivity differential between tradables and non
tradables lowers the relative wage wN/wT only if the elasticity of substitution φ between
traded and non traded goods is larger than one. As mentioned above, in this configuration,
a productivity shock biased toward the traded sector raises the share of tradables in total
expenditure and thereby has an expansionary effect on labor demand in the traded sector
relative to the non traded sector. Consequently, the productivity differential pushes up the
traded wage relative to the non traded wage; furthermore, ω falls less as Θ gets larger;
inspection of Θ indicates that a higher unemployment rate u, a smaller firing cost (which
reduces the surplus from hiring Ψ), a more responsive labor supply captured by σL, or lower
unemployment benefits reflected by a higher χ moderates the labor market frictions effect by
raising Θ that captures the extent of labor mobility across sectors.
The second term on the RHS of eq. (360), i.e., −ΩdυNX(φ+Θ) < 0, captures the labor accumu-
lation effect. By raising the demand for tradables in the long-run, a productivity differential
drives down the relative wage, less so the larger φ and Θ.
To conclude, we have to consider three cases depending on whether the elasticity of sub-
stitution between traded and non traded goods is equal, larger or smaller than one:
• If φ = 1, the share of non tradables remains unchanged so that a productivity differential
yields similar effects to those found in the standard BS effect. However, due to the
imperfect mobility of labor across sectors, increased demand for tradables triggered by
the long-run trade balance exerts a negative impact on P and ω; hence, along the labor
accumulation channel the relative price increases less than proportionately while the
relative wage declines.
• If φ > 1, keeping unchanged net exports, the increased share of tradables produces a
labor market frictions effect which stimulates labor demand in the traded sector and
78Note that, as for the traded labor market, the shift in the V CN -schedule dominates the shift in the
WSN -schedule because the worker bargaining power αNW is smaller than one.
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thereby drives further the relative wage while the relative price appreciates less. Hence,
the labor market frictions effect reinforces the labor accumulation channel.
• When φ < 1, the long-run adjustments in the relative price and the relative wage are the
result of two conflictory effects. On the one hand, the increased share of non tradables
has an expansionary effect on labor demand in the non traded sector which impinges
positively on the relative wage and the relative price, in contradiction with our evidence.
On the other hand, the long-run improvement in the balance of trade yields opposite
effects on P and ω.
Because in the latter case (i.e., φ < 1), the labor accumulation effect counteracts the labor
market frictions effect, we have to determine numerically if the former is large enough to
produce a decline in the relative wage and a less than proportional increase in the relative price
following a productivity differential between tradables and non tradables. Our preliminary
numerical results confirm that across all scenarios, the labor accumulation effect more than
offsets the labor market frictions effect.
K Degree of Substitutability of Hours Worked across Sectors
²: Empirical strategy
In this section, we detail our empirical strategy to estimate the extent of substitutability of
hours worked ² which captures the degree of labor mobility across sectors.
K.1 Limited Substitutability of Hours Worked across Sectors and the Deriva-
tion of the Testable Equation
To determine the equation we explore empirically, we follow closely Horvath [2000]. The
representative agent is endowed with one unit of time, supplies a fraction L(t) as labor,
and consumes the remainder 1 − L(t) as leisure. At any instant of time, households derive
utility from their consumption and experience disutility from working. Assuming that the
felicity function is additively separable in consumption and labor, the representative household
maximizes the following objective function:
U =
∫ ∞
0
(1− γ) lnC(t) + γ ln (1− L(t)) e−ρtdt, (361)
subject to
A˙(t) = r?A(t) +W (t)L(t)− PC (P (t))C(t). (362)
For the sake of clarity, we drop the time argument below when this causes no confusion.
First-order conditions are:
1− γ
C
= (PCλ) , (363a)
γ
1− L =Wλ, (363b)
λ˙ = λ (β − r?) . (363c)
The economic system consists of M distinct sectors, indexed by j = 0, 1, ...,M each pro-
ducing a different good. Along the lines of Horvath [2000], the aggregate leisure index is
assumed to take the form:
1− L (.) = 1−
 M∑
j=1
(
Lj
) ²+1
²
 ²²+1 . (364)
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The agent maximizes (364) subject to
M∑
j=1
W jLj = X, (365)
where Lj is labor supply in sector j, W j the wage rate in sector j and X total labor income.
Applying standard methods, we obtain labor supply Lj in sector j:
Lj =
(
W j
W
)²
L. (366)
where we used the fact that X =WL.
Combining (363a) and (363b), the aggregate wage index is:
W =
γ
1− γ
PCC
1− L (367)
which allows us to rewrite (366) as follows:
Lj =
(
W j
)²
L
(
γ
1− γ
PCC
1− L
)−²
(368)
A quantity Qj of good j is produced by combining capital, Kj , labor devoted to the sector,
Lj , and intermediate inputs, IM j , in a production process described by:
Qj = Zj
(
Lj
)ξj (
Kj
)γj (
IM j
)1−ξj−γj
, (369)
where ξj (γj) is the share of labor (capital) income in gross output of sector j.
We assume that labor is imperfectly mobile across sectors, while imposing perfect capital
mobility. Perfectly competitive firms in sector j seek to maximize the profit function given
by:
Πj = P jQj −W jLj −RKj − PIMIM j , (370)
where P j is the price of gross output, R is the user capital cost, W j the wage rate in sector
j, and PIM the price of intermediate inputs. Firms take the wage rate (capital rental cost)
as given and equate the labor’s (capital’s) marginal product to the wage (rental rate cost) to
determine demand. First-order conditions are:
P j
ξjQj
Lj
=W j , P j
γjQj
Kj
= R, P j
(
1− ξj − γj)Qj
IM j
= PIM . (371)
Eliminating the sectoral wage W j into (368) by using labor demand given by (371), the
equilibrium condition for labor is given by:
Lj =
(
ξjP jQj
) ²
²+1 L
1
1+²
(
γ
1− γ
PCC
1− L
)− ²
²+1
. (372)
Summing over the M sectors and using (364), we get:(
γ
1− γ
PCC
1− L
)
=
∑M
j=1 θ
jP jQj
L
Plugging this equation into (372) yields:
Lj =
(
ξjP jQj∑M
j=1 ξ
jP jQj
) ²
²+1
L. (373)
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As in Horvath [2000], we denote by βj the fraction of labor’s share of aggregate output
accumulating to labor in sector j:
βj =
ξjP jQj∑M
j=1 ξ
jP jQj
. (374)
We introduce the time subscript to avoid confusion. Expressing (373) in percentage
changes and adding an estimation error term ν results in the M estimation equations:
lˆjt − lˆt =
²
²+ 1
βˆjt + ν
j
t , j = 1, ...,M, (375)
where
lˆt =
M∑
j=1
βjt−1 lˆ
j
t . (376)
To derive (376), we proceed as follows. Because we consider a traded and a non traded sectors,
the labor index (364) can be rewritten as follows:
L
(
LTt , L
N
t
)
=
[(
LTt
) ²+1
² +
(
LNt
) ²+1
²
] ²
²+1
. (377)
Approximate changes in aggregate labor with differentials, we get:
dLt ≡ Lt − Lt−1 =
(
LTt−1
) 1
² (Lt−1)−
1
² dLTt +
(
LNt−1
) 1
² (Lt−1)−
1
² dLNt . (378)
Expressing into (378) in percentage changes and inserting (373), i.e.,
(
Lj
L
) ²+1
² = βj , we have:
lˆt ≡ Lt − Lt−1
Lt−1
=
(
LTt−1
Lt−1
) ²+1
²
lˆTt +
(
LNt−1
Lt−1
) ²+1
²
lˆNt ,
= βTt−1 lˆ
T
t + β
N
t−1 lˆ
N
t . (379)
According to eq. (379), the percentage change in total hours worked, lˆt, can be approximated
by a weighted average of changes in sectoral hours worked lˆjt (in percentage), the weight being
equal to βjt−1.
Combining optimal rules for labor supply and labor demand, we find that the change
in employment in sector j is driven by the change of the fraction βj of the labor’s share
of aggregate output accumulating to labor in sector j. We use panel data to estimate (375).
Including country fixed effects captured by country dummies, fi, and common macroeconomic
shocks by year dummies, ft, (375) can be rewritten as follows:
lˆji,t − lˆi,t = fi + ft + γiβˆji,t + νji,t, (380)
where γi = ²i²i+1 and β
j
i,t is given by (374); j indexes the sector, i the country, and t indexes
time. When exploring empirically (380), the coefficient γ is alternatively assumed to be
identical, i.e., γi = γ, or to vary across countries. The LHS term of (380), i.e., lˆ
j
i,t − lˆi,t, gives
the percentage change in hours worked in sector j driven by the pure reallocation of labor
across sectors.
K.2 Data Description
Data are taken from EU KLEMS database (the March 2011 data release). EU KLEMS data
provide yearly information for the period 1970-2007 (except for Japan: 1974-2007) for the 14
countries of our sample (BEL, DEU, DNK, ESP, FIN, FRA, GBR, IRL, ITA, JPN, KOR,
NLD, SWE and USA). To classify employment and gross output as traded or non traded, we
adopt the classification described in section A.1. We provide more details below about the
data used to estimate equation (380) (we indicate the code in EU KLEMS in parentheses)
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- Sectoral labor Ljt (j = T,N): total hours worked by persons engaged in sector j
(H EMP).
- Sectoral nominal gross output P jt Q
j
t (j = T,N): gross output at current prices in
millions of national currency in sector j (GO).
- Sectoral share of labor income in gross output ξj for j = T,N : labor compensation in
sector j (LAB) over gross output at current prices in that sector (GO) averaged over
the period 1970-2007 (1974-2007 for Japan).
By combining ξj and P jt Q
j
t , we can construct time series β
j
t defined by (374).
K.3 Exogeneity of the Regressor
By using optimal rules for both labor supply (366) and labor demand (371), we avoid any
endogeneity problem. To see it more clearly, when restricting our attention to the optimal
labor supply schedule without using firms’ first order conditions, eq. (366) in percentage
changes is:
lˆjt − lˆt = ²
(
wˆjt − wˆt
)
. (381)
where lˆt is given by (379). An endogeneity problem may arise because to construct time
series for sectoral wages W jt , we have to divide the labor compensation W
j
t L
j
t in sector j by
sectoral hours worked Ljt ; likewise, we have to divide the overall labor compensation WtLt by
total hours worked Lt to construct time series for the aggregate wage index Wt. A way to
circumvent any endogeneity problem is to use labor demand ξ
jP jt Q
j
t
Ljt
= W jt to eliminate the
sectoral wage from eq. (381), and Wt =
∑
j ξ
jP jt Q
j
t
Lt
to eliminate the aggregate wage index; we
get Ljt/Lt =
(
ξjP jt Q
j
t
Ljt
/
∑
j ξ
jP jt Q
j
t
Lt
)²
. Isolating Ljt/Lt and differentiating yields (375). Because
wages do not show up in eq. (381) as we use the labor income share which is constant over
time and gross output (at current prices), we avoid any endogeneity problem. More precisely,
the labor’s share in gross output ξj in sector j is defined as the ratio of the compensation of
employees to gross output in the jth sector, averaged over the period 1970-2007 so that the
explanatory variable (i.e., the RHS term in eq. (380)) is constructed independently from the
dependent variable (i.e., the LHS term in eq. (380)).
To check that endogeneity is not a major issue in eq. (380), we test for strict exogeneity
of the regressor with respect to the dependent variable. Engle et al. [1983] refer to a variable
xt as strongly exogenous with respect to the variable yt if yt does not Granger-cause xt (see
Granger [1969]). Formally, yt Granger causes xt if its past value can help to predict the future
value of xt beyond what could have been done with the past value of xt only. To implement
the test of whether (lˆji,t − lˆi,t) (i.e., the LHS term in eq. (380)) Granger-causes βˆji,t (i.e., the
RHS term in eq. (380)) we run the following regression:
βˆji,t = α
j
i +
p∑
i=1
aji,pβˆ
j
i,t−p +
p∑
i=1
bji,p
(
Lˆji,t − Lˆi,t
)
+ uji,t, (382)
where p is the autoregressive lag length and uji,t the error term. With respect to (382), in
country i sector j, the test of the null hypothesis that (lˆji,t − lˆi,t) does not Granger cause βˆji,t
is a F test of the form: H0 : b
j
i,1 = b
j
i,2 = · · · = bji,p = 0. By not rejecting the null, one may
conclude that the regressor in (380) is strictly exogenous to the dependent variable (lˆji,t− lˆi,t).
The results of causality tests for p = 1, 2, 3 from the change in hours worked in sector j
driven by the pure reallocation of labor across sectors (lˆji,t− lˆi,t) to the fraction of labor’s share
of aggregate output accumulating to labor in sector j (βˆji,t) are displayed in Table 17. The
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Table 17: Granger Causality Test (p-values)
Country Sector p = 1 p = 2 p = 3 Country Sector p = 1 p = 2 p = 3
BEL T 0.263 0.934 0.206 ITA T 0.481 0.303 0.054
BEL N 0.655 0.962 0.176 ITA N 0.362 0.262 0.022
DEU T 0.168 0.439 0.236 JPN T 0.049 0.019 0.051
DEU N 0.378 0.779 0.529 JPN N 0.130 0.070 0.112
DNK T 0.172 0.494 0.006 KOR T 0.947 0.103 0.397
DNK N 0.230 0.491 0.015 KOR N 0.962 0.138 0.415
FIN T 0.191 0.120 0.160 NLD T 0.239 0.533 0.703
FIN N 0.341 0.153 0.107 NLD N 0.285 0.426 0.615
FRA T 0.727 0.844 0.796 ESP T 0.015 0.024 0.022
FRA N 0.951 0.535 0.362 ESP N 0.018 0.020 0.021
GBR T 0.216 0.508 0.505 SWE T 0.344 0.218 0.204
GBR N 0.087 0.247 0.399 SWE N 0.133 0.111 0.096
IRL T 0.470 0.511 0.819 USA T 0.958 0.459 0.634
IRL N 0.252 0.535 0.798 USA N 0.832 0.632 0.885
Notes: the null hypothesis that (Lˆji,t − Lˆi,t) does not Granger-cause (βˆji,t) is rejected if p-value ≤ 0.05
at a 5% significance level.
results for p = 1 show that, with the exception of Japan (sector T ) and Spain (both sectors),
there is no causality running from (lˆji,t − lˆi,t) to βˆji,t at the 5% level of significance. Setting
p = 2 and p = 3 leads to similar qualitative results. By and large, these results show that one
can consider the regressor in eq. (380) as exogenous with respect to the dependent variable.
K.4 Panel Data Estimations of ²
The parameter we are interested in, the degree of substitutability of hours worked across
sectors, is given by ²i = γi/(1 − γi). In the regressions that follow, the parameter γi is
alternatively assumed to be identical across countries when estimating for the whole sample
(γi = γi′ ≡ γ for i 6= i′) or to be different across countries when estimating for each economy
(γi 6= γi′ for i 6= i′). The sample is running from 1971 to 2007 but we run regression (380)
over two sub-periods 1971-1989 and 1990-2007 as well in order to have a larger sample when
shedding light on the determinants of ² (we get 28 observations instead of 14).
Empirical results reported in Table 18 are consistent with ² > 0. For the whole sample,
we find γˆ = 0.378 over the period 1971-2007. Using the fact that ² = 11−γ , we find empirically
that an increase by 1 percentage point of the labor’s share of aggregate output accumulating
to labor in sector j shifts employment by 0.607 percentage point towards that sector. When
estimating ² for each economy of our sample over the period 1971-2007, all coefficients are
statistically significant, as shown in Table 18, except for Denmark. Excluding Denmark, we
find that the degree of substitutability of hours worked across sectors ranges from a low of
0.216 for the Netherlands to a high of 1.800 for the United States. As shown in the last line of
Table 18, the panel data estimations of ² for the whole sample are similar whether the sample
is running from 1971 to 2007 or is split into two sub-periods.
K.5 Determinants of the Degree of Substitutability of Hours Worked across
Sectors ²
While in the model costs of switching sectors are utility losses (compared with a model with
perfect substitutability of hours worked) and thus capture workers’ psychological costs, these
costs may also capture other barriers to mobility that are not included in the model such
as geographic mobility costs, sector-specific human capital, or labor market regulation like
firing and hiring costs. In the following, in order to investigate if the degree of labor mobility
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Table 18: Panel Data Estimation of ² (eq. (380))
1971-2007 1971-1989 1990-2007
γˆi ²ˆi γˆi ²ˆi γˆi ²ˆi
BEL 0.243a
(2.82)
0.320b
(2.14)
0.258b
(2.11)
0.347
(1.57)
0.226b
(1.85)
0.292
(1.43)
DEU 0.423a
(4.27)
0.733b
(2.47)
0.377b
(2.27)
0.604
(1.41)
0.450a
(3.69)
0.819b
(2.03)
DNK 0.106
(1.18)
0.119
(1.05)
0.119
(0.98)
0.135
(0.86)
0.088
(0.64)
0.097
(0.59)
ESP 0.623a
(6.92)
1.649a
(2.61)
0.830a
(5.25)
4.886
(0.89)
0.516a
(4.73)
1.066b
(2.29)
FIN 0.344a
(4.72)
0.525a
(3.09)
0.485a
(3.88)
0.941b
(2.00)
0.265a
(2.95)
0.361b
(2.16)
FRA 0.558a
(4.77)
1.262b
(2.11)
0.558a
(3.43)
1.265
(1.51)
0.557a
(3.30)
1.259
(1.46)
GBR 0.498a
(6.56)
0.994a
(3.29)
0.390a
(4.06)
0.638b
(2.48)
0.716a
(5.47)
2.522
(1.55)
IRL 0.199a
(3.32)
0.249a
(2.66)
0.033
(0.32)
0.034
(0.31)
0.294a
(3.98)
0.417a
(2.81)
ITA 0.434a
(4.39)
0.768b
(2.48)
0.469a
(3.53)
0.885c
(1.87)
0.385a
(2.53)
0.625
(1.56)
JPN 0.499a
(5.04)
0.994b
(2.53)
0.534a
(3.96)
1.147c
(1.84)
0.451a
(3.00)
0.820c
(1.65)
KOR 0.642a
(8.56)
1.795a
(3.06)
0.760a
(6.44)
3.175
(1.54)
0.553a
(5.64)
1.235a
(2.52)
NLD 0.177a
(2.02)
0.216c
(1.66)
0.098
(0.91)
0.108
(0.82)
0.356b
(2.30)
0.553
(1.48)
SWE 0.295a
(4.34)
0.419a
(3.06)
0.254a
(2.61)
0.340c
(1.95)
0.342a
(3.49)
0.519b
(2.30)
USA 0.643a
(5.14)
1.800c
(1.84)
0.678a
(4.11)
2.110
(1.32)
0.592a
(3.05)
1.454
(1.24)
R-squared 0.270 0.284 0.280
Number of observations 992 488 504
Number of countries 14 14 14
Number of sectors 2 2 2
Whole sample 0.378a
(16.43)
0.607a
(10.22)
0.368a
(10.81)
0.581a
(6.84)
0.388a
(12.12)
0.634a
(7.42)
R-squared 0.224 0.202 0.243
Number of observations 992 488 504
Number of countries 14 14 14
Number of sectors 2 2 2
Notes: a, b and c denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels; t-statistics are
reported in parentheses.
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captured by ² in our model is correlated with the switching costs put forward by the literature
related to the labor market, we run the regression of ² on a number of indicators like union
density, unemployment benefits, the share of young workers in total employment, the share
of low-skill workers in total labor force, and employment protection legislation.
Data
We use observable characteristics of individual workers (age and education) and labor
market regulation variables (union density, unemployment benefits and employment protec-
tion legislation) as determinants of labor switchings costs across sectors. Before discussing
our empirical strategy and estimation results, we provide a detailed description of the data
used in this analysis. Mnemonics are given in parentheses. Summary statistics of the data
used in the empirical analysis are displayed in Table 19.
- Union Density (UD): net union membership as a proportion wage and salary earners
in employment. This variable is constructed as: total union membership (minus union
members outside the active, dependent and employed labour force) over wage and salary
earners in employment. Source: ICTWSS (Jelle Visser [2009]). Data coverage: 1971-
2007 for BEL, DEU, DNK, FIN, FRA, GBR, IRL, ITA, NLD, SWE and USA, 1979-2007
for ESP, 1971-2006 for JPN (data are not available for KOR).
- Unemployment Benefit Replacement Rate (UBRR): net unemployment replacement
rate for an average production worker (single person). This measure is defined as:
(Cash Benefits − Taxes)out of work/(Wages − Taxes)in work, where taxes include net so-
cial charges (compulsory contributions to social insurance program less cash transfers).
The calculations assume a worker, aged 40, who earns the average production worker
wage. Source: Van Vliet and Caminada [2012]. Data coverage: 1971-2007 for BEL,
DEU, DNK, FIN, FRA, GBR, IRL, ITA, JPN, NLD, SWE and USA, 1979-2007 for
ESP (data are not available for KOR).
- Employment Protection Legislation (EPL): this index, developed by the OECD, is de-
signed as a multi-dimensional indicator of the strictness of legal protection against dis-
missals for permanent as well as temporary workers. The higher is EPL, the more
restricted is a country’s employment protection regulation. Source: OECD labour mar-
ket statistics database. Data coverage: 1990-2007 for all countries of our sample.
- Young Workers (Young): share of young workers (15-34 years) in total employment.
Source: OECD Labour Force Survey database. Data coverage: 1971-2007 for DEU,
FIN, ITA, JPN, SWE and USA, 1972-2007 for ESP, 1980-2007 for KOR, 1983-2007 for
BEL, DNK, FRA and IRL, 1984-2007 for GBR, and 1987-2007 for NLD.
- Low Skilled Workers (Low skilled) : share of workers with primary education in total
labor force. Source: World Bank World Development Indicators. Data coverage: 1992-
2007 for BEL, DEU, DNK, ESP, GBR, IRL, ITA and KOR, 1993-2007 for FRA, 1995-
2007 for FIN and SWE, 1996-2007 for JPN and NLD, and 1997-2001 for USA.
- High Skilled Workers (High skilled) : share of workers with secondary or tertiary educa-
tion education in total labor force. Source: World Bank World Development Indicators.
Data coverage: 1992-2007 for BEL, DEU, DNK, ESP, GBR, IRL, ITA and KOR, 1993-
2007 for FRA, 1995-2007 for FIN and SWE, 1996-2007 for JPN and NLD, and 1997-2001
for USA.
Predictions and Estimates
According to our two-sector model with labor market frictions developed in section J, we
expect countries with more stringent employment protection legislation (EPL), higher union
density, and more generous unemployment benefit scheme to display lower labor mobility (i.e.,
the parameter ² takes smaller values). We provide more details below:
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Table 19: Summary Statistics per Country
Countries Variables
UD UBRR EPL Young Low skilled
BEL 0.52 0.64 2.55 0.41 0.31
DEU 0.30 0.63 2.58 0.40 0.49
DNK 0.74 0.69 1.75 0.40 0.22
ESP 0.16 0.64 3.17 0.43 0.32
FIN 0.71 0.53 2.10 0.40 0.24
FRA 0.13 0.65 3.01 0.39 0.17
GBR 0.40 0.29 0.66 0.41 0.33
IRL 0.54 0.39 0.98 0.37 0.36
ITA 0.41 0.22 2.74 0.34 0.37
JPN 0.27 0.62 1.60 0.35 0.32
NLD 0.28 0.78 2.42 0.45 0.56
SWE 0.79 0.79 2.50 0.37 0.20
USA 0.17 0.62 0.21 0.43 0.14
KOR no data no data 2.35 0.41 0.29
Notes: UD is Union Density, UR is Unemployment Benefits Remplacement Rate, EPL
is Employment Protection Legislation, Young is the share of young workers (15-34
years) in total employment, Low skilled is the share of workers with primary education
in total labor force.
• Labor mobility across sectors decreases with firing costs because firms post less job
vacancies which reduces job flows. This prediction is in accordance with recent empir-
ical findings. Kambourov [2009] constructs an annual intersectoral reallocation index
in the lines of Wacziarg and Wallack [2004]. He finds that countries with low firing
costs experience larger sectoral reallocation of workers in the years following their trade
reforms.
• While sector-specific skills lower labor mobility across sectors as emphasized by Lee and
Wolpin [2006], drawing on Tang [2012], we expect specific skills to reduce mobility more
in countries with stringent employment protection legislation. Lee and Wolpin [2006]
find empirically that the cost of moving between sectors within the same occupation is
estimated to be significantly larger than moving between occupations within the same
sector; more specifically, workers who shift from one sector to another experience a
cost ranging from 50% to 75% of annual earnings due to sector-specific skills. Drawing
on Tang’s [2012] article, we also expect that in countries where labor laws are more
protective, workers expect a more stable relationship with their employers and obtain
higher bargaining power vis-a-vis their employers. Thus, they have more incentives to
acquire firms specific skills relative to general skills on the job and thus are less prone to
change jobs. Because educated workers may be more prone to accumulate specific skills
which are not perfectly transferable across occupations or sectors, we expect countries
with a higher share of skilled workers and stringent employment protection legislation
to experience lower labor mobility.
• Labor mobility across sectors decreases with the unemployment benefit replacement rate
as firms are less willing to post job vacancies because higher unemployment benefits
lowers the surplus from hiring.
• The effect of an increase in the worker’s bargaining power on labor mobility is ambiguous.
On the one hand, by raising the share of the surplus associated with a labor contract in
the marginal benefit of search χ, a higher worker’s bargaining power αW implies that
agents are more willing to search for a job which in turn raises further labor mobility
across sectors; on the other hand, by lowering the surplus from hiring, an increase in the
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worker’s bargaining power reduces labor demand and thus job flows. Hence, a higher
worker’s bargaining power αW may raise or lower labor mobility across sectors. We
find numerically that raising the worker bargaining power, αW , tends to reduce labor
mobility, although the effect is small (since it is the result of two opposite forces). In
the empirical literature, the worker bargaining power is commonly captured by the
unionization rate. Hence, we expect countries with larger union density to experience
smaller job flows and thus lower mobility of labor across sectors.
We can also provide more information about the nature of switching costs captured by ² by
drawing on the labor market literature. In particular, estimates documented by Kambourov
and Manovskii [2009] reveal that educated workers exhibit lower occupational mobility than
their less educated counterparts. The reason is that investment in human capital is not
perfectly transferable across all occupations, and thus it is expected to reduce workers’ occu-
pational mobility. Moreover, the authors find that mobility increased significantly for workers
younger than 40 in the USA. Building on these results, we expect countries with higher shares
of young employees and low-education workers to experience larger labor mobility, as these
workers’ groups accumulate relatively less specific human capital and thus should be more
prone to switch jobs.
Our estimates across countries are reported in (20. The dependent variable is ² while
explanatory variables are shown in the first column. We use two sample for panel data
estimations of ²: those over the period 1971-2007 (14 observations) and those over two sub-
periods 1971-1989 and 1990-2007 (28 observations) in order to have more observations. In all
cases, variables have an expected sign but several determinants like employment protection
legislation, the unemployment benefit replacement rate and the interaction term between
EPL and the share of skilled-workers are not significant at conventional levels exhibit low
statistic significance (remember that the time horizon is short). By and large, our estimates
reported in Table 20 reveal that in countries where unemployment benefits are more generous
(as captured by the replacement rate), firing costs are higher (as captured by EPL), and/or
worker bargaining power is large (as captured by union density), the labor mobility across
sectors captured by ² is lower. When turning to workers’ characteristics, we find that in
countries where the share of young workers or low-skilled workers is higher, the mobility of
labor captured by ² is larger. Moreover, we find that in countries with stringent employment
protection legislation, high-skilled workers are more prone to accumulate specific skills and
thus exhibit lower mobility across sectors. While these findings should give us confidence
about the ability of ² to reflect the degree of labor mobility across sectors and allow us to
discuss the nature of switching costs, the evidence are based on small sample (14 observations
over the period 1971-2007 or 28 observations when considering two sub-periods).
K.6 Dealing with Correlated Errors across Sectors
In this subsection, we address the issue of correlated errors across sectors within each country
by relaxing our assumption of independence of the errors and replacing it with the assumption
of independence between clusters while the errors are allowed to be correlated within clusters.
When running the regression (380), we allow the coefficient γi (with γi = ²i²i+1) to vary
across countries. Hence, we assume that the coefficient is the same across sectors within each
country. While this assumption γTi = γ
N
i = γi does not raise some issues, one difficulty
arises because the workers’ inflow in one sector is necessarily correlated with the workers’
outflow from the other sector.79 We thus relax the homoscedasticity assumption and allow
the error terms to be heteroscedastic and correlated within clusters. Put otherwise, to take
into account the correlation between dependent variables within each country (i.e., across
79Note that the definition of the percentage change in total hours worked lˆt implies that job flows are not
perfectly correlated between sectors; more specifically, we have Lt 6= LNt +LTt due to our assumption of limited
substitutability of hours worked).
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Table 20: Determinants of ²
Time period 1971-2007 1971-1989 & 1990-2007
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
Union Density −0.886a
(−2.92)
−0.941a
(−3.19)
−1.003a
(−3.84)
−1.059a
(−4.25)
Replacement rate −0.686
(−1.35)
−0.607c
(−1.92)
Young workers 1.531a
(4.01)
2.048a
(3.85)
1.697a
(5.06)
2.188a
(5.36)
Observations 13 13 26 26
R-squared 0.38 0.42 0.37 0.44
Time period 1990-2007
Specification (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Union Density −0.738a
(−2.88)
−0.728a
(−3.00)
−0.695a
(−2.69)
−0.630b
(−2.26)
−0.612b
(−2.06)
−0.674a
(−2.75)
−0.681a
(−2.60)
Replacement rate −0.657
(−1.49)
−0.145
(−0.30)
EPL −0.260
(−1.05)
−0.456b
(−2.08)
EPL×High skilled −0.264
(−1.02)
Young workers 1.329a
(3.80)
1.738a
(4.03)
1.139a
(2.91)
1.227a
(3.38)
Low skilled workers 0.872a
(3.06)
0.922a
(2.72)
0.766a
(3.01)
Observations 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
R-squared 0.38 0.44 0.39 0.22 0.15 0.40 0.38
Notes: all variables enter in regression in logarithms. a, b and c denote significance at 1%, 5% and
10% levels. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
sectors within each country), standard errors are clustered at the country level. To do so,
we re-estimate equation (380) by relaxing the homoscedasticity assumption and allowing the
error terms to be heteroscedastic and correlated within clusters. We follow Huber [1967]
and White [1980] and use a cluster-robust covariance matrix that assumes no particular kind
of within-cluster correlation nor a particular form of heteroscedasticity. This specification
allow us to run a robustness check regarding the statistic significance while coefficients are
identical. More specifically, the parameter γi is consistently estimated and asymptotically
equivalent to its OLS counterpart (see Wooldridge [2003]). This implies that our previous
OLS estimates of ²i are unbiased. Moreover, the clustering method provides robust standard
errors and allows us to infer in the panel model. Table 21 contrasts OLS standard errors σˆols²ˆi
(i.e., when cluster effects are left in the error term) with standard errors obtained with the
cluster-robust variance matrix σˆcluster²ˆi for three alternative periods: 1971-2007, 1971-1989,
1990-2007. For 10 countries, standard errors that are clustered at the country level are larger,
as one would expect if the error term νji,t in eq. (380) is correlated across sectors. However,
the estimates of ² remain statistically significant at the 10% significance for 11 countries of our
sample, except for Denmark, Ireland and Korea. By contrast, ² is significant for 13 countries
when using OLS standard errors at the 10% significance, with Denmark the sole exception.
Note that for the three time periods, the whole sample estimate of ² is still highly significant
when standard errors are clustered at the country level (the t-statistics are 6.91, 5.05 and
4.57 for the periods 1971-2007, 1971-1989 and 1990-2007 respectively). By and large, these
results suggest that allowing errors to be correlated within each country merely influences the
statistical significance of our estimates of the degree of labor mobility across sectors for the
whole sample and the majority of the countries.
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Table 21: Standard Errors for ² Estimates
1971-2007 1971-1989 1990-2007
²ˆi σˆ
ols
²ˆi
σˆcluster²ˆi ²ˆi σˆ
ols
²ˆi
σˆcluster²ˆi ²ˆi σˆ
ols
²ˆi
σˆcluster²ˆi
BEL 0.320 0.150b 0.183c 0.347 0.221 0.227 0.292 0.204 0.289
DNK 0.119 0.113 0.144 0.135 0.157 0.207 0.097 0.165 0.189
DEU 0.733 0.297b 0.393c 0.604 0.427 0.378 0.819 0.404b 0.616
ESP 1.649 0.632a 0.800b 4.886 5.474 7.067 1.066 0.465b 0.512b
FIN 0.525 0.170a 0.216b 0.941 0.471b 0.554c 0.361 0.167b 0.204c
FRA 1.262 0.598b 0.419a 1.265 0.836 0.405a 1.259 0.862 0.796
GBR 0.994 0.302a 0.318a 0.638 0.258b 0.215a 2.522 1.625 2.121
IRL 0.249 0.094a 0.153 0.034 0.110 0.147 0.417 0.149a 0.301
ITA 0.768 0.309b 0.425c 0.885 0.472c 0.746 0.625 0.401 0.446
JPA 0.994 0.394b 0.282a 1.147 0.622c 0.452b 0.820 0.497c 0.331b
KOR 1.795 0.586a 1.461 3.175 2.056 4.514 1.235 0.490b 1.294
NLD 0.216 0.130c 0.086b 0.108 0.133 0.076 0.553 0.374 0.280b
SWE 0.419 0.137a 0.159a 0.340 0.174c 0.235 0.519 0.226b 0.127a
USA 1.800 0.980b 0.737b 2.110 1.596 1.190c 1.454 1.168 0.891
All sample 0.607 0.059a 0.088a 0.581 0.085a 0.115a 0.634 0.085a 0.139a
Notes: a, b and c denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
L Elasticity of Substitution φ between Traded and Non Traded
Goods: Empirical Strategy
In this section, we detail our empirical strategy to estimate the elasticity of substitution
between traded and non traded goods φ. While the ability of the two-sector model with
imperfect mobility of labor across sectors to accommodate the data related to sectoral pro-
ductivity shocks relies heavily upon the size of the elasticity of substitution between traded
and non traded goods, estimates of the elasticity of substitution φ by the existing literature
are rather diverse. The cross-section studies report an estimate of φ ranging from 0.44 to
0.74, see e.g., Stockman and Tesar [1995] and Mendoza [1995], respectively.80 The literature
adopting the Generalized Method of Moments and the cointegration methods, see e.g. Ostry
and Reinhart [1992] and Cashin and Mc Dermott [2003], respectively, reports a value in the
range [0.75, 1.50] for developing countries and in the range [0.63, 3.50] for developed countries.
Since existing empirical studies do not unanimously report an elasticity of substitution larger
than one, we explore this assumption empirically for the whole sample and each economy.
L.1 Empirical Strategy to Estimate φ
Using Time Series by Industry Provided by EU KLEMS
To estimate φ, we adopt the following strategy. To determine an empirical relationship, we
combine the optimal rule for intra-temporal allocation of consumption (15) (that we repeat
for clarity purposes)
CT
CN
=
(
ϕ
1− ϕ
)
P φ. (383)
with the goods market equilibrium
CT
CN
=
Y T −NX −GT − IT
Y N −GN − IN , (384)
80While the sample used by Stockman and Tesar [1995] covers 30 countries (including 17 developing and
13 industrialized), Mendoza [1995] uses exactly the same data set in his estimation but includes only the 13
industrialized countries. Note that the estimate of φ has been obtained by using the cross sectional dataset by
Kravis, Heston and Summers for the year 1975.
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where we used the fact that B˙− r?B = Y T −CT −GT − IT ≡ NX. Inserting (383) into (384)
leads to
Y T −NX −GT − IT
Y N −GN − IN =
(
ϕ
1− ϕ
)
P φ. (385)
According to the market clearing condition, we could alternatively use data for consumption
or for sectoral value added along with times series for its demand components to estimate
φ. Unfortunately, nomenclatures for valued added by industry and for consumption by items
are different and thus it is most likely that CT differs from Y T − NX − GT − IT , and CN
from Y N − GN − IN as well. Because time series for traded and non traded consumption
display a short time horizon for half countries of our sample while data for sectoral value
added and net exports are available for the 14 OECD countries of our sample over the period
running from 1970 to 2007 (except for Japan: 1974-2007), we find appropriate to estimate
φ by computing Y T − NX − GT − IT and Y N − GN − IN . Yet, an additional difficulty
shows up because the classification adopted to split government spending and investment
expenditure into traded and non traded items is different from that adopted to break down
value added into traded and non traded components. Moreover, the time horizon is short at
a disaggregated level (for Ij and Gj) for most of the countries, especially for time series of
Gj . To overcome these difficulties, we proceed as follows. Denoting by υGT =
PTGT
PTY T−PTNX
and υIT =
PT IT
PTY T−PTNX the ratio of government and investment expenditure on tradables to
traded value added adjusted with net exports at current prices, respectively, and by υGN =
PNGN
PNY N
and υIN =
PN IN
PNY N
the ratio of government and investment expenditure on non tradables
to non traded value added at current prices, the goods market equilibrium can be rewritten
as follows: (
P TY T − P TNX) (1− υGT − υIT )
PNY N (1− υGN − υIN )
=
(
ϕ
1− ϕ
)
P φ−1,
or alternatively (
Y T −NX) (1− υGT − υIT )
Y N (1− υGN − υIN )
=
(
ϕ
1− ϕ
)
P φ. (386)
Setting
α ≡ ln (1− υGN − υIN )
(1− υGT − υIT )
+ ln
(
ϕ
1− ϕ
)
, (387)
and taking logarithm, eq. (386) can be rewritten as follows:
ln
(
Y T −NX
Y N
)
= α+ φ lnP. (388)
Indexing time by t and countries by i, and adding an error term µ, we estimate φ by exploring
the following empirical relationship:
ln
(
Y T −NX
Y N
)
i,t
= fi + ft + αit+ φi lnPi,t + µi,t. (389)
fi captures the country fixed effects, ft are time dummies, and µi,t are the i.i.d. error terms.
Because the term (387) may display a trend over time, we add country-specific trends, as
captured by αit.
Because data to construct time series for traded (IT ) and non traded investment (IN ) are
available for ten countries over the fourteen in our sample over a time horizon varying between
37 years (1970-2007) and 27 years (1980-2007), we computed time series Y T −NX − IT and
Y N − IN . In this case, eq. (386) can be rewritten as follows:(
Y T −NX − IT ) (1− υGT )
(Y N − IN ) (1− υGN )
=
(
ϕ
1− ϕ
)
P φ. (390)
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Denoting by
κ ≡ ln (1− υGN )
(1− υGT )
+ ln
(
ϕ
1− ϕ
)
, (391)
where υGT =
PTGT
PT (Y T−NX−IT ) and υGN =
PNGN
PN (Y N−IN ) and taking logarithm, we explore alter-
natively the following relationship to estimate φ:
ln
(
βT /βN
)
i,t
= fi + ft + αit+ φi lnPi,t + νi,t. (392)
where βT =
(
Y T −NX − IT ) and βN = (Y N − IN).
When determining (388), we can alternatively make use of first-order conditions equating
the marginal revenue of labor and the sectoral wage:
θjP jY j
Lj
=W j , (393)
where θj is labor’s share in value added in sector j = T,N . Using (393) to eliminate the
nominal sectoral value added P jY j , the goods market clearing condition can be rewritten as
follows: (
W TLT − θTP TNX) θN
θT
(1− υGT − υIT )
WNLN (1− υGN − υIN )
=
(
ϕ
1− ϕ
)
Pφ−1. (394)
We first set
η ≡ ln (1− %GN − %IN )
(1− %GT − %IT )
+ ln
(
θT
θN
)
+ ln
(
ϕ
1− ϕ
)
, (395)
where %GT =
PTGT
(WTLT−θTPTNX) and υGN =
PNGN
WNLN
, %IT =
PT IT
(WTLT−θTPTNX) and υIN =
PN IN
WNLN
.
Denoting by γT =
(
W TLT − θTP TNX) and γN = WNLN , and taking logarithm, eq. (395)
can be rewritten as follows:
ln
(
γT
γN
)
= η + (φ− 1) lnP. (396)
Indexing time by t and countries by i, and adding an error term ζ, we estimate φ by exploring
the following empirical relationship:
ln
(
γT /γN
)
i,t
= gi + gt + σit+ ρipi,t + ζi,t. (397)
Because ηi (see eq. (395)) is composed of both preference (i.e., ϕ) and production (i.e., θj)
parameters, and (logged) ratios which may display trend over time, we introduce country
fixed effects gi and add country-specific trends, as captured by σit. Once we have estimated
ρi, we can compute φˆi = ρˆi + 1 where a hat refers to point estimate in this context.
Using Time Series for Consumption by Purpose Provided by COICOP
The cross-section studies by Stockman and Tesar [1995] and Mendoza [1995] estimate φ
by running a regression of the (logged) ratio of consumption in non tradables to consumption
in tradables on the (logged) relative price of non tradables:
ln
(
CN
CT
)
= ln
(
1− ϕ
ϕ
)
− φ lnP. (398)
Note that when exploring the relationship (398) empirically, we abstract from the goods
market clearing condition. Indexing time by t and countries by i, and adding an error term
ι, we explore the following relationship empirically by using panel data:
ln
(
CN/CT
)
i,t
= di + dt + ζit− φi lnPCi,t + ιi,t, (399)
where PCi,t = P
C,N
i,t /P
C,T
i,t is the ratio of the price deflator for consumption in non tradable
goods (PC,Ni,t ) to the price deflator for consumption in tradable goods (P
C,T
i,t ); di captures the
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country fixed effects; dt are time dummies; ιi,t are the i.i.d. error terms. Because preferences
may not be homothetic, there might be income effects in the relative demand for tradable
and non-tradable goods. Cross-section studies by Stockman and Tesar [1995] and Mendoza
[1995] include GDP per capita in the regression to capture the wealth effect. Because it is
likely that GDP per capita is correlated with the relative price of non tradables, we capture
the wealth effect by time trend, i.e., ζit.
Estimating φ by running the regression (398) has two drawbacks. First, it does not take
into account the goods market clearing condition. Second, time series for consumption by
purpose provided by COICOP are available over a short time horizon for most of the countries
of the sample. Consequently, to estimate φ, we restrict ourselves to eqs. (389), (392) and
(397).
L.2 Data Construction and Source
Our dataset covers the fourteen OECD countries in our sample over the period 1970-2007
(except Japan: 1974-2007). We provide more details below on the construction of data
employed to estimate equations (389), (392) and (397) (codes in EU KLEMS are reported in
parentheses):
- Sectoral value-added deflator P jt (j = T,N): value added at current prices (VA) over
value added at constant prices (VA QI) in sector j. Source: EU KLEMS database.
The value added relative price of non tradables, Pt, corresponds to the ratio of the non
traded value added deflator to the traded value added deflator: Pt = PNt /P
T
t .
- Sectoral output Y jt (j = T,N): value added at constant prices in sector j (VA QI).
Source: EU KLEMS database.
- Net exports NXt: net exports deflated by the traded value added deflator, P Tt . Net
exports correspond to the external balance of goods and services at current prices.
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database.
- Sectoral investment Ijt (j = T,N): Real investment in sector j, I
j
t , is investment expen-
diture in sector j deflated by the value added price index P jt defined above. Investment
expenditure are gross capital formation at current prices; to split aggregate investment
expenditure into tradables and non tradables, we use the methodology presented in
section F.8 of the Technical Appendix. Source: OECD Input-Output database [?].
- Sectoral labor income W jt L
j
t (j = T,N): labor compensation in sector j (LAB). Source:
EU KLEMS database.
- Sectoral labor income share θj for j = T,N : labor compensation in sector j (LAB) over
value added at current prices (VA) averaged over the period 1970-2007 (1974-2007 for
Japan). Source: EU KLEMS database.
Data mentioned above are used to construct time series for Y
T
t −NXt
Y Nt
, β
T
t
βNt
, γ
T
t
γNt
, and Pt.
When estimating equations (389), (392) and (397), all variables are converted into index
1995=100 and are expressed in log levels.
L.3 Empirical Results
Since the set of variables of interest in regressions (389), (392), (397) display trends, we first
run panel unit root tests, see Table 22. By and large, all tests show that non stationarity
is pervasive, making it clear that pursuing a cointegration analysis is appropriate. We thus
implement the seven Pedroni’s [2004] tests of the null hypothesis of no cointegration, see
Table 23. Across almost all cases the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected but only
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at the 10% level. In small samples, Pedroni’s [2004] simulations reveal that the group-mean
parametric t-stat is the most powerful. Based on this result, in the three specifications, the
null hypothesis of no cointegration is strongly rejected at the 5% level.
To estimate the cointegrating vector, we use the group-mean fully modified dynamic OLS
estimator of Pedroni [2001]. Given our relatively limited time and cross section dimensions, we
restrict our attention here on the FMOLS estimator. Indeed, the group-mean DOLS estimator
adds leads and lags of the explanatory as additional regressors. This correction allows to take
care of a possible endogeneity of the regressors and to correct for correlation in the residuals.
However, this correction reduces sizeably the number of degrees of freedom, even in the case of
a DOLS estimator with one lead and lag. Accordingly, we will only consider the group-mean
FMOLS when estimating cointegration relationships.
Table 24 reports panel dates estimations of the coefficient φ for the panel as a whole
and for each country, when running the regression (389), (392), (397), respectively; these
empirical relationships are are derived by taking into account the goods market equilibrium.
Moreover, exploring alternatively the relationship (389) or (397) empirically has the advantage
of allowing us to use time series for sectoral value added or labor compensation which are
available over the period 1970-2007 for all countries of our sample (except Japan: 1974-2007).
Panel data estimations of φ when running the regression (389) where the dependent vari-
able is (Y T −NX)/Y N , are shown in column 1 of Table 24. The regressor in this case (and
for the rest of the analysis) is the log of the non traded value added deflator to the traded
value added deflator. The sample covers all countries we are interested in. For the whole
sample, the FMOLS estimate gives a significant value of φ of 0.66. The vast majority (9 out
of 14) of the individual estimated coefficients are statistically significant. In addition, we find
that φ is larger than one in only two countries (Finland and Germany), the estimated value
for Korea being not statistically significant.
Column 2 of Table 24 shows panel data estimations of φ when running the regression (392))
which explicitly takes into account investment expenditures. This, however, reduces the size of
the sample: the series for investment are not available for Belgium and Korea, and Sweden and
Ireland are excluded from the sample due to data limitation. Among the 10 countries, we find
that 6 have positive and statistically significant φ coefficients, ranging from a low of 0.25 (the
United Kingdom) to a high of 2.02 (Japan). Note that the coefficient φ is found to be larger
than one in 4 countries (Germany, Finland, Japan and the Netherlands). Two estimated
coefficients are negative (Denmark and the United States), none of them are statistically
significant. Due to data limitations and inconsistent estimates (i.e., negative or statistically
insignificant at conventional level for several countries), we find that including investment
expenditure does not improve the precision of our estimates, likely due to classification issues
as the nomenclature for investment by items differs from that for value added by industry;
different nomenclatures are most likely to result in different classification to treat investment
items or value added by industry as traded or non traded goods.
The last column of Table 24 gives panel data estimations of φ when running the re-
gression (397); the dependent variable is the (logged) ratio of the labor income in trad-
ables adjusted with net exports at current prices to labor income in non tradables, i.e.,
(W TLT − θTP TNX)/WNLN . By and large, estimates are similar to those shown in col-
umn 3 of Table 24.
When calibrating the model, our strategy is as follows. Our reference model is (389). We
thus take estimates of φ when running the regression (389) shown in column 1 of Table 24.
When estimates of φ are not statistically significant at conventional levels, we take values
given in column 3. Two estimates are problematic: those for Ireland and Italy which are
either negative or not statistically significant. In this case, we take the panel data estimation
for the whole sample, i.e., φˆ = 0.66.
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Table 22: Panel Unit Root Tests (p-values)
LLC Breitung IPS MW MW Hadri
(t-stat) (t-stat) (W-stat) (ADF) (PP) (Zµ-stat)
ln(PV A,N/PV A,T ) 0.840 0.730 1.000 1.000 0.982 0.000
ln(Y T −NX/Y N ) 0.409 0.017 0.408 0.155 0.199 0.000
ln(Y T −NX − IT )/(Y N − IN ) 0.878 0.169 0.991 0.986 0.977 0.000
ln(WTLT − θTPTNX)/(WNLN ) 0.238 0.021 0.069 0.013 0.245 0.000
Notes: For all tests, except for Hadri [2000], the null of a unit root is not rejected if p-value ≥ 0.05 at a 5%
significance level. For Hadri [2000], the null of stationarity is rejected if p-value ≤ 0.05 at a 5% significance level.
Table 23: Panel Cointegration Tests (p-values)
Dependent variable
Y T −NX
Y N
Y T −NX − IT
Y N − IN
WTLT − θTPTNX
WNLN
Explanatory variable PV A,N/PV A,T PV A,N/PV A,T PV A,N/PV A,T
Panel tests
Non-parametric ν 0.060 0.000 0.002
Non-parametric ρ 0.009 0.102 0.014
Non-parametric t 0.001 0.035 0.005
Parametric t 0.067 0.002 0.061
Group-mean tests
Non-parametric ν 0.257 0.026 0.299
Non-parametric t 0.007 0.007 0.028
Parametric t 0.017 0.001 0.028
Notes: the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected if the p-value is below 0.05 (0.10
resp.) at 5% (10% resp.) significance level.
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M Skill-Biased Technological Change
In this section, we investigate to which extent our analytical results are sensitive to biased
technological change. As opposed to the model explored in the paper where technological
change is assumed to be Hicks-neutral, we first allow for labor- and capita-augmenting pro-
ductivity which differ across sectors. Then, we consider low-skilled and high-skilled labor while
abstracting from physical capital which allows us to explore the role of skill-bias technological
change.
We first analyze the long-run effect of a productivity differential between tradables and
non tradables by considering that: i) traded and non traded goods are produced with cap-
ital and labor according to CES technologies instead of Cobb-Douglas technologies, and ii)
labor- and capital-augmenting productivity allowing for biased technological change. We
draw heavily on Alvarez-Cuadrado, Van Long and Poschke [2014]. We show that whether
CES technologies are considered and technological change is biased toward labor, as recent
empirical evidence suggest, our main conclusions hold. Note that when introducing labor- and
capital-augmenting productivity, technological change cannot be computed by the standard
method and must be estimated empirically along with the elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor, both in the traded and the non traded sector.
Drawing on Alvarez-Cuadrado, Van Long and Poschke [2014] who develop a closed econ-
omy dynamic general equilibrium model with two sectors, i.e., manufacturing and services, we
consider a small open economy model with traded and non traded goods produced by means
of CES technologies. For the sake of simplicity, we consider perfect mobility of capital and
labor across sectors.
In a second step, we analyze the implications of skilled biased technological change by
developing an open economy model with traded and non traded goods produced by perfectly
competitive firms using both high- and low-skilled labor. While assuming perfect labor mo-
bility across sectors, we find that the relative price of non tradables appreciates by a smaller
amount than the productivity differential between tradables and non tradables as long as: i)
the share of labor income paid to low-skilled labor in sectoral value added is higher in the
traded sector than that in the non traded sector, and ii) the skill premium increases.
M.1 Labor- and Capital-Augmenting Productivity
Households
At each instant of time t, the representative agent consumes traded goods and non-traded
goods denoted by CT (t) and CN (t), respectively, which are aggregated by a constant elasticity
of substitution function:
C
(
CT (t), CN (t)
)
=
[
ϕ
1
φ
(
CT (t)
)φ−1
φ + (1− ϕ) 1φ (CN (t))φ−1φ ] φφ−1 , (400)
The agent is endowed with a unit of time and supplies a fraction L(t) of this unit as labor,
while the remainder, 1 − L(t), is consumed as leisure. At any instant of time, households
derive utility from their consumption and experience disutility from working. Households
decide on consumption and worked hours by maximizing lifetime utility:
U =
∫ ∞
0
{
1
1− 1σC
C(t)1−
1
σC − 1
1 + 1σL
L(t)1+
1
σL
}
e−βtdt, (401)
where β is the consumer’s discount rate, σC > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
for consumption, and σL > 0 is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
The representative household chooses consumption, decides on labor supply, and invest-
ment that maximizes his/her lifetime utility (401) subject to the flow budget constraint:
B˙(t) = r?B(t) +R(t)K(t) +W (t)L(t)− PC (P (t))C(t)− P (t)I(t), (402)
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and capital accumulation which evolves as follows:
K˙(t) = I(t)− δK(t), (403)
where I(t) corresponds to investment expenditure which are assumed to be non traded and
0 ≤ δK < 1 is a fixed depreciation rate. For the sake of clarity, we drop the time argument
below when this causes no confusion.
Denoting the co-state variables associated with (402) and (403) by λ and ψ, respectively,
the first-order conditions characterizing the representative household’s optimal plans are:
C = (PCλ)
−σC , (404a)
L = (Wλ)σL , (404b)
λ˙ = λ (β − r?) , (404c)
R
P
− δ + P˙
P
= r?, (404d)
and the transversality conditions limt→∞ λ¯B(t)e−βt = 0 and limt→∞ P (t)K(t)e−βt = 0; to
derive (404d), we used the fact that ψ(t) = λP (t).
Firms
Traded and non traded goods are produced according to CES technologies:
Y T =
[
γT
(
BTKT
)σ−1
σ +
(
1− γT ) (ATLT )σ−1σ ] σσ−1 , (405a)
Y N =
[
γN
(
BNKN
)σ−1
σ +
(
1− γN) (ANLN)σ−1σ ] σσ−1 , (405b)
where σ is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor; for clarity purposes, we
abstract from sector-specific elasticities of substitution. As opposed to the model explored in
the paper where technological change is assumed to be Hicks-neutral, we allow for labor- and
capita-augmenting productivity Ai and Bi which differ across sectors.
We assume that factors are fully utilized:
LT + LN = L, (406a)
kTLT + kNLN = K, (406b)
where kj ≡ Kj/Lj .
The traded good is the numeraire and we denote the price of non traded goods in terms of
traded goods by P ≡ PN/P T . We assume perfect mobility of capital and labor across sectors
and denote the capital rental cost by R and the wage rate by W . First order conditions are:
∂Y T
∂KT
= γT
(
BT
)σ−1
σ
(
KT
)− 1
σ
(
Y T
) 1
σ = R, (407a)
∂Y T
∂LT
=
(
1− γT ) (AT )σ−1σ (LT )− 1σ (Y T ) 1σ =W, (407b)
P
∂Y N
∂KN
= PγN
(
BN
)σ−1
σ
(
KN
)− 1
σ
(
Y N
) 1
σ = R, (407c)
P
∂Y N
∂LN
= P
(
1− γN) (AN)σ−1σ (LN)− 1σ (Y N) 1σ =W, (407d)
Dividing the marginal revenue of labor by the marginal revenue of capital, the capital-labor
ratios in the traded and the non traded sectors, respectively, are:
kT ≡
(
γT
1− γT
)σ (
BT
AT
)σ−1(
W
R
)σ
, (408a)
kN ≡
(
γN
1− γN
)σ (
BN
AN
)σ−1(
W
R
)σ
. (408b)
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Equations (408) lead to the following positive relationship between the capital-labor in the
non traded sector and the capital-labor ratio in the traded sector:
kN =
(
γN
γT
1− γT
1− γN
) 1
σ
[(
BN
BT
)(
AT
AN
)]σ−1
kT ≡ ρkT . (409)
Using the fact that marginal revenues of labor equalize across sectors, i.e., (407b) and (407d),
leads to:
P =
1− γT
1− γN
(
AT
AN
)
σ − 1
σ
(
Y T
Y N
) 1
σ
(
LN
LT
) 1
σ
. (410)
Dividing the production function (405) by labor Lj , we get per worker output denoted by yj :
yj ≡ Y
j
Lj
=
[
γj
(
Bjkj
)σ−1
σ +
(
1− γj) (Aj)σ−1σ ] σσ−1 , (411)
and plugging this equation into (410) implies that the relative price of non tradables is given
by:
P =
1− γT
1− γN
(
AT
AN
)
σ − 1
σ
 γT
(
BTkT
)σ−1
σ +
(
1− γT ) (AT )σ−1σ
γN (BNρkT )σ−1 σ + (1− γN ) (AN )σ−1σ

1
σ−1
. (412)
Eq. (412) can be rewritten in a more interpretable form by calculating first the unit cost
for producing cj in sector j = T,N . To do so, we have to determine the conditional demands
for both inputs. Using (407), we have:
Lj = Kj
(
1− γj
γj
)σ (
Aj
Bj
)σ−1(
W
R
)σ
, (413a)
Kj = Lj
(
γj
1− γj
)σ (
Bj
Aj
)σ−1(
W
R
)−σ
. (413b)
Inserting (413) in the CES production function (405), isolating Lj and Kj , we have the
conditional demand for labor and capital:
Lj = Y j
(
Aj
)σ−1(1− γj
W
)σ (
Xj
) σ
1−σ , Kj = Y j
(
Bj
)σ−1(γj
R
)σ (
Xj
) σ
1−σ (414)
where
Xj =
(
1− γj)σ (Aj)σ−1W 1−σ + (γj)σ (Bj)σ−1R1−σ. (415)
Owing to the constant returns to scale property of our CES production function, we can
further simplify these conditional demand equations, by introducing the unit cost cj . Total
cost is equal to the sum of the labor and capital cost:
Cj =WLj +RKj . (416)
Inserting conditional demand for inputs (414) into total cost (416), we find Cj is homogenous
of degree one with respect to the level of production
Cj = cjY j , with cj =
(
Xj
) 1
1−σ , (417)
where Xj is given by (415). Substituting the capital-labor ratio in the traded sector given by
(408a) into the formal expression for the relative price of non tradables (410) and rearranging
terms leads to an alternative and more interpretable formal expression for the relative price:
P ≡ P
N
P T
=
cN
cT
=
{(
γN
)σ (
BN
)σ−1
R1−σ +
(
1− γN)σ (AN)σ−1W 1−σ
(γT )σ (BT )σ−1R1−σ + (1− γT )σ (AT )σ−1W 1−σ
} 1
1−σ
. (418)
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Before linearizing (418), it is useful to determine formal expressions for the labor and capital
shares in sectoral output. Using the fact that
(
cj
)1−σ = Xj , conditional demand for labor
(414) can be rewritten as Lj = Y j
(
Aj
)σ−1 (1−γj
W
) (
cj
)σ which gives the labor share denoted
by sjL:
sjL =
WLj
P jY j
=
(
1− γj)σ (Aj)σ−1 (cj)σ−1W 1−σ, (419)
where P j = cj (remembering that the price of tradable goods P T is normalized to one). An
alternative formal expression for the labor share can be obtained from the first-order condition
(407b) (or (407d)):
sjL =
(
1− γj) (AjLj)σ−1σ
γj (BjKj)
σ−1
σ + (1− γj) (AjLj)σ−1σ
=
(
1− γj) (Aj)σ−1σ
(yj)
σ−1
σ
, (420)
where yj is given by (411).
The Relative Price Effect of a Productivity Differential with Biased Techno-
logical Change
As it will be useful later, differentiating the wage rate (407b), i.e.,W =
(
1− γT ) (AT )σ−1σ (yT ) 1σ ,
and denoting the percentage deviation from its initial steady-state by a hat, we have:
Wˆ =
(
σ − 1
σ
)
AˆT +
1
σ
yˆT . (421)
Differentiating the output per worker (411) in the traded sector and plugging the labor share
sTL, we get:
yˆT =
(
1− sTL
) (
BˆT + kˆT
)
+ sTLAˆ
T . (422)
Differentiating the capital-labor ratio in the traded sector kT given by (408a) leads to:
kˆT = (σ − 1)
(
BˆT − AˆT
)
+ σ
(
Wˆ − Rˆ
)
. (423)
Plugging (423) into (422), inserting the resulting expression into (421), we can solve for the
wage rate:
Wˆ = AˆT +
(
1− sTL
sTL
)
BˆT −
(
1− sTL
sTL
)
Rˆ. (424)
Differentiating the relative price of non tradables given by (418) and using the labor share
sTL given by (420) yields:
Pˆ = cˆN − cˆT = (sNL − sTL) (Wˆ − Rˆ)+ [(1− sTL) BˆT − (1− sNL ) BˆN]
+
(
sTLAˆ
T − sNL AˆN
)
. (425)
Because we analyze the long-run changes and thus we estimate the steady-change of the
relative price of non tradables, we first evaluate the return on domestic capital by setting
P˙ = 0 into (404d) which gives R = P (r? + δK); differentiating yields R˙ = P˙ . Inserting
(424) into (425) and plugging R˙ = P˙ , isolating Pˆ and rearranging terms leads to the long-run
change of the relative price of non-tradables:
Pˆ = sTL
(
AˆT − AˆN
)
+
(
1− sTL
)
BˆT − s
T
L
sNL
(
1− sNL
)
BˆN .
By rearranging terms, the equation above can be rewritten in a more familiar form:
Pˆ =
[
sTLAˆ
T +
(
1− sTL
)
BˆT
]
− s
T
L
sNL
[
sNL Aˆ
N +
(
1− sNL
)
BˆN
]
. (426)
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When the labor-augmenting productivity Aj rises at the same speed as the capital-augmenting
productivity Bj , and denoting by Zˆj = Aˆj = Bˆj the Hicks-neutral technological change in
sector j = T,N , eq. (426) leads to the usual strict proportional relationship between the
relative price of non tradables and the productivity differential between tradables and non
tradables:
Pˆ = ZˆT − s
T
L
sNL
ZˆN , (427)
where sjL corresponds to the labor share in sector j = T,N . However, recent empirical ev-
idence documented by Antra`s [2004] and Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. [2014] suggest positive
labor-augmenting technological change and negative capital-augmenting technical change.
Both growth rates are larger in the manufacturing sector. The fact that evidence indicate
that Aˆj 6= Bˆj suggests the presence of a technological change biased toward labor. While
Hicks-neutral technological change does not conform to the data, the relationship (427) could
remain an acceptable approximation if the weighted average of labor- and capital-augmenting
productivity growth, sjLAˆ
j+
(
1− sjL
)
Bˆj , is close to the estimates of total factor productivity
growth, Zˆj .
M.2 Skill Biased Technological Change
In this subsection, we analyze the implications of skill biased technological change for the
relative price effect of a technological change biased toward the traded sector. In the lines
of Acemoglu [2002], we suppose that there are L unskilled (low-education) workers and H
skilled (high-education) workers, supplying labor inelastically. We further assume that labor
markets are competitive. For the sake of simplicity, we abstract from physical capital and
impose perfect labor mobility so that the wage rates must equalize across sectors for both
types of labor (i.e., for high- and low-skilled workers, respectively).
Traded and non traded goods are produced according to CES technologies:
Y T =
[
γT
(
BTHT
)σ−1
σ +
(
1− γT ) (ATLT )σ−1σ ] σσ−1 , (428a)
Y N =
[
γN
(
BNHN
)σ−1
σ +
(
1− γN) (ANLN)σ−1σ ] σσ−1 , (428b)
where Lj and Hj are low- and high-skilled labor, respectively, used in sector j = T,N to
produce Y j .Bj and Aj (with j = T,N) are factor-augmenting technology terms and σ is the
elasticity of substitution between high- and low-skilled labor; for clarity purposes, we abstract
from sector-specific elasticities of substitution; as Acemoglu, we refer to high- and low-skilled
workers as gross substitutes when the elasticity of substitution σ > 1.
We assume that factors are fully utilized:
LT + LN = L, (429a)
HT +HN = H, (429b)
where low-skilled labor L and high-skilled labor H are taken to be given for the sake of
simplicity.
The traded good is the numeraire and we denote the price of non traded goods in terms
of traded goods by P ≡ PN/P T . We assume perfect mobility of high- and low-skilled labor
across sectors and denote the high-skilled wage byWH and the low-skilled wage byWL. First
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order conditions are:
∂Y T
∂HT
= γT
(
BT
)σ−1
σ
(
HT
)− 1
σ
(
Y T
) 1
σ =WH , (430a)
∂Y T
∂LT
=
(
1− γT ) (AT )σ−1σ (LT )− 1σ (Y T ) 1σ =WL, (430b)
P
∂Y N
∂HN
= PγN
(
BN
)σ−1
σ
(
HN
)− 1
σ
(
Y N
) 1
σ =WH , (430c)
P
∂Y N
∂LN
= P
(
1− γN) (AN)σ−1σ (LN)− 1σ (Y N) 1σ =WL, (430d)
Dividing the marginal revenue of low-skilled labor by the marginal revenue of high-skilled
labor, the skilled-unskilled ratios (denoted by hj) in the traded and the non traded sectors,
respectively, are:
hT ≡
(
γT
1− γT
)σ (
BT
AT
)σ−1(
WL
WH
)σ
, (431a)
hN ≡
(
γN
1− γN
)σ (
BN
AN
)σ−1(
WL
WH
)σ
. (431b)
Dividing the production function (428) by labor Lj , we get per low-skilled worker output
denoted by yj :
yj ≡ Y
j
Lj
=
[
γj
(
Bjhj
)σ−1
σ +
(
1− γj) (Aj)σ−1σ ] σσ−1 , (432)
In order to determine a useful form for the relative price of non tradables, we first calculate
the unit cost for producing cj in sector j = T,N . To do so, we have to determine the
conditional demands for both inputs. Using (431), we have:
Lj = Hj
(
1− γj
γj
)σ (
Aj
Bj
)σ−1(
WL
WH
)σ
, (433a)
Hj = Lj
(
γj
1− γj
)σ (
Bj
Aj
)σ−1(
WL
WH
)−σ
. (433b)
Inserting (433a) ((433a) resp.) in the CES production function (428), isolating Lj (Kj resp.),
we have the conditional demand for low-skilled labor (high-skilled labor resp.):
Lj = Y j
(
Aj
)σ−1(1− γj
WL
)σ (
Xj
) σ
1−σ , Hj = Y j
(
Bj
)σ−1( γj
WH
)σ (
Xj
) σ
1−σ (434)
where
Xj =
(
1− γj)σ (Aj)σ−1 (WL)1−σ + (γj)σ (Bj)σ−1 (WH)1−σ . (435)
Owing to the constant returns to scale property of our CES production function, we can
further simplify these conditional demand equations, by introducing the unit cost cj . Total
cost is equal to the sum of the labor and capital cost:
Cj =WLLj +WHHj . (436)
Inserting conditional demand for inputs (434) into total cost (436), we find Cj is homogenous
of degree one with respect to the level of production
Cj = cjY j , with cj =
(
Xj
) 1
1−σ , (437)
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where Xj is given by (435). As shown in section M.1, the price of non traded goods in terms
of traded goods PN/P T must equalize the ratio of units cost for producing cN/cT :
P ≡ P
N
P T
=
cN
cT
=
{(
γN
)σ (
BN
)σ−1 (
WH
)1−σ + (1− γN)σ (AN)σ−1 (WL)1−σ
(γT )σ (BT )σ−1 (WH)1−σ + (1− γT )σ (AT )σ−1 (WL)1−σ
} 1
1−σ
. (438)
Before linearizing (438), it is useful to determine the formal expression for the low-skilled
labor share in sectoral output. Using the fact that
(
cj
)1−σ = Xj , conditional demand for
low-skilled labor (434) can be rewritten as Lj = Y j
(
Aj
)σ−1 (1−γj
W
) (
cj
)σ which gives the
low-skilled labor income share denoted by sjL:
sjL =
WLLj
P jY j
=
(
1− γj)σ (Aj)σ−1 (cj)σ−1 (WL)1−σ , (439)
where P j = cj . An alternative formal expression for the low-skilled labor income share can
be obtained from the first-order condition (430b) (or alternatively (430d)):
sjL =
(
1− γj) (AjLj)σ−1σ
γj (BjHj)
σ−1
σ + (1− γj) (AjLj)σ−1σ
=
(
1− γj) (Aj)σ−1σ
(yj)
σ−1
σ
, (440)
where yj is given by (432).
The Relative Price Effect of a Productivity Differential with skill-biased Tech-
nological Change
As it will be useful later, we first differentiate the unit cost for producing cj =
(
Xj
) 1
1−σ
where Xj is given by (435); denoting the percentage deviation from its initial steady-state by
a hat, we have:
cˆj =
(
1− sjL
)(
−Bˆj + WˆH
)
+ sjL
(
−Aˆj + WˆL
)
, (441)
where we have inserted the low-skilled labor income share denoted by sjL given by (439).
Differentiating the relative price of non tradables given by (438) and using the labor share
sjL given by (440) yields:
Pˆ = cˆN − cˆT = − (sNL − sTL) (WˆH − WˆL)+ [(1− sTL) BˆT − (1− sNL ) BˆN]
+
(
sTLAˆ
T − sNL AˆN
)
. (442)
Totally differentiating the skilled-unskilled ratio given by (431a) and assuming that the
relative supply of skilled rises at the rate HˆT − LˆT in the traded sector, we are able to
determine a formal expression for the percentage change in the skill premium WˆH − WˆL:
WˆH − WˆL =
(
σ − 1
σ
)(
BˆT − AˆT
)
− 1
σ
(
HˆT − LˆT
)
. (443)
According to (443), the change in the skill premium is driven by exogenous forces: the percent-
age change in relative productivity of skilled labor and the percentage change in the relative
supply of skills in the traded sector. The skill premium falls when skilled workers become more
abundant, i.e., HˆT − LˆT > 0. Additionally, as equation (443) shows, the elasticity of substi-
tution, σ, is important for the behavior of the skill premium. If σ > 1, then an improvement
in the productivity of skilled workers, BT , relative to the productivity of unskilled workers,
AT , stimulates the relative demand for skilled labor and thus raises the skill premium. As
documented by Acemoglu [2002], most estimates report an elasticity of substitution between
skilled and unskilled workers greater than 1 so that the skill premium increases when skilled
workers become relatively more productive.
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Inserting (443) into (442), we find that skill-biased technological change modifies the
response of the relative price of non tradables to a productivity differential between tradables
and non tradables:
Pˆ =
[
sTLAˆ
T +
(
1− sTL
)
BˆT
]
−
[
sNL Aˆ
N +
(
1− sNL
)
BˆN
]
+
(
sTL − sNL
) [(σ − 1
σ
)(
BˆT − AˆT
)
− 1
σ
(
HˆT − LˆT
)]
. (444)
Denoting the weighted average of high-skilled and low-skilled labor-augmenting productivity
growth, i.e., the term sjLAˆ
j +
(
1− sjL
)
Bˆj , by Zˆj , eq. (444) can be rewritten in a more
compact form:
Pˆ =
(
ZˆT − ZˆN
)
+
(
sTL − sNL
) (
WˆH − WˆL
)
. (445)
where sjL is the low-skilled labor’s share in value added in sector j = T,N . As shown by
the first term of the RHS of eq. (445), a productivity differential between tradables and non
tradables of 1% appreciates the relative price of non tradables by 1%, as in the standard BS
model which assumes that labor is homogenous. As captured by the second term of the RHS
of eq. (445), a rise in the skill premium, i.e., WˆH − WˆL > 0, amplifies the appreciation in the
price of non traded goods in terms of traded goods following a productivity differential as long
as the low-skilled labor income share in the traded sector is higher than that in the non traded
sector, i.e., sTL − sNL > 0. Table 25 shows the ratio of labor compensation to value added for
the whole economy and for the traded and non traded sector as well. Column 10 of Table 25
gives the difference (i.e., sTL − sNL ) between the low-skilled labor income share in the traded
sector, sTL, and the low-skilled labor income share in the non traded sector, s
N
L . The difference
sTL − sNL is positive in all countries of our sample, except Sweden. Hence, data reveal that
the traded sector is relatively more intensive in unskilled labor than the non traded sector.
Regarding the change in the skill premium, using data on the employment of production and
nonproduction workers in manufacturing from twelve developed countries Berman, Bound
and Machin [1998] find that the relative wage of nonproduction workers typically declined in
the 1970s and increased in the 1980s. In the 1980s, estimates by Berman, Bound and Machin
[1998] indicate that relative wages of nonproduction workers rose by an average of 4 percent
in these developed countries in the 1980s. The U.S. increase of 7 percent was above average.
When estimating the (percentage) change of the relative wage of high-skilled workers over the
period 1970-2005, we find that the skill premium decreases in most of the OECD countries
in our sample, except for Germany, Ireland and the United States. By and large, columns
10 and 11 of Table 25 reveal that the term
(
sTL − sNL
) (
WˆH − WˆL
)
is negative for most of
the countries of our sample. Hence, technological change biased toward skilled labor tends
to moderate the appreciation in the relative price of non tradables following a productivity
differential between tradables and non tradables captured by ZˆT − ZˆN > 0.
The Relative Wage Effect of a Productivity Differential with skill-biased Tech-
nological Change
We now derive the change in the ratio of non traded wage WN to traded wage W T
following a productivity differential. According to (436), total cost is equal to the sum of the
low- and high-skilled labor cost, i.e., Cj =WLLj +WHHj where Cj = cjY j (see (437)) witg
CT = Y T and CN = PY N . The average wage rate in sector j is determined by dividing labor
compensation Cj by total labor used in sector j:
W j =
WLLj +WHHj
Lj +Hj
=
cjY j
Lj +Hj
=
cjyj
1 + hj
, (446)
where hj ≡ Hj
Lj+Hj
is the share of high-skilled workers employed by sector j = T,N and
yj ≡ Y j/Lj is given by (432). Totally differentiating (446) shows that the percentage change
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in the wage rate in sector j is driven by percentage changes in the unit cost for producing,
the per low-skilled worker output and the share of low-skilled labor:
Wˆ j = cˆj + yˆj − h
j
1 + hj
hˆj , (447)
where cˆT = 0 and cˆN = Pˆ and yˆj = sjLAˆ
j +
(
1− sjL
)
Bˆj +
(
1− sjL
)
hˆj . Inserting yˆj , the
percentage change in the wage rate in sector j can be rewritten as follows:
Wˆ j = cˆj +
[(
1− sjL
)
− h
j
1 + hj
]
hˆj + sjLAˆ
j +
(
1− sjL
)
Bˆj . (448)
Denoting the weighted average of high-skilled and low-skilled labor-augmenting productivity
growth, i.e., the term sjLAˆ
j +
(
1− sjL
)
Bˆj , by Zˆj , and denoting by Ω ≡WN/W T the ratio of
non traded wage to traded wage and totally differentiating, making use of (448), the percentage
change in the relative wage of non tradables is given by:
Ωˆ = WˆN − Wˆ T = Pˆ + ZˆN − ZˆT
+
[(
1− sNL
)− hN
1 + hN
]
hˆN −
[(
1− sTL
)− hT
1 + hT
]
hˆT . (449)
Substituting Pˆ given by (445), the percentage change in the relative wage of non tradables
reduces to:
Ωˆ = WˆN − Wˆ T = (sTL − sNL ) (WˆH − WˆL)
+
[(
1− sNL
)− hN
1 + hN
]
hˆN −
[(
1− sTL
)− hT
1 + hT
]
hˆT , (450)
where the skill premium change
(
WˆH − WˆL
)
is given by (443) and depends on skilled biased
technological change captured by BˆT −AˆT > 0. We discuss below the effects of a productivity
differential between tradables and non tradables when technological change is skill-biased.
The first line of eq. (450) shows that the change in the skill premium
(
WˆH − WˆL
)
is
positively related to the change in the relative wage Ωˆ of non tradables because data reported
in column 10 of Table 25 indicate that the non traded sector is relatively more high-skilled
intensive than the traded sector, i.e., sTL > s
N
L or alternatively
(
1− sNL
)
>
(
1− sTL
)
. Hence,
a rise in the skill premium would increase the non traded wage relative to the traded wage
as the non traded sector uses relatively more intensively high-skilled workers. As shown in
the last column of Table 25, the skill premium tends to decline, except for the United States,
France and Finland. By and large, for two-third of the countries of our sample, the term(
sTL − sNL
) (
WˆH − WˆL
)
is negative, so that biased technological change exerts a negative
impact on the relative wage of non tradables for these countries.
The second line of eq. (450) shows the impact of a rise in the ratio of hj on the sectoral wage
and thus on WN/W T . According to (448), the average wage W j is increasing in hj = Hj/Lj
as long as the skill premium is positive (i.e., WH/WL > 1, see Acemoglu [2002]). Intuitively,
as the skill composition of the labor force improves, wages will increase. As shown in columns
11 and 12 of Table 26, the term
[(
1− sjL
)
− hj
1+hj
]
is positive in both sectors (but small);
while a rise in hj raises the average wage W j , by assuming that
[(
1− sjL
)
− hj
1+hj
]
is almost
identical across sectors, it is the speed at which sectors increase the share of high-skilled
workers in total labor, as captured by the term hˆN − hˆT , that determines the change in the
ratio WN/W T . Column 15 of Table 26 reveals that hˆN − hˆT is negative in all countries of
our sample. As the sectoral average wage is positively related with the share of skilled labor,
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Table 25: The Labor Income Share by Country, Sector and Skill
Country Aggregate Sector T Sector N Differences Data coverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
s sH sL s
T sTH s
T
L s
N sNH s
N
L s
T
L − sNL WˆH − WˆL
BEL 0.66 0.12 0.54 0.66 0.09 0.57 0.66 0.13 0.52 0.04 -0.28 1980-2005
DEU 0.69 0.09 0.61 0.77 0.07 0.70 0.65 0.10 0.55 0.00 -0.80 1970-2005
DNK 0.68 0.06 0.62 0.66 0.03 0.63 0.69 0.07 0.62 0.04 -1.25 1980-2005
ESP 0.64 0.16 0.48 0.59 0.09 0.51 0.67 0.21 0.46 0.10 -1.11 1980-2005
FIN 0.71 0.24 0.46 0.66 0.17 0.49 0.74 0.30 0.44 0.15 0.30 1970-2005
FRA 0.69 0.13 0.56 0.71 0.08 0.63 0.68 0.15 0.53 -0.10 0.49 1980-2005
GBR 0.72 0.12 0.61 0.70 0.08 0.63 0.74 0.15 0.59 0.12 -0.02 1970-2005
IRL 0.59 0.13 0.45 0.47 0.07 0.40 0.69 0.19 0.50 0.01 -0.43 1988-2005
ITA 0.71 0.06 0.65 0.75 0.03 0.72 0.68 0.08 0.60 0.18 -1.48 1970-2005
JPN 0.65 0.17 0.48 0.60 0.12 0.48 0.68 0.20 0.47 -0.06 -0.89 1973-2005
KOR 0.78 0.34 0.44 0.75 0.22 0.53 0.82 0.47 0.35 0.04 -0.47 1970-2005
NLD 0.68 0.08 0.60 0.61 0.04 0.56 0.73 0.11 0.62 -0.01 -0.27 1979-2005
SWE 0.69 0.13 0.56 0.64 0.08 0.56 0.72 0.16 0.56 0.03 -0.88 1981-2005
USA 0.62 0.22 0.41 0.64 0.18 0.46 0.61 0.24 0.38 0.08 0.53 1970-2005
Average 0.68 0.15 0.53 0.66 0.10 0.56 0.70 0.18 0.51 0.05 -0.47
Notes: sH is the labor income share for high-skilled workers and sL the labor income share for low-skilled workers, W
H is the
high-skilled wage rate while WL is the low-skilled wage rate; hence WˆH − WˆL is the percentage change of the skill premium.
because the traded sector increases more rapidly the share of skilled labor than the non traded
sector, this movement exerts a negative impact on the relative wage.
In conclusion, both the change in the skill premium and the skill composition of the labor
force in each sector matter in determining the responses of the relative price and relative
wage of non tradables to technological change biased toward the traded sector. We find
that a declining skill premium moderates the response of the relative price to a productivity
differential between tradables and non tradables and exerts a negative impact on the relative
wage, even when imposing perfect mobility of labor across sectors. We believe that more work
must be done in this direction. We leave a further analysis of these issues for future research.
Data Construction and Source
The EU KLEMS database (the March 2008 data release) provides details data on labor
compensation and the number of hours worked by industry and by skill level (low, medium
and high) for the fourteen countries of our sample. Note that in the March 2011 data release
of the EU KLEMS, which is our baseline database, sectoral disaggregation of employment
and labor compensation between skilled and unskilled labor is not available. In detail, the
2008 EU KLEMS database gives information, at the sectoral level, on the share of labor
compensation devoted to each skill level in total labor compensation and on the share of
hours worked by each skill level in total hours worked. Having pinned down those ratios,
we are able to decompose the aggregate labor compensation and hours worked in the March
2011 data release of the EU KLEMS using the same proportions that we observe in the March
2008 data release of the EU KLEMS. The EU KLEMS categorization of labor by skill provides
data on three types (low, medium and high skills). We group the low and medium levels into
a single category that corresponds to our definition of unskilled workers, and the remaining
data coincides with our definition of high-skilled workers. The EU KLEMS defines high-skilled
workers as those workers that hold a Bachelor degree (or equivalent) or above. The period
begins earliest in 1970 and ending at the latest in 2005 (see the last column of Table 25).
No country is followed for less than 25 years with the exception of Ireland (1988-2005). We
now describe the construction for the data shown in Table 25 and 26 (mnemonics are given
in parentheses).
- Labor compensation of high-skilled workers WHt H
j
t in sector j = T,N : share of high-
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skilled labor compensation in total labour compensation (LABHS) times labor compen-
sation in sector j (LAB). Source: EU KLEMS database (the March 2008 for LABHS
and the March 2011 for LAB).
- Labor compensation of low-skilled workers WLt L
j
t in sector j = T,N : share of low-
skilled and medium-skilled labor compensation in total labour compensation (LABMS
and LABLS) times labor compensation in sector j (LAB). Source: EU KLEMS database
(the March 2008 for LABMS and LABLS and the March 2011 for LAB).
- Hours worked by high-skilled persons engaged Hjt in sector j = T,N : share of hours
worked by high-skilled persons engaged in total hours (H HS) times total hours worked
by persons engaged in sector j (H EMP). Source: EU KLEMS database (the March
2008 for H HS and the March 2011 for H EMP).
- Hours worked by low-skilled persons engaged Ljt in sector j = T,N : share of hours
worked by low-skilled and medium-skilled persons engaged in total hours (H MS and
H LS) times total hours worked by persons engaged in sector j (H EMP). Source: EU
KLEMS database (the March 2008 for H MS and H LS and the March 2011 for H EMP).
Using time series forWHt H
j
t ,W
L
t L
j
t , H
j
t and L
j
t , we construct the low-skilled labor income
share sjL and the share of low-skilled labor in total labor κ
j in sector j = T,N .
N Endogenous Markups and Technological Change Biased to-
ward the Traded Sector
The framework builds on Jaimovich and Floetotto [2008]. We assume that two imperfectly
competitive sectors produce a traded good denoted by the superscript T and a non-traded
good denoted by the superscript N . Following Yang and Heijdra [1993] and Jaimovich and
Floetotto [2008], we depart from the usual practice by assuming that the number of firms
is large enough so that we can ignore the strategic effects but not so large that the effect of
entry on the firm’s demand curve is minuscule. Consequently, the price elasticity of demand
faced by a single firm is no longer constant and equal to the elasticity of substitution between
any two varieties, but rather a function of the number of firms M j in sector j.
The final output, Y j , is produced in a competitive retail sector with constant-returns-
to-scale production which aggregates a continuum measure one of goods. We denote the
elasticity of substitution between any two different goods by ω > 0. In each industry, there
are M j > 1 firms producing differentiated goods that are aggregated into an intermediate
good. The elasticity of substitution between any two varieties within an industry is denoted
by ρ > 0, and we assume that this is higher than the elasticity of substitution across industries,
i.e. ² > ω (see Jaimovich and Floetotto [2008]). Within each industry, there is monopolistic
competition; each firm that produces one variety is a price setter. Output X ji,s of firm i in
industry s in sector j is produced using labor, i.e. X ji,s = AjLji,s.
N.1 Households
At each instant the representative household consumes traded and non traded goods denoted
by CT (t) and CN (t), respectively, which are aggregated by means of a CES function:
C(t) =
[
ϕ
1
φ
(
CT (t)
)φ−1
φ + (1− ϕ) 1φ (CN (t))φ−1φ ] φφ−1 , (451)
where 0 < ϕ < 1 is the weight of the traded good in the overall consumption bundle and φ
corresponds to the elasticity of substitution between traded goods and non traded goods.
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The representative agent supplies inelastically labor L that we normalize to one. At any
instant of time, households derive utility from their consumption C(t). The representative
household maximizes the following objective function:
U =
∫ ∞
0
1
1− 1σC
C(t)1−
1
σC e−βtdt, (452)
where β is the discount rate, σC > 0 corresponds to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
for consumption.
Labor income is derived by supplying labor at a wage rate W (t). In addition, households
accumulate internationally traded bonds, B(t), that yield net interest rate earnings of r?B(t).
The flow budget constraint is equal to households’ income less consumption expenditure:
B˙(t) = r?B(t) +W (t)L− PC (P (t))C(t). (453)
where L = 1.
Denoting the co-state variable associated with eq. (453) by λ the first-order conditions
characterizing the representative household’s optimal plans are:
C(t) = [PC (P (t))λ(t)]
−σC , (454a)
λ˙(t) = λ(t) (β − r?) , (454b)
and the transversality conditions limt→∞ λB(t)e−βt = 0. In an open economy model with a
representative agent having perfect foresight, a constant rate of time preference and perfect
access to world capital markets, we impose β = r? in order to generate an interior solution.
Setting β = r? into (454b) yields λ = λ¯. This standard assumption made in the literature
implies that the marginal utility of wealth, λ, will undergo a discrete jump when individuals
receive new information and must remain constant over time from then on.
For the sake of clarity, we drop the time argument below when this causes no confusion.
The homogeneity of C(.) allows a two-stage consumption decision: in the first stage,
consumption is determined, and the intratemporal allocation between traded and non-traded
goods is decided at the second stage. Applying Shephard’s lemma gives CN = P ′CC with
P ′C =
∂PC
∂P ; denoting by αC the share of non-traded goods in the consumption expenditure,
we have CN = αCPCC/P and CT = PCC−PCN = (1− αC)PCC. Intra-temporal allocation
of consumption follows from the following optimal rule:
CT
CN
=
(
ϕ
1− ϕ
)
P φ. (455)
N.2 Firms
The final output in sector j = T,N , Y j , is produced in a competitive retail sector using a
constant-returns-to-scale production function which aggregates a continuum measure one of
intermediate goods:
Y j =
[∫ 1
0
(Qjs)ω−1ω ds] ωω−1 , (456)
where ω > 0 represents the elasticity of substitution between any two different sectoral goods
and QMjs stands for intermediate consumption of industry’s variety in sector j = T,N (with
s ∈ [0,M j]). The final good producers behave competitively, and the households use the final
good for consumption.
In each of the s industries, there are M j > 1 firms producing differentiated goods that
are aggregated into an intermediate good by a CES aggregating function. The intermediate
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good output of industry s is given by:81
Qjs =
(
M j
)− 1
ρ−1
[∫ Mj
0
(
X ji,s
) ρ−1
ρ di
] ρ
ρ−1
, (457)
where X ji,s stands for output of firm i in industry s and ρ is the elasticity of substitution
between any two varieties.
Denoting by P j and Pjs the price of the final good and of the sth variety of the intermediate
good, respectively, the profit the final good producer is written as follows:
Πj = P j
[∫ 1
0
(Qjs)ω−1ω ds] ωω−1 − ∫ 1
0
PjsQjsds. (458)
Total cost minimizing for a given level of final output gives the (intratemporal) demand
function for each input:
Qjs =
(
Pjs
P j
)−ω
Y j , (459)
and the price of the final output P j is given by:
P j =
(∫ 1
0
(Pjs)1−ω ds) 11−ω , (460)
where Pjs is the price index of industry s and P j is the price of the final good.
Within each sector, there is monopolistic competition; each firm that produces one variety
X ji,s is a price setter. One variety X ji,s is produced using labor Lji,s as the sole input in a linear
(constant returns to scale) technology:
X ji,s = AjLji,s, (461)
where labor productivity is assumed to be symmetric across producers of differentiated goods.
Denoting by Pji,s the price of good i in industry s in sector j, the profit function for the
sth good producer denoted by pijs is:
pijs ≡ Pjs
(
M j
)− 1
ρ−1
(∫ Mj
0
(
X ji,s
) ρ−1
ρ di
) ρ
ρ−1
−
∫ Mj
0
Pji,sX ji,sdi. (462)
The demand faced by each producer X ji,s is defined as follows:
X ji,s =
(
Pji,s
Pjs
)−ρ Qjs
M j
, (463)
and the price index of industry s in sector j is given by:
Pjs =
(
M j
)− 1
1−ρ
(∫ Mj
0
(
Pji,s
)1−ρ
di
) 1
1−ρ
. (464)
Combining (459) and (463), the demand for variety X ji,s can be expressed in terms of the
relative price of the final good:
X ji,s =
(
Pji,s
Pjs
)−ρ(Pjs
P j
)−ω
Y j
M j
. (465)
81By having the term
(
M j
)− 1
ρ−1 in (457), the analysis abstracts from the variety effect and concentrates
solely on the effects of markup variation.
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In order to operate, each imperfectly competitive producer must pay a fixed cost denoted
by φj measured in terms of the final good which is assumed to be symmetric across firms.
Each firm i chooses labor to maximize profits. The profit function for the ith producer in
industry s denoted by piji,s is:
piji,s ≡ Pji,sAjLji,s −W jLji,s − P jφj . (466)
The demand for hours worked is given by the equality of the markup-adjusted marginal
revenue of labor to the producer wage W j , respectively:
Pji,sAj
µj
=W j (467)
where the markup µj is a decreasing function of the price-elasticity of demand ej :
µj ≡ e
j
ej − 1 . (468)
We consider a symmetric equilibrium where all imperfectly competitive producers within
one industry s produce the output level X ji,s = X j with the same quantities of labor Lji,s = Lj .
Hence, total hours worked are Lj = M jLj . They also set the same price Pji,s = Pj . Hence,
eqs. (460) and (464) imply that Pj = P j . The first-order condition (467) reduces to:
P jAj
µj
=W j . (469)
We follow Yang and Heijdra [1993] and Jaimovich and Floetotto [2008] by taking into
account that output of one variety does not affect the general price index P , but influences
the intermediate good price level; in a symmetric equilibrium, the resulting price elasticity of
demand is:
e
(
M j
) ≡ −∂X ji,s
∂Pji,s
Pji,s
X ji,s
= ²− (²− ω)
M j
, M j ∈ (1,∞) , (470)
where we used the fact that ∂Ps
∂Pji,s
Pji,s
Ps
= 1
Mj
. Note that we assume that the elasticity of
substitution among intermediate goods s captured by ω and among varieties i captured by
ρ are identical across sectors j = T,N . Assuming that ² > ω, the price elasticity of demand
faced by one single firm is an increasing function of the number of firmsM j within an industry
s. Henceforth, the markup µj = e
j
ej−1 decreases as the number of competitors increases:
µj = µ
(
M j
)
,
∂µj
∂M j
< 0. (471)
We further assume that free entry drives profits down to zero in all industries of sector j
at each instant of time. Aggregating, the zero profit condition implies in sector j:
P jY j −W jLj − P jM jφj = 0. (472)
where Y j = M jX j = AjLj . Inserting (461) and (469), the zero-profit condition can be
rewritten as follows:
AjLj
(
1− 1
µj
)
=M jφj . (473)
Remembering that µj = µ
(
M j
)
, eq. (470) can be solved for the number of firms:
M j =M j
(
Lj , Aj , φj
)
. (474)
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Totally differentiating (473) and denoting by a hat a percentage deviation from the initial
steady-state, we have:
Mˆ j =
M jφj
(
Aˆj + Lˆj − φˆj
)
(
M jφj − Y j
µj
∂µj
∂Mj
Mj
µj
) . (475)
Using the fact that Y
j
µj
= M
jφj
µj−1 , the partial derivatives reduce to:
Mˆ j
Aˆj
=
Mˆ j
Lˆj
= −Mˆ
j
φˆj
=
(
µj − 1)
(µj − 1) + ηµj ,Mj
> 0, (476)
where ηµj ,Mj = − ∂µ
j
∂Mj
Mj
µj
is the elasticity of markup to entry. The partial derivatives (476)
are increasing in µj which imply that entry reacts more to a change in Lj , Aj or φj when the
markup µj is initially high. Hence, a sector poor with poor competition in product markets
will experience larger firm entry so that the markup will fall by a larger amount.
Since the denominator of (476) is positive (see eq. (471)), the number of firmsM j in sector
j is an increasing of the productivity index Aj and market size captured by Lj . Because fixed
costs lower firm entry by reducing profit opportunities, such recurring costs act like a cost of
entry. Hence, the number of firms M j in sector j is a decreasing function of fixed costs φj .
In summary, we have:
∂M j
∂Aj
> 0,
∂M j
∂Lj
> 0,
∂M j
∂φj
< 0. (477)
N.3 Market-Clearing Conditions
Aggregating labor over the two sectors gives us the resource constraint:
LT + LN = 1, (478)
where we assume that agents supply inelastically labor normalized to one.
To fully describe the equilibrium, we impose good market clearing conditions. The non
traded good market clearing condition requires that non traded output is equalized with
consumption in non-tradables and total fixed cost:
Y N = CN +MNφN . (479)
Plugging this condition into the flow budget constraint (453) and using firms’ optimal condi-
tions yields the market clearing condition for tradables or the current account equation:
B˙ = r?B + Y T − CT −MTφT = r?B + Y
T
µT
− CT . (480)
where we used the free entry condition in the traded sector, i.e., Y T −MTφT = Y T
µT
; the
second term on the RHS, i.e., Y
T
µT
− CT ≡ NX, corresponds to net exports denoted by NX.
N.4 Short-Run Static Solutions
Short-Run Static Solutions for Consumption
We compute the short-run static solution for consumption. Static efficiency condition
(454a) can be solved for consumption which of course must hold at any point of time:
C = C
(
λ¯, P
)
, (481)
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with
Cλ¯ =
∂C
∂λ¯
= −σCC
λ¯
< 0, (482a)
CP =
∂C
∂P
= −αCσCC
P
< 0, (482b)
Inserting (481) into CT = (PC − PP ′C)C and CN = P ′CC, we can solve for consumption in
tradables and non tradables:
CT = CT
(
λ¯, P
)
, CN = CN
(
λ¯, P
)
, (483)
where partial derivatives are
CTλ¯ = −σC
CT
λ¯
< 0, (484a)
CTP = αC
CT
P
(φ− σC) ≶ 0, (484b)
CNλ¯ = −σC
CN
λ¯
< 0, (484c)
CNP = −
CN
P
[(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ] < 0, (484d)
where we used the fact that −P ′′CP
P ′C
= φ (1− αC) > 0.
Short-Run Static Solutions for Labor
Inserting the short-run static solution for consumption in non tradables (483) and for the
number of firms in the non traded sector (474) into the market clearing condition (479) for
the non tradables yields:
ANLN = CN
(
λ¯, P
)
+MN
(
LN , AN , φN
)
φN . (485)
Eq. (485) can be solved for non traded labor:
LN = LN
(
P, λ¯, AN , φN
)
. (486)
Partial derivatives are determined by totally differentiating (485) and by isolating the per-
centage change in non traded labor LˆN :
LˆN = −AˆN − C
N
Y N
{
σC
ΓN
ˆ¯λ+
[(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ]
ΓN
Pˆ
}
+
MNφN
Y N
1
ΓN
ηµN ,MN
(µN − 1) + ηµN ,MN
φˆN , (487)
where we set:
ΓN = 1−
(
µN − 1)
(µN − 1) + ηµN ,MN
MNφN
Y N
> 0. (488)
The sign of ΓN > 0 follows from the fact that 0 < (
µN−1)
(µN−1)+η
µN ,MN
< 1 and the share of total
fixed cost in non traded output 0 < M
NφN
Y N
< 1.
Plugging (486) into (478), the resource constraint for labor can be solved for traded labor:
LT = 1− LN = 1− (P, λ¯, AN , φN) (489)
with
LˆT = −L
N
LT
LˆN . (490)
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Short-Run Static Solutions for the Number of Firms
Inserting (486) into (474), we can solve for the number of firms in the non traded sector:
MN =MN
[
LN
(
P, λ¯, AN , φN
)
, AN , φN
]
.
Because partial derivatives Mˆ
N
LˆN
LˆN
AˆN
and Mˆ
N
AˆN
cancel each other, short-run static solution for
MN reduces to:
MN =MN
(
P, λ¯, φN
)
, (491)
where partial derivatives are determined by inserting (487) into (475) and using (476)
MˆN = −
(
µN − 1)
(µN − 1) + ηµN ,MN
1
ΓN
{(
1− M
NφN
Y N
)
φˆN
+
CN
Y N
{
σC
ˆ¯λ+ [(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ] Pˆ
}}
, (492)
where ΓN is given by (488) and 0 < M
NφN
Y N
< 1. According to (492), a rise in P or an increase
in the marginal utility of wealth λ¯ lowers the number of firms by reducing the demand for
tradables and thus profit opportunities in that sector while higher fixed cost φN acts like a
cost of entry and thus reduces the number of firms MN as well.
Inserting (489) into (474), we can solve for the number of firms in the traded sector:
MT =MT
[
LT
(
P, λ¯, AN , φN
)
, AT , φT
]
. (493)
A rise in P , λ¯, AN lowers non traded labor LN by producing an excess of supply in the non
traded goods market. Hence, an increase in P , λ¯, AN raises LT and thusMT while an increase
in φN reduces it by reallocating labor toward the non traded sector (see (487)). An increase
in AT raises MT by producing profit opportunities in the traded sector while φT raises the
cost of entry and thus lowers MT .
Short-Run Static Solutions for the relative Price of Non Tradables
We suppose that the traded good is the numeraire so that P T = 1. Assuming perfect
mobility of labor across sectors the marginal revenue of labor must equalize across sectors
(see eq. (469)):
AT
µT
=
PAN
µN
=W. (494)
Isolating P , we find that the price of non traded goods in terms of traded goods depends on
the ratio of productivity and the ratio of markups:
P =
AT
AN
µN
[
MN
(
P, λ¯, φN
)]
µT
{
MT
[
LT
(
P, λ¯, AN , φN
)
, AT , φT
]} , (495)
where we inserted (491) and (493), using the fact that µj = µ
(
M j
)
(see eq. (471)). Eq. (495)
can be solved for the relative price of non tradables:
P = P
(
AT , AN , λ¯, φT , φN
)
. (496)
N.5 Dynamics
Linearizing (496) around the steady-state implies that the dynamics for the relative price of
non tradables degenerate, i.e., P (t) = P˜ . Inserting the short-run static solutions for labor in
the traded sector, consumption in tradables, and the number of firms in the traded sector,
given by (483), (489), (493) respectively, into the accumulation equation of foreign bonds
(480) and linearizing around the steady-state yields:
B˙(t) = r?
(
B(t)− B˜
)
. (497)
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Solving and invoking the transversality condition limt→∞ λB(t)e−r
?t = 0 leads to:
B(t) = B0. (498)
Hence, for the transversality condition to hold, the stock of traded bonds B(t) must be equal
to its initial predetermined level. Combining (498) with (480) yields:
r?B0 + Y T = CT . (499)
Because the stock of foreign bonds must stick to its initial value, for the sake of simplicity
and without loss of generality, we set B0 = 0.
N.6 Relative Price Effect of a Productivity Differential
Taking logarithm and differentiating (494), denoting the the percentage deviation from its
initial steady-state by a hat, gives the change in the relative price of non tradables:
Pˆ =
(
AˆT − AˆN
)
+
(
µˆN − µˆT ) . (500)
Because the model is analytically untractable, a quantitative analysis would be necessary.
Yet, we can state some predictions by rewriting the steady-state in relative terms.
The equilibrium is defined by the following set of equations:
CT
CN
=
(
ϕ
1− ϕ
)
P φ, (501a)
Y T
[
1− 1
µT (MT )
]
=MTφT , (501b)
Y N
[
1− 1
µN (MN )
]
=MNφN , (501c)
P =
AT
AN
µN
(
MN
)
µT (MT )
, (501d)
Y T
Y N
µN
µT
=
CT
CN
, (501e)
where we used the zero profit condition, i.e., Y j −M jφj = Y j
µj
to derive the goods market
clearing condition (501e). Remember that we set B0 = 0.
The equilibrium which comprises (501a)-(501e) can be reduced to two equations. Combin-
ing the optimal rule for intra-temporal allocation of consumption (501a) with market clearing
conditions for the non traded and the traded good, i.e., (501e) yields the goods market equi-
librium (henceforth GME):
Y T
Y N
=
ϕ
1− ϕ
µT
µN
P φ. (502)
As it will be useful, we differentiate the zero-profit condition Y j
[
1− 1
µj(Mj)
]
= φjM j
(501b) or alternatively (501c) (see eq. (476)):
Mˆ j = χj Yˆ j , χj =
(
µj − 1)
(µj − 1) + ηµj ,Mj
> 0. (503)
Totally differentiating (501d) and inserting (503) yields:
Pˆ =
(
AˆT − AˆN
)
+
[
ηµT ,MTχ
T Yˆ T − ηµN ,MNχN Yˆ N
]
, (504)
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where ηµj ,Mj = − ∂µ
j
∂Mj
Mj
µj
> 0. For the sake of clarity, let us assume that χj ' χ > 0 and
ηµj ,Mj = ηµ,M > 0; these approximations imply that eq. (504) reduces to:
Pˆ =
(
AˆT − AˆN
)
+ ηµ,Mχ
(
Yˆ T − Yˆ N
)
. (505)
Eq. (505) corresponds to the labor market equilibrium (henceforth LME) which is upward-
sloping in the (ln
(
Y T /Y N
)
, lnP )-space where the slope is equal to ηµ,Mχ > 0.
Totally differentiating the goods market equilibrium (502) and inserting (503) yields:
Yˆ T − Yˆ N = φPˆ −
[
ηµT ,MTχ
T Yˆ T − ηµN ,MNχN Yˆ N
]
.
For the sake of clarity, let us assume that χj ' χ > 0 and ηµj ,Mj = ηµ,M > 0; these
approximations imply that the GME-schedule reduces to:
Pˆ =
(1 + ηµ,Mχ)
φ
(
Yˆ T − Yˆ N
)
. (506)
The GME-schedule is upward-sloping in the (ln
(
Y T /Y N
)
, lnP )-space where the slope is
equal to 1+ηµ,Mχφ > 0. The GME-schedule is steeper than the LME-schedule as long as the
following inequality holds:
φ < 1 +
1
ηµ,Mχ
(507)
Since ηµ,Mχ > 0 is usually small for reasonable values of parameters, it is reasonable to assume
that the GME-schedule is steeper than the LME-schedule in the (ln
(
Y T /Y N
)
, lnP )-space.
A productivity shock biased toward the traded sector shifts the LME-schedule to the right
in the (ln
(
Y T /Y N
)
, lnP )-space. As traded output increases relative to non-traded output,
the relative price of non-tradables must rise to clear the goods market. Because the markup
of tradables falls more than the markup of non tradables, the relative price must appreciate
by a larger amount. This can be seen more formally by totally differentiating (501d):
Pˆ =
(
AˆT − AˆN
)
+
(
µˆN − µˆT ) , (508)
where µˆj < 0 with j = T,N . Eq. (508) allows us to draw several conclusions related to the
long-run movements in the relative price of non tradables:
• Assuming that markups are fixed as in the standard BS model, the percentage change
in the relative price of non tradables reduces to the first term on the RHS of eq. (508)
so that a productivity differential of 1% appreciates the relative price by 1%. When
markups are endogenous, because traded output increases relative to non traded output,
more firms enter the traded good market than the non traded good market so that the
markup in that the traded sector, µT , falls more than that in the non traded sector,
µN , thus amplifying the appreciation in the relative price of non tradables.
• Because we impose perfect mobility of labor across sectors, both sectors pay the same
wage so that the ratio Ω ≡ WN
WT
remains unaffected.
• While traded output increases relative to non traded output and thus (µˆN − µˆT ) > 0
should be positive, we expect the term
(
µˆN − µˆT ) to be small; we have assumed that
the elasticity of the markup to entry ηµj ,Mj = ηµ,M > 0 and the elasticity of entry to
sectoral output χj ' χ > 0 were homogenous across sectors; as documented by Epifani
and Gancia [2011], some sectors are more shielded than others from foreign competition;
hence, the markup in the non traded sector should be initially high and thus we have
χN > χT and ηµN ,MN > ηµT ,MT . While traded output increases relative to non traded
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output, for given change in sectoral output, the non traded sector should experience a
larger entry of firms and thus a larger decline in the markup. As a result, we expect
the term
(
µˆN − µˆT ) to be small and the relative price of non tradables to appreciate by
roughly 1% following a productivity differential of 1%.
• We have restricted our attention to the analysis of the effects of a productivity differen-
tial between tradables and non tradables while the last thirty years have been witnessed
of a deregulation episode on an unprecedented scale in OECD countries. Such a deregu-
lation episode has mainly affected non traded sectors and thus has contributed to lower
the markup in those sectors, as documented by Bertinelli et al. [2013]. As a conse-
quence, the deregulation episode, by reducing the markup in the non traded sector,
should exert a negative impact on the relative price of non tradables. More specifi-
cally, eq. (496) shows that both labor productivity and cost of entry impinge on P ,
i.e., P
(
AT , AN , λ¯, φT , φN
)
where ∂P/∂φN > 0. It would be interesting to explore the
following relationship empirically:
pi,t = αi + γ .
[
zTi,t −
(
θTi /θ
N
i
)
zNi,t
]
+ δ .PMRi,t + ui,t,
where PMR represents a set of time and country varying indicators of product market
regulations. We expect the coefficient δ to be positive as stringent anti-competitive
product market regulation (in the non traded sector) raises µN and thus appreciates
the relative price of non tradables. We leave a further analysis of these issues for future
research.
N.7 Introducing Physical Capital and Assuming Imperfect Mobility of La-
bor
In this subsection, we derive the long-run adjustment of the relative price following a produc-
tivity differential by emphasizing the role of endogenous markups when introducing physical
capital while labor is assumed to be imperfectly mobile across sectors. We suppose that
investment is non traded.
Assuming that products markets are imperfectly competitive, capital is perfectly mobile
while labor imperfectly mobile across sectors, first-order conditions from the firm’s profit
maximization evaluated at the steady-state are:
1
µT
ZT
(
1− θT ) (kT )−θT = P
µN
ZN
(
1− θN) (kN)−θN ≡ R, (509a)
1
µT
ZT θT
(
kT
)1−θT ≡W T , (509b)
P
µN
ZNθN
(
kN
)1−θN ≡WN , (509c)
(509d)
where R is the capital rental cost and W j the labor cost in sector j.
Setting P˙ = 0 into (95d), the capital rental cost can be written as follows:
R = P (r? + δ) . (510)
Dividing the marginal product of labor by the marginal product of capital in each sector
yields the sectoral capital-labor ratios:
kT =
1− θT
θT
W
R
, kN =
1− θN
θN
W
R
. (511)
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Substituting sectoral capital-labor ratios (511) into (509b)-(509c) yields an expression of
the steady-state relative price of non tradables :
P =
ΨT
ΨN
ZT
ZN
(
WN
)θN (R)1−θN
(W T )θ
T
(R)1−θ
T
=
ΨT
ΨN
ZT
ZN
(
WN
)θN
(W T )θ
T R
(θT−θN), (512)
where
Ψj =
(
θj
)θj (1− θj)1−θj , j = T,N. (513)
Substituting the sectoral capital-labor ratio kT given by (511) into (509b), the wage rate
in the traded sector can be rewritten as follows:
W T =
(
ZT
) 1
θT
(
µT
)− 1
θT
(
ΨT
) 1
θT R
−
(
1−θT
θT
)
. (514)
Multiplying and dividing the RHS of (512) by
(
W T
)θN and substituting (514) yields:
P =
ΨT
ΨN
ZT
ZN
(
WN
W T
)θN (
W T
)(θN−θT )
Rθ
T−θN ,
=
(
ΨT
) θN
θT
ΨN
(ZT )
θN
θT
ZN
(
µT
)( θT−θN
θT
)(
WN
W T
)θN
R
θT−θN
θT . (515)
Inserting (510) into (515) and collecting terms yields:
P =
ΨT
(ΨN )θ
T /θN
ZT
(ZN )θ
T /θN
(
µT
)−( θN−θT
θN
)(
WN
W T
)θT
(r? + δK)
θT−θN
θN . (516)
Taking logarithm, and denoting by ω = ln
(
WN/W T
)
the (logged) relative wage yields:
p = c+
(
zT − θ
T
θN
zN
)
+ θTω −
(
θN − θT
θN
)
µT , (517)
where c = lnΨT − θT
θN
lnΨN +
(
θT−θN
θN
)
ln (r? + δK) is a constant. According to eq. (517),
imperfect mobility of labor moderates the appreciation in the relative price p following a
productivity differential between tradables and non tradables by reducing the relative wage
ω. Conversely, higher productivity triggers firm entry and thus raises labor demand which in
turn pushes up the wage rate, as captured by the fall in the markup µˆT < 0. If the labor
income share is higher in the non traded sector than in the traded sector, i.e., θN > θT , in
line with empirical evidence for most of the countries of our sample, the fall in the markup
exerts a positive impact on the relative price of non tradables by raising wages.
O Quantitative Analysis: Additional Numerical Results
In this section, we provide additional numerical results: i) for the relative price and relative
wage responses to a productivity differential between tradables and non tradables when con-
sidering a model abstracting for physical capital, ii) for aggregate and sectoral variables when
considering a model with physical capital accumulation, iii) for the relative price and rela-
tive wage responses to a productivity differential between tradables and non tradables when
abstracting from government spending. In the latter case, we keep the calibration detailed
in section 5.1 unchanged but set GT = GN = 0. Finally, iv) we contrast predicted with
observed responses for the relative price and the relative wage for each country, setting φi and
²i to their estimated values and calibrating the model in order to target the (aggregate and
non-tradable) ratios for each country i.
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O.1 Relative Price and Relative Wage Responses in a Model without Phys-
ical Capital
Table 27 shows the long-run relative price and relative wage responses to a productivity
differential between tradables and non tradables when considering a model abstracting for
physical capital. Relative wage and relative price responses are given by (83) and (81),
respectively.
O.2 Responses of Aggregate and Sectoral Variables: Numerical Estimates
Table 28 gives numerical results for the long-run changes of several aggregate and sectoral
variables following a productivity differential between tradables and non tradables of 1%. We
consider three alternative scenarios (panel B, panel C, panel D): the elasticity of substitution
φ between traded and non traded goods is set alternatively to one, 0.5 and 1.5. Note that
we report in panel A the long-run responses of aggregate variables only when φ = 1 to save
space.
O.3 Relative Price and Relative Wage Response when Abstracting from
Government Spending in the Calibration
Table 29 gives numerical results for the long-run changes of several aggregate and sectoral
variables following a productivity differential between tradables and non tradables of 1%. We
consider three alternative scenarios (panel B, panel C, panel D): the elasticity of substitution
φ between traded and non traded goods is set alternatively to one, 0.5 and 1.5. The calibration
is identical to that detailed in section 5.1, except that we set GT = GN = 0.
We contrast the relative price and relative wage effects shown in Table 4 with those
reported in Table 29. Numerical results reported in panel A of Table 29 show that, across all
scenarios, the capital accumulation effect is more than three times smaller when abstracting
from government spending. When φ = 1, the relative price of non tradables increases by
0.91% instead of 0.72% and the relative wage falls by 0.13% instead of 0.45%. When φ < 1,
the combined effect of the capital accumulation effect and capital reallocation effect is not
large enough to more than offset the productivity effect so that the relative price appreciates
more than proportionately than the productivity differential while the relative wage increases
instead of decreasing, in contradiction with our evidence.
The explanation of these results is straightforward. The percentage deviation of the rela-
tive wage from its initial steady-state following a productivity differential between tradables
and non tradables is:
ωˆ = − (φ− 1) [ΘL + (ΘK −ΘL)] [zˆT − (θT /θN) zˆN]−ΘK (dυNX − dυI) , (518)
and the deviation in percentage of the relative price from its initial steady state is:
pˆ = (1 + ²)
[
ΘL +
(
ΘK −ΘL)] [zˆT − (θT /θN) zˆN]− θTΘK (dυNX − dυI) , (519)
where υNX ≡
(
Y T − CT ) /Y T the ratio of net exports to traded output and υI ≡ δKK/Y N
is the ratio of investment to non traded output.
Inspection of eqs. (518) and (519) reveals that the abstracting from government spending
does not impinge on ΘL and ΘK which depend on parameters. Conversely, setting GT =
GN = 0 affect the term dυNX − dυI and thus the capital accumulation channel, remembering
that GN and GT are set so as to yield a non-tradable share of government spending of 90%,
and government spending as a share of GDP of 20%. When abstracting from government
spending, the non tradable content of GDP falls from 63% to roughly 50% as non traded
government spending raises non traded output by raising demand for non tradables. Hence,
setting GT = GN = 0 raises substantially Y T and lowers Y N . Hence, dυI > 0 becomes larger
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while dυNX < 0 becomes smaller in absolute terms so that the term dυNX − dυI becomes
much smaller (less negative).
It is important to state that calibrating the model without government spending yields
ratios at odds with the data: consumption as a share of GDP is 78% instead of 58%, the non
tradable content of GDP is 50% instead of 2/3, the non-tradable content of labor compensation
is 58% instead of 65%. In brief, by abstracting from government spending and especially
setting GN = 0, the non tradable content of various aggregates are reduced by such an
amount that the initial steady state is not consistent with the key empirical properties of a
representative OECD economy.
O.4 Calibration of the Model by Country: Predicted Responses for the
Relative Price and Relative Wage
In section 5.3, we compare the predicted values for pˆ and ωˆ with estimates for each country
and the whole sample. To do so, we keep unchanged the baseline calibration, except for the
parameter capturing the degree of labor mobility across sectors (i.e., ²) and the elasticity of
substitution between traded and non traded goods (i.e., φ) which play a major role in the
determination of responses of p and ω. In this subsection, we set φ and ² to their estimated
values for each country and calibrate the model in order to target all the ratios shown in Table
30.
Predicted values for the relative price response to a productivity differential of 1% are
shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table 31 while predicted values for the relative wage are shown
in columns 6 and 7 of Table 31. Columns 3 and 6 report fully modified OLS estimates of pˆ
and ωˆ for each country. While columns 1 and 6 of Table 31 give the predicted values pˆpredict
and ωˆpredict when cross-country heterogeneity is generated by φ and ² while other parameters
are kept fixed, columns 2 and 7 of Table 31 give the predicted values denoted by pˆpredict,′ and
ωˆpredict,′ by letting φ and ² to vary along with all observed ratios and parameters shown in
Table 30.
Column 4 of Table 31 gives the difference between the observed and the predicted value
for the relative price in absolute terms when letting only two parameters (i.e., φ and ²) to vary
while column 5 gives the difference between the observed and the predicted value in absolute
terms by letting all parameters to vary. The last line shows the average value of the error in
absolute terms. By and large, we find that the ability of the model to predict the relative
price response relies mainly upon the cross-country heterogeneity generated by ² and φ.
Column 9 of Table 31 gives the difference between the observed and the predicted value
for the relative wage in absolute terms when letting only two parameters (i.e., φ and ²) to vary
while column 10 gives the difference between the observed and the predicted value in absolute
terms by letting all parameters to vary. The last line shows the average value of the error. The
same conclusion applies for the relative wage; we find that the ability of the model to predict
the relative wage response relies mainly upon the cross-country heterogeneity generated by ²
and φ.
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Table 29: Long-Term Relative Price and Relative Wage Responses to a Productivity Differ-
ential between Tradables and Non Tradables by Setting GT = GN = 0 (in %)
BS Bench Labor supply Mobility kN > kT
(² =∞) (² = 0.8) (σL = 0.2) (σL = 1) (² = 0.2) (² = 1.8) (² =∞) (² = 0.8)
φ = 1
A.Relative Wage
Relative wage, ωˆ 0.00 -0.13 -0.11 -0.15 -0.17 -0.09 0.00 -0.06
Baseline effect 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Capital reallocation effect 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Capital accumulation effect 0.00 -0.13 -0.11 -0.15 -0.17 -0.09 0.00 -0.06
B.Relative Price
Relative price, pˆ 1.00 0.91 0.92 0.90 0.89 0.94 1.00 0.95
Baseline effect 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Capital reallocation effect 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Capital accumulation effect 0.00 -0.08 -0.07 -0.09 -0.10 -0.05 0.00 -0.04
φ < 1
C.Relative Wage
Relative wage, ωˆ 0.00 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.21 0.04 0.00 0.20
Baseline effect 0.00 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.71 0.22 0.00 0.38
Capital reallocation effect 0.00 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.16 -0.02 0.00 -0.04
Capital accumulation effect 0.00 -0.24 -0.22 -0.26 -0.34 -0.16 0.00 -0.14
D.Relative Price
Relative price, pˆ 1.00 1.05 1.06 1.04 1.12 1.02 1.00 1.13
Baseline effect 1.00 1.38 1.38 1.38 1.71 1.22 1.00 1.38
Capital reallocation effect 0.00 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.38 -0.10 0.00 -0.14
Capital accumulation effect 0.00 -0.14 -0.13 -0.15 -0.20 -0.09 0.00 -0.10
φ > 1
E.Relative Wage
Relative wage, ωˆ 0.00 -0.27 -0.26 -0.29 -0.38 -0.19 0.00 -0.24
Baseline effect 0.00 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.29 -0.15 0.00 -0.22
Capital reallocation effect 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.02
Capital accumulation effect 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 0.00 -0.01
F.Relative Price
Relative price, pˆ 1.00 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.76 0.88 1.00 0.82
Baseline effect 1.00 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.71 0.85 1.00 0.78
Capital reallocation effect 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.05
Capital accumulation effect 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.01
Notes: Effects of a labor share-adjusted TFPs diffential between tradables and non tradables of 1%. Panels A and
B show the deviation in percentage relative to steady-state for the relative price of non tradables p ≡ pN/pT and
the relative wage of non traded workers ω ≡ wN/wT , respectively, and break down changes in a productivity effect
(keeping unchanged sectoral capital-labor ratios kj , the overall capital stock K and the stock of foreign bonds B),
a capital reallocation effect (induced by changes in kj keeping unchanged K and B), a capital accumulation effect
(stemming from the investment boom causing a current account deficit in the short-run and therefore requiring a
steady-state improvement in the balance of trade). While panels A and B show the results when setting φ to one,
panels C and D show results for φ < 1 and panels E and F show results for φ > 1; φ is the elasticity of substitution
between tradables and non tradables; ² captures the degree of labor mobility across sectors.
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